API tokens and Actions task tokens could see data beyond their scope
through user-scoped API routes and web profile pages.
- Actions task tokens authenticate as a shared system user with a
negative ID, which org, project and SSH/GPG key filters treated as "no
owner filter". These filters now check `!= 0`, so system users own
nothing. The `/api/v1/user` routes except `GET /api/v1/user` only accept
individual and bot accounts, and repo search no longer skips access
checks for the owner.
- `/{username}` only accepts tokens for RSS/Atom feeds. HTML profile and
org pages render as anonymous for token requests.
- User and org feeds require `read:user` or `read:organization` from
tokens, the same way repo feeds require `read:repository`.
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Several handlers and parsers skipped checks that their siblings already
perform.
- Reject issue, comment, label, milestone and release mutations in
archived repositories via the API with one guard per route group,
matching the web UI
- Hide timeline references and dependencies pointing at issues the doer
cannot read, in the web UI and the API, including pull requests of the
same repository without pull request access
- Reject workflow runs with more than `MaxJobNumPerRun` jobs, including
inline reusable workflow jobs, and show rejected pushes as invalid
workflow runs
- Bound how much of a Helm chart archive is inflated while looking for
`Chart.yaml`
---------
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Webhook delivery history (request/response, status, timestamp) was only
reachable through the repo settings UI, which shows the last ~10
deliveries with no filtering. There was no way to fetch this data
programmatically for debugging integrations or auditing webhook
activity.
This adds two read endpoints at the repository level:
- `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks/{id}/deliveries` — paginated list of
a hook's deliveries, most recent first
- `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks/{id}/deliveries/{uuid}` — a single
delivery, including request/response headers, body, and status
Both reuse the existing `hook_task` storage and retention policy (the
`CleanupHookTaskTable` cron job) that already back the "Recent
Deliveries" web UI, and are gated by the same `reqAdmin()` +
`reqWebhooksEnabled()` guard as the existing hook endpoints.
Org, user, and admin/system-level webhooks are intentionally out of
scope for this PR to keep it reviewable; they can follow as separate
PRs using the same pattern.
## Usage
```bash
curl -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks/{id}/deliveries
curl -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks/{id}/deliveries/{uuid}
```
## Testing
- Unit tests for the new model-layer query functions
(`ListHookTasks`, `GetHookTaskByUUID`)
- Integration tests covering: list + get, an undelivered task's response
is `null`, a hook/delivery UUID from another repository 404s instead
of leaking across repos, and pagination (`page`/`limit`, `Link` and
`X-Total-Count` headers, correct ordering/no overlap across pages)
- `make lint-go`, `make generate-swagger`
Fixes: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/38463.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
This PR introduces project workflows, allowing users to configure
event-based automations directly from the UI.
Users can define filters and actions for each workflow event, and
duplicate existing events when needed.
### Concepts
Every workflow is composed of `event`, `filters`, and `actions`.
- **Event** - An Event defines when a workflow should be triggered. It
represents specific activities such as an issue being added to the
project, a pull request being merged, or a project column being changed.
- **Filter** - A Filter refines when an event should take effect. It
allows users to specify conditions like issue type, labels, or project
columns to ensure actions only run in targeted scenarios.
- **Action** - An Action defines what happens when the event and filters
match. It performs operations such as adding labels, moving issues
between columns, or changing the issue or pull request state.
### Available Events
Currently, the following eight events are supported:
- On issues/pull requests closed
- On issues/pull requests reopened
- On issues/pull requests was added to the project, including when
created in it
- On issues/pull requests was removed from the project
- On issues/pull requests' column was changed
- On code changes requested
- On code review approved
- On pull request merged
Each event type supports its own set of filters and actions.
### Available Filters
There are four types of filters that can be configured for an event:
- **Apply to** - Specify the target type: `issues only`, `pull requests
only`, or `issues and pull requests`.
- **Labels** - Trigger the event only if the issue or pull request
contains one or more specified labels.
- **Move from column** - Filter events based on the original project
column.
- **Move to column** - Filter events based on the destination project
column.
