Backport https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39945
API tokens and Actions task tokens could see data beyond their scope
through user-scoped API routes and web profile pages.
- Actions task tokens authenticate as a shared system user with a
negative ID, which org, project and SSH/GPG key filters treated as "no
owner filter". These filters now check `!= 0`, so system users own
nothing. The `/api/v1/user` routes except `GET /api/v1/user` only accept
individual and bot accounts, and repo search no longer skips access
checks for the owner.
- `/{username}` only accepts tokens for RSS/Atom feeds. HTML profile and
org pages render as anonymous for token requests.
- User and org feeds require `read:user` or `read:organization` from
tokens, the same way repo feeds require `read:repository`.
`release/v28` lacks https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39967, so
`/{username}` enables basic auth only for feed requests through a
middleware. The profile page token tests from
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39853 are folded into
`TestFeedUser`, because profile pages no longer accept tokens.
Co-authored-by: bircni <bircni@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Giteabot <teabot@gitea.io>
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:
- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.
### 📌 Attention for site admins
Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:
- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.
---------
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
