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feat: add autogroup:self (#2789)

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This commit is contained in:
Vitalij Dovhanyc
2025-10-16 12:59:52 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent fddc7117e4
commit c2a58a304d
15 changed files with 1448 additions and 26 deletions
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2
.github/workflows/test-integration.yaml vendored
View File

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ jobs:
- TestPolicyUpdateWhileRunningWithCLIInDatabase
- TestACLAutogroupMember
- TestACLAutogroupTagged
- TestACLAutogroupSelf
- TestAuthKeyLogoutAndReloginSameUser
- TestAuthKeyLogoutAndReloginNewUser
- TestAuthKeyLogoutAndReloginSameUserExpiredKey
@@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ jobs:
- TestSSHNoSSHConfigured
- TestSSHIsBlockedInACL
- TestSSHUserOnlyIsolation
- TestSSHAutogroupSelf
uses: ./.github/workflows/integration-test-template.yml
with:
test: ${{ matrix.test }}

3
CHANGELOG.md
View File

@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ upstream is changed.
[#2764](https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/pull/2764)
- Add FAQ entry on how to recover from an invalid policy in the database
[#2776](https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/pull/2776)
- EXPERIMENTAL: Add support for `autogroup:self`
[#2789](https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/pull/2789)
## 0.26.1 (2025-06-06)
@@ -252,6 +254,7 @@ working in v1 and not tested might be broken in v2 (and vice versa).
- Add documentation for routes
[#2496](https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/pull/2496)
## 0.25.1 (2025-02-25)
### Changes

2
docs/about/features.md
View File

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ provides on overview of Headscale's feature and compatibility with the Tailscale
- [x] Access control lists ([GitHub label "policy"](https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/labels/policy%20%F0%9F%93%9D))
- [x] ACL management via API
- [x] Some [Autogroups](https://tailscale.com/kb/1396/targets#autogroups), currently: `autogroup:internet`,
`autogroup:nonroot`, `autogroup:member`, `autogroup:tagged`
`autogroup:nonroot`, `autogroup:member`, `autogroup:tagged`, `autogroup:self`
- [x] [Auto approvers](https://tailscale.com/kb/1337/acl-syntax#auto-approvers) for [subnet
routers](../ref/routes.md#automatically-approve-routes-of-a-subnet-router) and [exit
nodes](../ref/routes.md#automatically-approve-an-exit-node-with-auto-approvers)