### Available Actions
There are four types of actions that can be executed when an event is
triggered:
- **Add labels** - Automatically add one or more labels to the issue or
pull request.
- **Remove labels** - Remove one or more specified labels.
- **Move to column** - Move the issue or pull request to a designated
project column.
- **Issue state** - Close or reopen the issue. Pull requests can only be
closed.
### Enable/Disable an event workflow
Each event workflow can be individually enabled or disabled. When
disabled, the workflow will be ignored even if the event occurs. This
feature is useful when you want to temporarily stop certain automated
actions without deleting the workflow configuration. Workflows of closed
projects don't run either.
### Clone an event workflow
When you need multiple workflows for the same event, you can clone an
existing event to create a new one with different filters and actions.
This allows you to customize how the same event behaves under different
conditions, making workflows more flexible and powerful.
### Permissions
Permissions are checked when workflows are managed, not when they run:
- Viewing a project's workflows needs read access to the project
- Managing them needs write access to the project plus write access to
both issues and pull requests of a repository project's repository,
being an owner of an organization project's organization or a site
administrator, or being the user of a user project. Tokens limited to
public repositories can't manage owner-level projects' workflows
- A workflow runs when its event happens to an item of an open project
that can hold the item's repository, unless that repository is archived,
no matter who caused the event, and applies its actions without further
permission checks. Pull requests are never reopened
- Changes show as made by "Project workflow" on behalf of the user who
triggered the event and don't trigger other workflows
- Only users who can read an item can put it on a board or move its card
The management rule is also documented on `CanManageWorkflows` in
`services/projects/workflow.go`.
Fixes: #14359Fixes: #26704Fixes: #27990
Replaces: #28745
Documentation PR: https://gitea.com/gitea/docs/pulls/308
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
The token a request authenticated with now lives on the doer, so
permission and visibility checks apply its scope from the doer alone.
Replaces https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39167, following
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39167#issuecomment-6063839619.
1. Public-only tokens get 404 instead of 403 for hidden users, orgs and
repos, like GitHub.
2. Org ownership, site admin, repo and org creation, generation and
transfer endpoints reject public-only tokens.
3. API pull request responses set `head.repo` to `null` and
`head.repo_id` to `-1` when the caller cannot see the head repository.
4. Public-only tokens see org memberships like anonymous callers, so
concealed members stay hidden.
5. Site admin access in activity feeds, follower lists, org members,
Actions run lists and packages needs a session or an `all`-scoped token.
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Several handlers and model helpers skipped checks that their siblings
already perform.
- Only match principal keys when looking up SSH certificate principals
- Return no attachments for an unsaved issue instead of every issue-less
one
- Reject issue and comment attachments when adding release attachments
- Share one permission check for editing, deleting and reacting to issue
content and for comment attachments between the web UI and the API,
refusing them on locked issues for users who can't write
- Reject issue edits, deletion and label changes in archived
repositories via the API
- Apply cross-origin protection to the repository topics endpoint
- Return 404 for the repositories tab of individual users and respect
profile visibility for the heatmap
Fixes: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/39226
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Allow bot accounts to use the API when a legacy password-change flag is
set, since bots cannot complete the interactive password-change flow.
Preserve password-change enforcement for human accounts and restrictions
for inactive or prohibited accounts.
Fixes: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/39542
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Follow-up to https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38966. Replaces the
unreleased `POST /admin/users/{username}/convert-type` endpoint with a
`type` field on `PATCH /admin/users/{username}`.
Adds first-class bot accounts (`UserTypeBot`): local, password-less
users for automation that authenticate only with access tokens.
1. Admin UI: create bots, filter users by type, manage a bot's access
tokens, convert between user and bot
2. API: `POST /admin/users/{username}/convert-type`, and user objects
gain a GitHub-compatible `type` (`User`, `Organization`, `Bot`)
3. CLI: `gitea admin user change-type`, `--user-type` accepts `User` or
`Bot` case-insensitively
4. Converting keeps the password, 2FA, OAuth2 grants and access tokens,
and since sign-in rejects bots, converting back restores the account.
