oidc: serve the registration confirmation page from a reloadable URL

The interstitial was the body of /oidc/callback, the URL carrying the
single-use code, so any reload re-entered the spent exchange. Redirect to
GET /register/confirm/{auth_id}, also missing from the route table.

0.29 lacks the authPathURL helper from main, so it is added here.

(cherry picked from commit 6d377b5348)

hscontrol/app.go

@@ -563,6 +563,7 @@ func (h *Headscale) createRouter(grpcMux *grpcRuntime.ServeMux) *chi.Mux {
 
 	if provider, ok := h.authProvider.(*AuthProviderOIDC); ok {
 		r.Get("/oidc/callback", provider.OIDCCallbackHandler)
+		r.Get("/register/confirm/{auth_id}", provider.RegisterConfirmGetHandler)
 		r.Post("/register/confirm/{auth_id}", provider.RegisterConfirmHandler)
 	}
 

hscontrol/handlers.go

@@ -73,7 +73,10 @@ func userMessageForStatusCode(code int) string {
 	case code == http.StatusUnauthorized || code == http.StatusForbidden:
 		return "You are not authorized. Please contact your administrator."
 	case code == http.StatusGone:
-		return "Your session has expired. Please try again."
+		// Overwhelmingly a reload or a back button on a link the user
+		// already used, not a failure, so lead with that.
+		return "This link has already been used or has expired. " +
+			"If your device is connected you are done; otherwise start the login again."
 	case code >= 400 && code < 500:
 		return "The request could not be processed. Please try again."
 	default:
@@ -296,6 +299,17 @@ func NewAuthProviderWeb(serverURL string) *AuthProviderWeb {
 	}
 }
 
+// authPathURL builds an auth-flow URL of the form
+// "<serverURL>/<kind>/<id>", trimming a trailing slash from serverURL.
+func authPathURL(serverURL, kind string, authID types.AuthID) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(
+		"%s/%s/%s",
+		strings.TrimSuffix(serverURL, "/"),
+		kind,
+		authID.String(),
+	)
+}
+
 func (a *AuthProviderWeb) RegisterURL(authID types.AuthID) string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf(
 		"%s/register/%s",

hscontrol/handlers_test.go

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ func TestHttpUserError(t *testing.T) {
 			name:           "gone_renders_session_expired",
 			err:            NewHTTPError(http.StatusGone, "login session expired, try again", nil),
 			wantCode:       http.StatusGone,
-			wantContains:   "Your session has expired. Please try again.",
+			wantContains:   "This link has already been used or has expired.",
 			wantNotContain: "login session expired",
 		},
 		{

hscontrol/oidc.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
@@ -350,7 +351,7 @@ func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) OIDCCallbackHandler(
 	// /register/{auth_id} could silently complete a registration when
 	// the IdP allows silent SSO.
 	if authInfo.Registration {
-		a.renderRegistrationConfirmInterstitial(writer, req, authInfo.AuthID, user, nodeExpiry)
+		a.beginRegistrationConfirmation(writer, req, authInfo.AuthID, user, nodeExpiry)
 
 		return
 	}
@@ -668,34 +669,70 @@ func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) createOrUpdateUserFromClaim(
 // browser do not collide.
 const registerConfirmCSRFCookie = "headscale_register_confirm"
 
