Lets users approve an OAuth2 scope change on an existing grant instead
of failing with `a grant exists with different scope`.
- Approving a different scope updates the existing grant. Issued tokens
follow immediately, since their scope is read from the grant.
- Confidential and trusted apps show the consent page when the scope set
changes, instead of silently reusing the old grant.
- An omitted `scope` reuses the existing grant's scope, like GitHub.
- The consent page lists newly added scopes.
Fixes: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/issues/38940
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Introduces gitproxy module which spawns a small forward proxy as scanner
for git calls
Replaces hostmatcher with matchlist which supports port rules
Deprecates ALLOWED_DOMAINS/BLOCKED_DOMAINS and ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS
settings in migration in favor of full names we have in security
configs.
Removes `external` preset in favor of lax/strict modes, strict mode
requiring explicit ports if they aren't standard http/s ones.
Breaking changes:
- `external` preset no longer works as deny rule. To enforce that, use
`strict` mode and allow ranges to connect to
- Wildcards are no longer accepted in IP addresses
- `*` is no longer allowed as entry in lists
- domain rules now use curl like syntax `*.example.com` matching
subdomains but not `example.com`, `example.com` matching itself and all
subdomains. `example.*` is not a valid rule
- In the default `lax` mode, `[security] ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` no longer
restricts public hosts, set `EGRESS_MODE = strict` to keep an exclusive
list. A startup warning flags this
- Invalid list entries are logged at startup, invalid
`BLOCKED_HOST_LIST`/`BLOCKED_DOMAINS` entries stop it
Docs: https://gitea.com/gitea/docs/pulls/557
Signed-off-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:
- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.
### 📌 Attention for site admins
Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:
- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.
---------
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
Bumping `github.com/golang-jwt/jwt` from v4 to v5.
`github.com/golang-jwt/jwt` v5 is bringing some breaking changes:
- standard `Valid()` method on claims is removed. It's replaced by
`ClaimsValidator` interface implementing `Validator()` method instead,
which is called after standard validation. Gitea doesn't seem to be
using this logic.
- `jwt.Token` has a field `Valid`, so it's checked in `ParseToken`
function in `services/auth/source/oauth2/token.go`
---------
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
To avoid duplicated load of the same data in an HTTP request, we can set
a context cache to do that. i.e. Some pages may load a user from a
database with the same id in different areas on the same page. But the
code is hidden in two different deep logic. How should we share the
user? As a result of this PR, now if both entry functions accept
`context.Context` as the first parameter and we just need to refactor
`GetUserByID` to reuse the user from the context cache. Then it will not
be loaded twice on an HTTP request.
But of course, sometimes we would like to reload an object from the
database, that's why `RemoveContextData` is also exposed.
The core context cache is here. It defines a new context
```go
type cacheContext struct {
ctx context.Context
data map[any]map[any]any
lock sync.RWMutex
}
var cacheContextKey = struct{}{}
func WithCacheContext(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, cacheContextKey, &cacheContext{
ctx: ctx,
data: make(map[any]map[any]any),
})
}
```
Then you can use the below 4 methods to read/write/del the data within
the same context.
```go
func GetContextData(ctx context.Context, tp, key any) any
func SetContextData(ctx context.Context, tp, key, value any)
func RemoveContextData(ctx context.Context, tp, key any)
func GetWithContextCache[T any](ctx context.Context, cacheGroupKey string, cacheTargetID any, f func() (T, error)) (T, error)
```
Then let's take a look at how `system.GetString` implement it.
```go
func GetSetting(ctx context.Context, key string) (string, error) {
return cache.GetWithContextCache(ctx, contextCacheKey, key, func() (string, error) {
return cache.GetString(genSettingCacheKey(key), func() (string, error) {
res, err := GetSettingNoCache(ctx, key)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return res.SettingValue, nil
})
})
}
```
First, it will check if context data include the setting object with the
key. If not, it will query from the global cache which may be memory or
a Redis cache. If not, it will get the object from the database. In the
end, if the object gets from the global cache or database, it will be
set into the context cache.
An object stored in the context cache will only be destroyed after the
context disappeared.
Change all license headers to comply with REUSE specification.
Fix#16132
Co-authored-by: flynnnnnnnnnn <flynnnnnnnnnn@github>
Co-authored-by: John Olheiser <john.olheiser@gmail.com>
Harsh Sharma
TheFox0x7
bircni
Lunny Xiao
wxiaoguang
Baltazár Radics
harryzcy
silverwind
flynnnnnnnnnn
oGi4i