Only local, non-admin accounts can be converted, and conversions are
audited
5. Session, reverse proxy, SSPI, external source and password reset
sign-in reject non-individual users, so a bot never gets an interactive
session
6. Bots receive no notifications or emails
Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: joestump <joe@joestump.net>
Co-authored-by: Joe Stump <joe@stu.mp>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Deploy keys only work over SSH. A deploy token is their counterpart for HTTPS: a repository scoped credential, used as the password of a Git request, with read or read and write access. It covers Git operations and LFS, and can be regenerated in place.
Signed-off-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude Mythos <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Only made some necessary changes:
1. remove `GOEXPERIMENT`, only use jsonv2
1. `make fmt`
* `SigningKey` and `Signature` were affected due to some bugs in the
toolchain, so rewrote them
1. remove or fix fragile magic numbers and strings
* the outputs of image/gzip/zlib packages are different
1. update "nolint" comments for the changed lint behaviors
1. add `tls.MLKEM1024`
Use the canonical profile-visibility check for user API content and
prevent restricted users from enumerating public repositories owned by
limited users.
This keeps feeds, heatmaps, keys, and issue search consistent with
profile visibility.
---------
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Add `GET /admin/packages` so site administrators can review packages
across every owner without querying each owner separately.
It returns the same package version representation as `GET
/packages/{owner}` and supports `page`, `limit`, `type`, and `q`
filters.
---
Assisted by Codet(DeepSeek)
---------
Signed-off-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Reject public-only tokens for repository migrations and require
repository scope for canonical organization repository creation. This
aligns both routes with the existing token authorization boundaries.
_Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5_
Better than before, still not good enough (more work can be done in the
future)
And add the missing error handling in the PrivateContext "bind"
middleware.
By the way, picked some "TrimSpace" changes from "fix: trim whitespace
from SMTP address and port - #38934" (fix#38926)
Admin and write team authorize now grant that mode on every unit,
including units added later, instead of only rows present in
`team_unit`. Granular teams keep `authorize=none` and explicit unit
rows.
Closes the `TEAM-UNIT-PERMISSION` design gap from
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/34128.
Maybe also fix#15962 (actually maybe it had been fixed before, the root
cause is out-of-sync "access" table)
## Screenshots
only writing selected:
<img width="1399" height="1007" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1d1b4c49-a59a-47b6-998f-0464a067395b"
/>
_Created with the help of AI_
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Enable [`forcetypeassert`](https://github.com/gostaticanalysis/forcetypeassert)
linter to prevent unchecked type assertions. ~650 issues fixed, most
fixes were clean, some use `setting.PanicInDevOrTesting`.
The only behaviour changes are where code would previously send a 500 error
or panic, a 4xx error is now emitted.
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Gitea currently exposes the endpoint:
`GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/git/commits/{sha}`
to retrieve a single commit. However, GitHub provides the equivalent
endpoint as:
`GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits/{ref}`
Applications integrating with both GitHub and Gitea must implement
platform-specific logic to use different endpoints, reducing API
compatibility.
Fixes#38225
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
Implements the missing REST API endpoints for Actions workflow run
management:
1. `POST /actions/runs/{run}/cancel` cancels a run and its jobs, `409`
when it already finished
1. `POST /actions/runs/{run}/approve` approves a run awaiting approval,
idempotent, `409` when it never awaited one
1. `GET /actions/runs/{run}/logs` downloads the latest attempt's job
logs as a zip archive
`ActionWorkflowRun` gains `created_at`, `updated_at` and the `jobs_url`,
`logs_url`, `artifacts_url`, `cancel_url` and `rerun_url` fields, and
now always emits `conclusion` and `head_branch`.
Cancellation is shared with the web handler in `services/actions`.
Fixes https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/35176
Fixes https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/36554
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <claude-sonnet-4-6@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: OpenCode Agent <opencode@rossgolder.com>
Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:
- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.
### 📌 Attention for site admins
Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:
- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.
---------
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
Fixes#38226
## Summary
Add `chi_middleware.GetHead` as the first `BeforeRouting` middleware on
the API router. This makes every API `GET` endpoint automatically handle
`HEAD` requests, as required by RFC 9110 §9.3.2.