+// registrationLinkSpentMsg is logged when a user returns to a
+// registration link whose session is gone, which is usually a reload or a
+// back button after they already confirmed. The page the user sees comes
+// from [userMessageForStatusCode].
+const registrationLinkSpentMsg = "registration link already used or expired"
+
+var errRegistrationLinkSpent = NewHTTPError(http.StatusGone, registrationLinkSpentMsg, nil)
+
+// registerConfirmURL is the browser-facing URL of the confirmation page.
+// It is built from server_url, like [AuthProviderOIDC.RegisterURL] and the
+// OIDC redirect URI, so a Headscale that a reverse proxy serves under a
+// path prefix hands the browser a URL that resolves.
+func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) registerConfirmURL(authID types.AuthID) string {
+	return authPathURL(a.serverURL, "register/confirm", authID)
+}
+
 // setRegisterConfirmCookie writes the per-session register-confirm CSRF
 // cookie. Pass the CSRF token and authCacheExpiration seconds to set it;
 // pass ("", -1) to clear it after the registration is finalised.
-func setRegisterConfirmCookie(
+func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) setRegisterConfirmCookie(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	req *http.Request,
 	authID types.AuthID,
 	value string,
 	maxAge int,
-	secure bool,
 ) {
+	// Scope the cookie to the browser-facing path, which carries the
+	// reverse proxy's prefix; the routed path does not.
+	path := "/register/confirm/" + authID.String()
+	if u, err := url.Parse(a.registerConfirmURL(authID)); err == nil { //nolint:noinlineerr
+		path = u.Path
+	}
+
 	//nolint:gosec // G124: Secure from server_url scheme or req.TLS; HttpOnly + SameSite already set
 	http.SetCookie(writer, &http.Cookie{
 		Name:     registerConfirmCSRFCookie,
 		Value:    value,
-		Path:     "/register/confirm/" + authID.String(),
+		Path:     path,
 		MaxAge:   maxAge,
-		Secure:   secure || req.TLS != nil,
+		Secure:   a.cookiesSecure() || req.TLS != nil,
 		HttpOnly: true,
-		SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
+		// Lax, not Strict: the callback sets this cookie and immediately
+		// redirects to the confirmation page. That hop ends a redirect
+		// chain which began cross-site at the IdP, and Firefox evaluates
+		// the whole chain, so a Strict cookie is withheld and the
+		// confirmation page 403s. Lax still never rides a cross-site
+		// POST, so the confirm submission stays protected.
+		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
 	})
 }
 
-// renderRegistrationConfirmInterstitial captures the resolved OIDC
+// beginRegistrationConfirmation captures the resolved OIDC identity and
-// identity and node expiry into the cached [types.AuthRequest], sets the CSRF
+// node expiry into the cached [types.AuthRequest], sets the CSRF cookie, and
-// cookie, and renders the confirmation page that the user must
+// redirects the browser to the confirmation page.
-// explicitly submit before the registration is finalised.
+//
-func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) renderRegistrationConfirmInterstitial(
+// The interstitial is served from its own URL rather than written inline
+// here, because this request carries the single-use OAuth authorization
+// code. A page rendered on this response leaves the browser parked on the
+// code-bearing URL, and anything that reloads it — an extension calling
+// window.location.reload(), the back button, pull-to-refresh, a prerender
+// — re-enters the callback with a spent code and paints an error over the
+// interstitial. Redirecting keeps the code exchange one-shot and makes the
+// page the user waits on safe to reload.
+func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) beginRegistrationConfirmation(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	req *http.Request,
 	authID types.AuthID,
@@ -732,14 +769,78 @@ func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) renderRegistrationConfirmInterstitial(
 		CSRF:       csrf,
 	})
 
-	setRegisterConfirmCookie(writer, req, authID, csrf, int(authCacheExpiration.Seconds()), a.cookiesSecure())
+	a.setRegisterConfirmCookie(writer, req, authID, csrf, int(authCacheExpiration.Seconds()))
+
+	// 303 See Other so the browser issues a fresh GET for the
+	// confirmation page and leaves the code-bearing URL behind as a
+	// transient hop rather than a history entry it can return to.
+	http.Redirect(writer, req, a.registerConfirmURL(authID), http.StatusSeeOther)
+}
+
+// RegisterConfirmGetHandler renders the OIDC registration confirmation
+// interstitial. It is reached via the redirect that
+// [AuthProviderOIDC.beginRegistrationConfirmation] issues from the OIDC
+// callback, and it is safe to reload: it only reads the pending
+// confirmation captured on the cached [types.AuthRequest] and never touches
+// the one-time code exchange.
+//
+// Listens in GET /register/confirm/:auth_id.
+func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) RegisterConfirmGetHandler(
+	writer http.ResponseWriter,
+	req *http.Request,
+) {
+	authID, err := authIDFromRequest(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		httpUserError(writer, err)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	authReq, ok := a.h.state.GetAuthCacheEntry(authID)
+	if !ok {
+		httpUserError(writer, errRegistrationLinkSpent)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	pending := authReq.PendingConfirmation()
+	if pending == nil {
+		httpUserError(writer, NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "registration not OIDC-authorized", nil))
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Only the browser that completed the OIDC flow holds this cookie, and
+	// holding it is what authorises the confirm POST. Requiring it here too
+	// keeps the device details, and the token that finalises the
+	// registration, away from anyone who merely knows the auth ID — which
+	// the node being registered does.
+	cookie, err := req.Cookie(registerConfirmCSRFCookie)
+	if err != nil {
+		httpUserError(writer, NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "missing csrf cookie", err))
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	if cookie.Value != pending.CSRF {
+		httpUserError(writer, NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "csrf token mismatch", nil))
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	user, err := a.h.state.GetUserByID(types.UserID(pending.UserID))
+	if err != nil {
+		httpUserError(writer, fmt.Errorf("looking up user: %w", err))
+
+		return
+	}
 