94
docs/ref/acls.md
View File

@@ -194,13 +194,93 @@ Here are the ACL's to implement the same permissions as above:
"dst": ["tag:dev-app-servers:80,443"]
},
// We still have to allow internal users communications since nothing guarantees that each user have
// their own users.
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["boss@"], "dst": ["boss@:*"] },
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["dev1@"], "dst": ["dev1@:*"] },
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["dev2@"], "dst": ["dev2@:*"] },
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["admin1@"], "dst": ["admin1@:*"] },
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["intern1@"], "dst": ["intern1@:*"] }
// Allow users to access their own devices using autogroup:self (see below for more details about performance impact)
{
"action": "accept",
"src": ["autogroup:member"],
"dst": ["autogroup:self:*"]
}
]
}
```
## Autogroups
Headscale supports several autogroups that automatically include users, destinations, or devices with specific properties. Autogroups provide a convenient way to write ACL rules without manually listing individual users or devices.
### `autogroup:internet`
Allows access to the internet through [exit nodes](routes.md#exit-node). Can only be used in ACL destinations.
```json
{
"action": "accept",
"src": ["group:users"],
"dst": ["autogroup:internet:*"]
}
```
### `autogroup:member`
Includes all users who are direct members of the tailnet. Does not include users from shared devices.
```json
{
"action": "accept",
"src": ["autogroup:member"],
"dst": ["tag:prod-app-servers:80,443"]
}
```
### `autogroup:tagged`
Includes all devices that have at least one tag.
```json
{
"action": "accept",
"src": ["autogroup:tagged"],
"dst": ["tag:monitoring:9090"]
}
```
### `autogroup:self`
**(EXPERIMENTAL)**
!!! warning "The current implementation of `autogroup:self` is inefficient"
Includes devices where the same user is authenticated on both the source and destination. Does not include tagged devices. Can only be used in ACL destinations.
```json
{
"action": "accept",
"src": ["autogroup:member"],
"dst": ["autogroup:self:*"]
}
```
*Using `autogroup:self` may cause performance degradation on the Headscale coordinator server in large deployments, as filter rules must be compiled per-node rather than globally and the current implementation is not very efficient.*
If you experience performance issues, consider using more specific ACL rules or limiting the use of `autogroup:self`.
```json
{
// To allow internal users communications to their own nodes we can do following rules to allow access in case autogroup:self is causing performance issues.
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["boss@"], "dst": ["boss@:"] },
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["dev1@"], "dst": ["dev1@:*"] },
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["dev2@"], "dst": ["dev2@:"] },
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["admin1@"], "dst": ["admin1@:"] },
{ "action": "accept", "src": ["intern1@"], "dst": ["intern1@:"] }
}
```
### `autogroup:nonroot`
Used in Tailscale SSH rules to allow access to any user except root. Can only be used in the `users` field of SSH rules.
```json
{
"action": "accept",
"src": ["autogroup:member"],
"dst": ["autogroup:self"],
"users": ["autogroup:nonroot"]
}
```

15
hscontrol/mapper/builder.go
View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/policy"
"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/policy/matcher"
"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
"tailscale.com/types/views"
@@ -180,7 +181,11 @@ func (b *MapResponseBuilder) WithPacketFilters() *MapResponseBuilder {
return b
}
filter, _ := b.mapper.state.Filter()
filter, err := b.mapper.state.FilterForNode(node)
if err != nil {
b.addError(err)
return b
}
// CapVer 81: 2023-11-17: MapResponse.PacketFilters (incremental packet filter updates)
// Currently, we do not send incremental package filters, however using the
@@ -226,7 +231,13 @@ func (b *MapResponseBuilder) buildTailPeers(peers views.Slice[types.NodeView]) (
return nil, errors.New("node not found")
}
filter, matchers := b.mapper.state.Filter()
// Use per-node filter to handle autogroup:self
filter, err := b.mapper.state.FilterForNode(node)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
matchers := matcher.MatchesFromFilterRules(filter)
// If there are filter rules present, see if there are any nodes that cannot
// access each-other at all and remove them from the peers.

2
hscontrol/policy/pm.go
View File

@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ import (
type PolicyManager interface {
// Filter returns the current filter rules for the entire tailnet and the associated matchers.
Filter() ([]tailcfg.FilterRule, []matcher.Match)
// FilterForNode returns filter rules for a specific node, handling autogroup:self
FilterForNode(node types.NodeView) ([]tailcfg.FilterRule, error)
SSHPolicy(types.NodeView) (*tailcfg.SSHPolicy, error)
SetPolicy([]byte) (bool, error)
SetUsers(users []types.User) (bool, error)

205
hscontrol/policy/v2/filter.go
View File

@@ -82,6 +82,159 @@ func (pol *Policy) compileFilterRules(
return rules, nil
}
// compileFilterRulesForNode compiles filter rules for a specific node.
func (pol *Policy) compileFilterRulesForNode(
users types.Users,
node types.NodeView,
nodes views.Slice[types.NodeView],
) ([]tailcfg.FilterRule, error) {
if pol == nil {
return tailcfg.FilterAllowAll, nil
}
var rules []tailcfg.FilterRule
for _, acl := range pol.ACLs {
if acl.Action != ActionAccept {
return nil, ErrInvalidAction
}
rule, err := pol.compileACLWithAutogroupSelf(acl, users, node, nodes)
if err != nil {
log.Trace().Err(err).Msgf("compiling ACL")
continue
}
if rule != nil {
rules = append(rules, *rule)
}
}
return rules, nil
}
// compileACLWithAutogroupSelf compiles a single ACL rule, handling
// autogroup:self per-node while supporting all other alias types normally.
func (pol *Policy) compileACLWithAutogroupSelf(
acl ACL,
users types.Users,
node types.NodeView,
nodes views.Slice[types.NodeView],
) (*tailcfg.FilterRule, error) {
// Check if any destination uses autogroup:self
hasAutogroupSelfInDst := false
for _, dest := range acl.Destinations {