Previously, `HEAD` requests to endpoints like `GET
/repos/{owner}/{repo}/git/commits/{sha}` returned `405 Method Not
Allowed`.
The web router already used this same middleware (see
`routers/web/web.go:261`), so this aligns API behaviour with the web
router.
## Changes
- `routers/api/v1/api.go`: add `chi_middleware.GetHead` middleware to
the API router
- `tests/integration/api_repo_git_commits_test.go`: add
`TestAPIReposGitCommitsHEAD` verifying HEAD returns 200 on a valid ref
and 404 (not 405) on a missing ref
- Enforce org visibility on organization label read endpoints (private
org labels no longer leak to non-members).
- Block fork sync (`merge-upstream`) when the base repo is no longer
readable (stops pulling commits after a parent goes private).
- Remove `REVERSE_PROXY_LIMIT` / `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` from
the Docker `app.ini` templates (the `= *` default allowed
`X-WEBAUTH-USER` impersonation; reverse-proxy auth is now opt-in and
admin-configured).
- Enforce single-use TOTP passcodes across web login, password-reset,
and Basic-Auth `X-Gitea-OTP` (fixes a TOCTOU race and a stateless
replay).
- Re-check branch write permission for every ref in a push (the
pre-receive hook cached the first ref's result, letting a per-branch
maintainer-edit grant escalate to full repo write).
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Closes#37670.
Today, org members in Gitea only see teams they're a member of. In
larger orgs that hurts onboarding and discoverability — there's no way
to look up which team owns what without asking around. GitHub solves
this with a per-team visibility setting; this PR brings the same model
to Gitea.
## What changes
- Every team gets a `visibility` setting:
- `private` *(default)* — only team members and org owners can see the
team. Same as today's behavior.
- `limited` — listable by any member of the organization. Members and
the repos the team has access to are visible too. Non-org-members still
see nothing.
- `public` — listable by any signed-in user.
- The Owners team visibility is fixed and cannot be changed via
settings.
- Existing teams default to `private`, so this is a no-op for anyone who
doesn't change anything.
## API
- `Team`, `CreateTeamOption`, `EditTeamOption` all gain a `visibility`
field (string enum: `private` | `limited` | `public`).
- `GET /orgs/{org}/teams` and `/orgs/{org}/teams/search` now apply the
same visibility rules as the web UI:
- site admins and org owners still see every team
- other org members see their own teams plus any `limited` or `public`
team
- `private` teams are no longer leaked through these endpoints
- Swagger/OpenAPI specs regenerated.
## UI
View from admin2 (not an owner):
<img width="1669" height="726"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/daf4bccb-644b-4426-b178-71963aeaf73b"
/>
View from admin (owner):
<img width="2559" height="863"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4f22cebc-e9df-4fd2-8ed4-724d31fadb7a"
/>
---------
Signed-off-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
This PR closes remaining `public-only` token gaps in the API by making
the restriction apply consistently across repository, organization,
activity, notification, and authenticated `/api/v1/user/...` routes.
Previously, `public-only` tokens were still able to:
- receive private results from some list/search/self endpoints,
- access repository data through ID-based lookups,
- and reach several authenticated self routes that should remain
unavailable for public-only access.
This change treats `public-only` as a cross-cutting visibility boundary:
- list/search endpoints now filter private resources consistently,
- repository lookups enforce the same restriction even when addressed
indirectly,
- and self routes that inherently expose or mutate private account state
now reject `public-only` tokens.
---
Generated by a coding agent with Codex 5.2
---------
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude (Opus 4.7) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Avoid per-item DB queries in ListRuns, ListJobs, and ListActionTasks by
batch-loading trigger users, repositories, and task attributes before
the conversion loop. Remove ReferencesGitRepo from the /actions route
group since no task/run endpoints use it.
Added tests for these endpoints as well.
---------
Signed-off-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude (Opus 4.7) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The `Repository` struct in `services/context/repo.go` embedded
`access_model.Permission` anonymously, causing all permission methods to
be promoted directly onto `Repository`. This made it unclear at call
sites whether a method belonged to `Repository` itself or to its
embedded `Permission`.