 	regData := authReq.RegistrationData()
 
 	info := templates.RegisterConfirmInfo{
-		FormAction:    "/register/confirm/" + authID.String(),
+		FormAction:    a.registerConfirmURL(authID),
 		CSRFTokenName: registerConfirmCSRFCookie,
-		CSRFToken:     csrf,
+		CSRFToken:     pending.CSRF,
 		User:          user.Display(),
 		Hostname:      regData.Hostname,
 		MachineKey:    regData.MachineKey.ShortString(),
@@ -748,6 +849,9 @@ func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) renderRegistrationConfirmInterstitial(
 		info.OS = regData.Hostinfo.OS
 	}
 
+	// The page carries the token that finalises the registration, so no
+	// shared cache or history restore may serve it back.
+	writer.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
 	writer.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
 	writer.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 
@@ -764,12 +868,6 @@ func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) RegisterConfirmHandler(
 	writer http.ResponseWriter,
 	req *http.Request,
 ) {
-	if req.Method != http.MethodPost {
-		httpUserError(writer, errMethodNotAllowed)
-
-		return
-	}
-
 	authID, err := authIDFromRequest(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		httpUserError(writer, err)
@@ -810,7 +908,7 @@ func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) RegisterConfirmHandler(
 
 	authReq, ok := a.h.state.GetAuthCacheEntry(authID)
 	if !ok {
-		httpUserError(writer, NewHTTPError(http.StatusGone, "registration session expired", nil))
+		httpUserError(writer, errRegistrationLinkSpent)
 
 		return
 	}
@@ -838,7 +936,7 @@ func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) RegisterConfirmHandler(
 	newNode, err := a.handleRegistration(user, authID, pending.NodeExpiry)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, db.ErrNodeNotFoundRegistrationCache) {
-			httpUserError(writer, NewHTTPError(http.StatusGone, "registration session expired", err))
+			httpUserError(writer, NewHTTPError(http.StatusGone, registrationLinkSpentMsg, err))
 
 			return
 		}
@@ -849,7 +947,7 @@ func (a *AuthProviderOIDC) RegisterConfirmHandler(
 	}
 
 	// Clear the CSRF cookie now that the registration is final.
-	setRegisterConfirmCookie(writer, req, authID, "", -1, a.cookiesSecure())
+	a.setRegisterConfirmCookie(writer, req, authID, "", -1)
 
 	content := renderRegistrationSuccessTemplate(user, newNode)
 

