mirror of
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git
synced 2026-07-15 20:40:52 +09:00
f69e15afe7
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by area: - **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path. - **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation; keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings, star/watch lists, limited/private owners). - **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions, label/attachment scoping. - **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys. ### 📌 Attention for site admins Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth a look: - **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars, OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches internal hosts, you may need to add them to `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` settings). - **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` instead; the old key still works for now. --------- Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io> Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
122 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
122 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2021 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package auth
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import (
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"sync/atomic"
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"testing"
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"gitea.dev/models/auth"
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"gitea.dev/models/unittest"
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user_model "gitea.dev/models/user"
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"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
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"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
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"gitea.dev/modules/test"
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"gitea.dev/services/oauth2_provider"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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func createAndParseToken(t *testing.T, grant *auth.OAuth2Grant) *oauth2_provider.OIDCToken {
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signingKey, err := oauth2_provider.CreateJWTSigningKey("HS256", make([]byte, 32))
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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assert.NotNil(t, signingKey)
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response, terr := oauth2_provider.NewAccessTokenResponse(t.Context(), grant, signingKey, signingKey)
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assert.Nil(t, terr)
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assert.NotNil(t, response)
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parsedToken, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(response.IDToken, &oauth2_provider.OIDCToken{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
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assert.NotNil(t, token.Method)
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assert.Equal(t, signingKey.SigningMethod().Alg(), token.Method.Alg())
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return signingKey.VerifyKey(), nil
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})
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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assert.True(t, parsedToken.Valid)
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oidcToken, ok := parsedToken.Claims.(*oauth2_provider.OIDCToken)
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assert.True(t, ok)
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assert.NotNil(t, oidcToken)
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return oidcToken
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}
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func TestNewAccessTokenResponse_OIDCToken(t *testing.T) {
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assert.NoError(t, unittest.PrepareTestDatabase())
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grants, err := auth.GetOAuth2GrantsByUserID(t.Context(), 3)
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Len(t, grants, 1)
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// Scopes: openid
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oidcToken := createAndParseToken(t, grants[0])
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assert.Empty(t, oidcToken.Name)
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assert.Empty(t, oidcToken.PreferredUsername)
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assert.Empty(t, oidcToken.Profile)
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assert.Empty(t, oidcToken.Picture)
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assert.Empty(t, oidcToken.Website)
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assert.Empty(t, oidcToken.UpdatedAt)
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assert.Empty(t, oidcToken.Email)
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assert.False(t, oidcToken.EmailVerified)
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user := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{ID: 5})
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grants, err = auth.GetOAuth2GrantsByUserID(t.Context(), user.ID)
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assert.NoError(t, err)
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assert.Len(t, grants, 1)
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// Scopes: openid profile email
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oidcToken = createAndParseToken(t, grants[0])
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assert.Equal(t, user.DisplayName(), oidcToken.Name)
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assert.Equal(t, user.Name, oidcToken.PreferredUsername)
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assert.Equal(t, user.HTMLURL(t.Context()), oidcToken.Profile)
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assert.Equal(t, user.AvatarLink(t.Context()), oidcToken.Picture)
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assert.Equal(t, user.Website, oidcToken.Website)
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assert.Equal(t, user.UpdatedUnix, oidcToken.UpdatedAt)
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assert.Equal(t, user.Email, oidcToken.Email)
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assert.Equal(t, user.IsActive, oidcToken.EmailVerified)
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}
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func TestOAuth2AvatarClientBlocksLoopback(t *testing.T) {
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var hit atomic.Bool
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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hit.Store(true)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("img"))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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// the httptest server binds a loopback address, which the SSRF-protected dialer must refuse
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resp, err := oauth2AvatarHTTPClient().Get(srv.URL)
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if resp != nil {
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_ = resp.Body.Close()
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}
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.False(t, hit.Load(), "avatar client must refuse to dial a loopback address")
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}
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func TestOAuth2AvatarAllowListRestricts(t *testing.T) {
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defer test.MockVariableValue(&setting.Security.AllowedHostList, "avatars.example.com")()
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allowList := oauth2AvatarAllowList()
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assert.True(t, allowList.MatchHostName("avatars.example.com"), "the configured host must be allowed")
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assert.False(t, allowList.MatchHostName("8.8.8.8"), "an unrelated external host must be rejected")
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// the default `external` allow-list still permits external hosts
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setting.Security.AllowedHostList = hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinExternal
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assert.True(t, oauth2AvatarAllowList().MatchHostName("8.8.8.8"), "default allow-list permits external hosts")
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}
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func TestOAuth2AvatarClientBlocksCloudMetadata(t *testing.T) {
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// external-only allow-list must reject link-local cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) at dial time
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resp, err := oauth2AvatarHTTPClient().Get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
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if resp != nil {
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_ = resp.Body.Close()
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}
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require.Error(t, err)
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assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "can only call allowed HTTP servers",
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"avatar client must refuse a link-local cloud-metadata address")
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}
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