### Changes
- **`services/context/repo.go`**: Replace anonymous
`access_model.Permission` with named field `Permission
access_model.Permission`
- **49 files** updated to route permission method calls through the
named field:
```go
// Before
ctx.Repo.IsAdmin()
ctx.Repo.CanWrite(unit.TypeCode)
ctx.Repo.CanReadIssuesOrPulls(isPull)
slices.ContainsFunc(unitTypes, ctx.Repo.CanWrite)
// After
ctx.Repo.Permission.IsAdmin()
ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite(unit.TypeCode)
ctx.Repo.Permission.CanReadIssuesOrPulls(isPull)
slices.ContainsFunc(unitTypes, ctx.Repo.Permission.CanWrite)
```
Methods defined directly on `*Repository` (`CanWriteToBranch`,
`CanCreateBranch`, etc.) are unchanged.
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <2114189+wxiaoguang@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Nicolas <bircni@icloud.com>
This PR introduces a new `ActionRunAttempt` model and makes Actions
execution attempt-scoped.
**Main Changes**
- Each workflow run trigger generates a new `ActionRunAttempt`. The
triggered jobs are then associated with this new `ActionRunAttempt`
record.
- Each rerun now creates:
- a new `ActionRunAttempt` record for the workflow run
- a full new set of `ActionRunJob` records for the new
`ActionRunAttempt`
- For jobs that need to be rerun, the new job records are created as
runnable jobs in the new attempt.
- For jobs that do not need to be rerun, new job records are still
created in the new attempt, but they reuse the result of the previous
attempt instead of executing again.
- Introduce `rerunPlan` to manage each rerun and refactored rerun flow
into a two-phase plan-based model:
- `buildRerunPlan`
- `execRerunPlan`
- `RerunFailedWorkflowRun` and `RerunFailed` no longer directly derives
all jobs that need to be rerun; this step is now handled by
`buildRerunPlan`.
- Converted artifacts from run-scoped to attempt-scoped:
- uploads are now associated with `RunAttemptID`
- listing, download, and deletion resolve against the current attempt
- Added attempt-aware web Actions views:
- the default run page shows the latest attempt
(`/actions/runs/{run_id}`)
- previous attempt pages show jobs and artifacts for that attempt
(`/actions/runs/{run_id}/attempts/{attempt_num}`)
- New APIs:
- `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs/{run}/attempts/{attempt}`
- `/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs/{run}/attempts/{attempt}/jobs`
- New configuration `MAX_RERUN_ATTEMPTS`
- https://gitea.com/gitea/docs/pulls/383
**Compatibility**
- Existing legacy runs use `LatestAttemptID = 0` and legacy jobs use
`RunAttemptID = 0`. Therefore, these fields can be used to identify
legacy runs and jobs and provide backward compatibility.
- If a legacy run is rerun, an `ActionRunAttempt` with `attempt=1` will
be created to represent the original execution. Then a new
`ActionRunAttempt` with `attempt=2` will be created for the real rerun.
- Existing artifact records are not backfilled; legacy artifacts
continue to use `RunAttemptID = 0`.
**Improvements**
- It is now easier to inspect and download logs from previous attempts.
-
[`run_attempt`](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/contexts#github-context)
semantics are now aligned with GitHub.
- > A unique number for each attempt of a particular workflow run in a
repository. This number begins at 1 for the workflow run's first
attempt, and increments with each re-run.
- Rerun behavior is now clearer and more explicit.
- Instead of mutating the status of previous jobs in place, each rerun
creates a new attempt with a full new set of job records.
- Artifacts produced by different reruns can now be listed separately.
Signed-off-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
Unties settings page from package version and adds button to delete the
package version
Settings page now allows for deletion of entire package and it's
versions as opposed to a single version
Adds an API endpoint to delete the entire package with all versions from
registry
fixes: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/36904
Co-Authored-By: gemini-3-flash
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
Lunny Xiao
Rathina Devan E Mandsilverwind
Nitish-1303andwxiaoguang
Zettat123
Copilotandwxiaoguang