hscontrol/oidc_callback_reload_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+package hscontrol
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/cookiejar"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	grpcRuntime "github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2/runtime"
+	"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
+	"github.com/oauth2-proxy/mockoidc"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"tailscale.com/types/key"
+)
+
+// oidcBrowser drives the interactive OIDC registration flow the way a
+// browser does: over real HTTP against the real route table, through a
+// cookie jar that honours Path and expiry, following redirects.
+//
+// Both halves matter for this bug. The route table is where the
+// confirmation page's missing GET route lives, and cookie Path decides
+// whether the state cookie the callback deletes is actually gone on the
+// next hit.
+type oidcBrowser struct {
+	app    *Headscale
+	idp    *mockoidc.MockOIDC
+	srv    *httptest.Server
+	client *http.Client
+}
+
+func newOIDCBrowser(t *testing.T) *oidcBrowser {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	idp, err := mockoidc.Run()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_ = idp.Shutdown()
+	})
+
+	app := createTestApp(t)
+
+	// The provider derives its OIDC redirect_uri from the server URL, and
+	// the server serves the router the provider is registered on, so bind
+	// the router late to break the cycle.
+	var router http.Handler
+
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		router.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+
+	provider, err := NewAuthProviderOIDC(
+		context.Background(),
+		app,
+		srv.URL,
+		&types.OIDCConfig{
+			Issuer:       idp.Issuer(),
+			ClientID:     idp.ClientID,
+			ClientSecret: idp.ClientSecret,
+			Scope:        []string{"openid", "profile", "email"},
+		},
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	app.authProvider = provider
+	router = app.createRouter(grpcRuntime.NewServeMux())
+
+	jar, err := cookiejar.New(nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	return &oidcBrowser{
+		app:    app,
+		idp:    idp,
+		srv:    srv,
+		client: &http.Client{Jar: jar},
+	}
+}
+
+// get fetches a URL, follows redirects, and returns the status, the URL
+// the browser ended up on, and the page body.
+func (b *oidcBrowser) get(t *testing.T, rawURL string) (int, *url.URL, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	resp, err := b.client.Get(rawURL) //nolint:noctx,bodyclose // test client; closed below
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	return resp.StatusCode, resp.Request.URL, string(body)
+}
+
+// pendingNode mints a pending node registration and returns the URL the
+// tailscale client would print for the user to open.
+func (b *oidcBrowser) pendingNode(t *testing.T) (types.AuthID, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	authID := types.MustAuthID()
+	b.app.state.SetAuthCacheEntry(authID, types.NewRegisterAuthRequest(&types.RegistrationData{
+		MachineKey: key.NewMachine().Public(),
+		NodeKey:    key.NewNode().Public(),
+		Hostname:   "reload-victim",
+	}))
+
+	return authID, b.srv.URL + "/register/" + authID.String()
+}
+
+var (
+	csrfInputRe = regexp.MustCompile(
+		`name="` + registerConfirmCSRFCookie + `"[^>]*value="([^"]+)"`,
+	)
+	formActionRe = regexp.MustCompile(`action="([^"]+)"`)
+)
+
+// TestOIDCLoginDoesNotParkTheBrowserOnTheCodeURL reproduces
+// https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/issues/3365.
+//
+// The interactive OIDC flow ends with the browser sitting on the
+// confirmation interstitial, waiting for the user to click. Today that
+// interstitial is written as the body of the /oidc/callback response, so
+// the URL the browser is parked on is the one carrying the single-use
+// OAuth authorization code. Reloading it re-enters the callback, which
+// has already spent the code and deleted the state cookie, and the error
+// page paints over the interstitial. The node is never registered.
+//
+// Adblock Plus is only the loudest trigger — it calls
+// window.location.reload() to apply element-hiding filters. The back
+// button, mobile pull-to-refresh and browser prerendering all aim at the
+// same URL.
+//
+// The property asserted here is the one that fixes the whole class,
+// stated without naming an implementation: wherever the flow leaves the
+// browser, that URL must be free of the authorization code and safe to
+// load again.
+func TestOIDCLoginDoesNotParkTheBrowserOnTheCodeURL(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newOIDCBrowser(t)
+
+	_, registerURL := b.pendingNode(t)
+
+	status, landed, body := b.get(t, registerURL)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, status, "the login flow must reach a page")
+	require.Contains(t, body, "Confirm node registration",
+		"the flow must end on the confirmation interstitial")
+
+	assert.Empty(t, landed.Query().Get("code"),
+		"the browser must not be left parked on the URL carrying the one-time "+
+			"OAuth code; any reload of it re-enters the spent callback")
+
+	reloadedStatus, _, reloadedBody := b.get(t, landed.String())
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, reloadedStatus,
+		"reloading the page the flow left the browser on must re-render it")
+	assert.Contains(t, reloadedBody, "Confirm node registration",
+		"the reload must show the confirmation interstitial, not an error page")
+}
+
+// TestOIDCLoginCompletesAfterReload is the reporters' scenario end to
+// end: the confirmation page is reloaded before the user clicks, and the
+// registration must still complete. One deployment measured login
+// completion falling from 100% to 61-73% across this exact step.
+func TestOIDCLoginCompletesAfterReload(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newOIDCBrowser(t)
+
+	_, registerURL := b.pendingNode(t)
+
+	status, landed, _ := b.get(t, registerURL)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, status)
+
+	// The spurious reload, on whatever URL the flow parked the browser on.
+	reloadedStatus, reloadedURL, body := b.get(t, landed.String())
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, reloadedStatus,
+		"the page the user is sitting on must survive a reload")
+
+	csrf := csrfInputRe.FindStringSubmatch(body)
+	require.Len(t, csrf, 2, "the reloaded page must still carry a usable confirm form")
+
+	action := formActionRe.FindStringSubmatch(body)
