Gitea doesn't evaluate a job's `if:` before checking the job's
concurrency group, which causes a job that should have been skipped to
incorrectly cancel other jobs in the same concurrency group.
This PR makes Gitea decide `if:` for every job before it becomes
waiting, including jobs without `needs` at insertion, on approval and on
rerun. A skipped job therefore no longer takes part in job concurrency
or holds a max-parallel slot, and a reusable caller whose `if:` is false
is no longer expanded on approval or rerun. An invalid `if:` skips the
job with an error summary.
After this PR, Gitea decides all jobs' `if:` expressions and sends `if:
always()` to the runner, so the runner no longer needs to evaluate a
job's `if:` again ([gitea/runner
`run_context.go`](https://gitea.com/gitea/runner/src/commit/81add274599355ec1838b6ebe45804890d40bab9/act/runner/run_context.go#L1195)).
---------
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:
- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.
### 📌 Attention for site admins
Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:
- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.
---------
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
3 reductions in the DB load generated by many runners polling
`FetchTask`:
**1. Debounce runner heartbeat writes**
Every poll wrote `last_online`, and every `UpdateTask`/`UpdateLog` wrote
`last_active` — while a runner streams logs that is many writes per
second per runner. These are now persisted only when stale enough to
actually affect the active/offline status (`ShouldPersistLastOnline` /
`ShouldPersistLastActive`), using the existing columns.
**2. Throttle concurrent task picks**
A new in-process semaphore (`MAX_CONCURRENT_TASK_PICKS`) bounds how many
runners run the task-assignment transaction at once, so a fleet polling
together cannot stampede the query. Throttled polls retry on their next
poll without advancing the runner's tasks version.
**3. Paginate the task-pick query**
`CreateTaskForRunner` previously loaded every waiting job in the
runner's scope into memory on each poll (no `LIMIT`). Now it pages
through the waiting backlog oldest-first with `LIMIT`, claiming the
first label-matching job.
---------
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
Zettat123
bircni