+	require.Len(t, action, 2, "the reloaded page must still carry a form action")
+
+	confirmURL, err := reloadedURL.Parse(action[1])
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	//nolint:noctx,bodyclose // test client; closed below
+	confirmed, err := b.client.PostForm(confirmURL.String(), url.Values{
+		registerConfirmCSRFCookie: {csrf[1]},
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer confirmed.Body.Close()
+
+	confirmedBody, err := io.ReadAll(confirmed.Body)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, confirmed.StatusCode,
+		"confirming after a reload must register the node")
+	assert.Contains(t, strings.ToLower(string(confirmedBody)), "registered",
+		"the user must get the registration success page")
+}
+
+// TestRegisterConfirmGETIsNotADeadEnd covers the second, independent way
+// a registration is lost, reported with no ad blocker involved: the
+// confirmation endpoint is POST-only in the route table, so a user who
+// refreshes or navigates back to it gets a bare 405 from the router with
+// no way to recover, while the pending registration sits in the cache
+// unreachable until it expires.
+//
+// This is a route-table gap, so it can only be observed through the real
+// router — calling the handler directly cannot see it.
+func TestRegisterConfirmGETIsNotADeadEnd(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newOIDCBrowser(t)
+
+	authID, registerURL := b.pendingNode(t)
+
+	// Complete the OIDC leg so there is a pending confirmation to render.
+	status, _, _ := b.get(t, registerURL)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, status)
+
+	confirmStatus, _, body := b.get(t, b.srv.URL+"/register/confirm/"+authID.String())
+
+	require.NotEqual(t, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, confirmStatus,
+		"GET on the confirmation URL must not be a dead end for a user who "+
+			"refreshes or goes back")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, confirmStatus,
+		"the confirmation page must be reachable by GET")
+	assert.Contains(t, body, "Confirm node registration")
+}
+
+// TestRegisterConfirmNeedsTheCallbackCookie locks the reason the
+// confirmation step exists. The node being registered knows its own auth
+// ID, so the auth ID alone must never be enough to view the device
+// details or to finalise the registration — only the browser that
+// completed the OIDC login holds the cookie the callback set, and holding
+// it is what authorises the confirm.
+//
+// Without this, an attacker could hand a victim a /register/{auth_id}
+// link for the attacker's own node, let the victim's IdP silently sign
+// in, and then confirm the registration themselves under the victim's
+// identity.
+func TestRegisterConfirmNeedsTheCallbackCookie(t *testing.T) {
+	b := newOIDCBrowser(t)
+
+	authID, registerURL := b.pendingNode(t)
+
+	status, _, body := b.get(t, registerURL)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, status)
+
+	csrf := csrfInputRe.FindStringSubmatch(body)
+	require.Len(t, csrf, 2)
+
+	// A second browser that knows the auth ID, and even the token from the
+	// rendered page, but never completed the OIDC login.
+	jar, err := cookiejar.New(nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	attacker := &http.Client{Jar: jar}
+	confirmURL := b.srv.URL + "/register/confirm/" + authID.String()
+
+	//nolint:noctx,bodyclose // test client; closed below
+	viewed, err := attacker.Get(confirmURL)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer viewed.Body.Close()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, viewed.StatusCode,
+		"the confirmation page must not render without the callback cookie")
+
+	//nolint:noctx,bodyclose // test client; closed below
+	submitted, err := attacker.PostForm(confirmURL, url.Values{
+		registerConfirmCSRFCookie: {csrf[1]},
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer submitted.Body.Close()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, submitted.StatusCode,
+		"the registration must not finalise without the callback cookie")
+
+	cached, ok := b.app.state.GetAuthCacheEntry(authID)
+	require.True(t, ok, "the pending registration must survive the attempt")
+	assert.NotNil(t, cached.PendingConfirmation(),
+		"the pending registration must still be waiting for the real user")
+}
+
+// TestSetRegisterConfirmCookieSameSite pins SameSite=Lax. Strict is
+// withheld by browsers that evaluate the whole redirect chain, and this
+// cookie now has to survive the callback's redirect to the confirmation
+// page — a chain that begins cross-site at the identity provider. Lax is
+// still never attached to a cross-site POST, so the confirm submission
+// keeps its protection.
+func TestSetRegisterConfirmCookieSameSite(t *testing.T) {
+	a := &AuthProviderOIDC{serverURL: "https://hs.example.com"}
+	authID := types.MustAuthID()
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	a.setRegisterConfirmCookie(rec,
+		httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/oidc/callback", nil),
+		authID, "token", 900)
+
+	cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+	require.Len(t, cookies, 1)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, cookies[0].SameSite,
+		"the confirm cookie must survive the callback redirect")
+	assert.True(t, cookies[0].Secure, "https server_url must set Secure")
+	assert.Equal(t, "/register/confirm/"+authID.String(), cookies[0].Path)
+}
+
+// TestRegisterConfirmURLFollowsServerURLPrefix covers the deployment
+// where a reverse proxy serves Headscale under a path prefix. The
+// redirect target, the form action and the cookie scope are all seen by
+// the browser, so they carry the prefix even though the routed path does
+// not.
+func TestRegisterConfirmURLFollowsServerURLPrefix(t *testing.T) {
+	a := &AuthProviderOIDC{serverURL: "https://example.com/hs"}
+	authID := types.MustAuthID()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, "https://example.com/hs/register/confirm/"+authID.String(),
+		a.registerConfirmURL(authID))
+
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	a.setRegisterConfirmCookie(rec,
+		httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/oidc/callback", nil),
+		authID, "token", 900)
+
+	cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
+	require.Len(t, cookies, 1)
+	assert.Equal(t, "/hs/register/confirm/"+authID.String(), cookies[0].Path,
+		"the cookie must be scoped to the path the browser sees")
+}

integration/scenario.go

@@ -1128,6 +1128,11 @@ func (j *debugJar) Dump(w io.Writer) {
 	}
 }
 
+// registerConfirmCSRFField is the name of both the hidden CSRF form field
+// and the cookie on the OIDC registration confirmation interstitial. It
+// mirrors registerConfirmCSRFCookie in hscontrol, which is unexported.
+const registerConfirmCSRFField = "headscale_register_confirm"
+
 func copyCookie(c *http.Cookie) *http.Cookie {
 	cc := *c
 	return &cc
@@ -1241,10 +1246,11 @@ func doLoginURLWithClient(hostname string, loginURL *url.URL, hc *http.Client, f
 		}
 	}
 
-	// The OIDC registration flow now renders a confirmation interstitial
+	// The OIDC registration flow renders a confirmation interstitial
-	// (POST form) instead of completing immediately. Detect the form and
+	// (POST form) instead of completing immediately. Detect the form by its
+	// CSRF field, which does not move when the form action does, and
 	// auto-submit it so integration tests behave like a real browser.
-	if followRedirects && strings.Contains(body, `action="/register/confirm/`) {
+	if followRedirects && strings.Contains(body, `name="`+registerConfirmCSRFField+`"`) {
 		confirmBody, confirmURL, confirmErr := submitConfirmForm(hostname, body, resp, hc)
 		if confirmErr != nil {
 			return body, redirectURL, confirmErr
@@ -1283,7 +1289,7 @@ func submitConfirmForm(
 
 	// Extract hidden CSRF input value. The rendered <input> has
 	// attributes in name-type-value order so we grab the whole tag.
-	before, _, ok := strings.Cut(htmlBody, `name="headscale_register_confirm"`)
+	before, _, ok := strings.Cut(htmlBody, `name="`+registerConfirmCSRFField+`"`)
 	if !ok {
 		return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("%s confirm form: no CSRF input", hostname) //nolint:err113
 	}
@@ -1309,18 +1315,17 @@ func submitConfirmForm(
 	valEnd := strings.Index(inputTag[valStart:], `"`)
 	csrfToken := inputTag[valStart : valStart+valEnd]
 
-	// Build the absolute POST URL from the response's request URL.
+	// Resolve the form action against the page it was served from, so an
-	base := prevResp.Request.URL
+	// absolute and a relative action both work.
-	confirmURL := &url.URL{
+	confirmURL, err := prevResp.Request.URL.Parse(formAction)
-		Scheme: base.Scheme,
+	if err != nil {
-		Host:   base.Host,
+		return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("%s confirm form: resolving action %q: %w", hostname, formAction, err)
-		Path:   formAction,
 	}
 
 	log.Printf("%s auto-submitting confirm form: %s", hostname, confirmURL)
 
 	formData := url.Values{
-		"headscale_register_confirm": {csrfToken},
+		registerConfirmCSRFField: {csrfToken},
 	}
 
 	ctx := context.Background()