if ag, ok := dest.Alias.(*AutoGroup); ok && ag.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
hasAutogroupSelfInDst = true
break
}
}
var srcIPs netipx.IPSetBuilder
// Resolve sources to only include devices from the same user as the target node.
for _, src := range acl.Sources {
// autogroup:self is not allowed in sources
if ag, ok := src.(*AutoGroup); ok && ag.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("autogroup:self cannot be used in sources")
}
ips, err := src.Resolve(pol, users, nodes)
if err != nil {
log.Trace().Err(err).Msgf("resolving source ips")
continue
}
if ips != nil {
if hasAutogroupSelfInDst {
// Instead of iterating all addresses (which could be millions),
// check each node's IPs against the source set
for _, n := range nodes.All() {
if n.User().ID == node.User().ID && !n.IsTagged() {
// Check if any of this node's IPs are in the source set
for _, nodeIP := range n.IPs() {
if ips.Contains(nodeIP) {
n.AppendToIPSet(&srcIPs)
break // Found this node, move to next
}
}
}
}
} else {
// No autogroup:self in destination, use all resolved sources
srcIPs.AddSet(ips)
}
}
}
srcSet, err := srcIPs.IPSet()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if srcSet == nil || len(srcSet.Prefixes()) == 0 {
// No sources resolved, skip this rule
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
}
protocols, _ := acl.Protocol.parseProtocol()
var destPorts []tailcfg.NetPortRange
for _, dest := range acl.Destinations {
if ag, ok := dest.Alias.(*AutoGroup); ok && ag.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
for _, n := range nodes.All() {
if n.User().ID == node.User().ID && !n.IsTagged() {
for _, port := range dest.Ports {
for _, ip := range n.IPs() {
pr := tailcfg.NetPortRange{
IP: ip.String(),
Ports: port,
}
destPorts = append(destPorts, pr)
}
}
}
}
} else {
ips, err := dest.Resolve(pol, users, nodes)
if err != nil {
log.Trace().Err(err).Msgf("resolving destination ips")
continue
}
if ips == nil {
log.Debug().Msgf("destination resolved to nil ips: %v", dest)
continue
}
prefixes := ips.Prefixes()
for _, pref := range prefixes {
for _, port := range dest.Ports {
pr := tailcfg.NetPortRange{
IP: pref.String(),
Ports: port,
}
destPorts = append(destPorts, pr)
}
}
}
}
if len(destPorts) == 0 {
// No destinations resolved, skip this rule
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
}
return &tailcfg.FilterRule{
SrcIPs: ipSetToPrefixStringList(srcSet),
DstPorts: destPorts,
IPProto: protocols,
}, nil
}
func sshAction(accept bool, duration time.Duration) tailcfg.SSHAction {
return tailcfg.SSHAction{
Reject: !accept,
@@ -107,14 +260,39 @@ func (pol *Policy) compileSSHPolicy(
var rules []*tailcfg.SSHRule
for index, rule := range pol.SSHs {
// Check if any destination uses autogroup:self
hasAutogroupSelfInDst := false
for _, dst := range rule.Destinations {
if ag, ok := dst.(*AutoGroup); ok && ag.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
hasAutogroupSelfInDst = true
break
}
}
// If autogroup:self is used, skip tagged nodes
if hasAutogroupSelfInDst && node.IsTagged() {
continue
}
var dest netipx.IPSetBuilder
for _, src := range rule.Destinations {
// Handle autogroup:self specially
if ag, ok := src.(*AutoGroup); ok && ag.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
// For autogroup:self, only include the target user's untagged devices
for _, n := range nodes.All() {
if n.User().ID == node.User().ID && !n.IsTagged() {
n.AppendToIPSet(&dest)
}
}
} else {
ips, err := src.Resolve(pol, users, nodes)
if err != nil {
log.Trace().Caller().Err(err).Msgf("resolving destination ips")
continue
}
dest.AddSet(ips)
}
}
destSet, err := dest.IPSet()
if err != nil {
@@ -142,6 +320,33 @@ func (pol *Policy) compileSSHPolicy(
continue // Skip this rule if we can't resolve sources
}
// If autogroup:self is in destinations, filter sources to same user only
if hasAutogroupSelfInDst {
var filteredSrcIPs netipx.IPSetBuilder
// Instead of iterating all addresses, check each node's IPs
for _, n := range nodes.All() {
if n.User().ID == node.User().ID && !n.IsTagged() {
// Check if any of this node's IPs are in the source set
for _, nodeIP := range n.IPs() {
if srcIPs.Contains(nodeIP) {
n.AppendToIPSet(&filteredSrcIPs)
break // Found this node, move to next
}
}
}
}
srcIPs, err = filteredSrcIPs.IPSet()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if srcIPs == nil || len(srcIPs.Prefixes()) == 0 {
// No valid sources after filtering, skip this rule
continue
}
}
for addr := range util.IPSetAddrIter(srcIPs) {
principals = append(principals, &tailcfg.SSHPrincipal{
NodeIP: addr.String(),

549
hscontrol/policy/v2/filter_test.go
View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package v2
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -15,6 +16,14 @@ import (
"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
)
// aliasWithPorts creates an AliasWithPorts structure from an alias and ports.
func aliasWithPorts(alias Alias, ports ...tailcfg.PortRange) AliasWithPorts {
return AliasWithPorts{
Alias: alias,
Ports: ports,
}
}
func TestParsing(t *testing.T) {
users := types.Users{
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "testuser"},
@@ -786,8 +795,548 @@ func TestSSHJSONSerialization(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotContains(t, string(jsonData), `"sshUsers": null`, "SSH users should not be null")
}
func TestCompileFilterRulesForNodeWithAutogroupSelf(t *testing.T) {
users := types.Users{
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "user1"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 2}, Name: "user2"},
}
nodes := types.Nodes{
{
User: users[0],
IPv4: ap("100.64.0.1"),
},
{
User: users[0],
IPv4: ap("100.64.0.2"),
},
{
User: users[1],
IPv4: ap("100.64.0.3"),
},
{
User: users[1],
IPv4: ap("100.64.0.4"),
},
// Tagged device for user1
{
User: users[0],
IPv4: ap("100.64.0.5"),
ForcedTags: []string{"tag:test"},
},
// Tagged device for user2
{
User: users[1],
IPv4: ap("100.64.0.6"),
ForcedTags: []string{"tag:test"},
},
}
// Test: Tailscale intended usage pattern (autogroup:member + autogroup:self)
policy2 := &Policy{
ACLs: []ACL{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: []Alias{agp("autogroup:member")},
Destinations: []AliasWithPorts{
aliasWithPorts(agp("autogroup:self"), tailcfg.PortRangeAny),
},
},
},
}
err := policy2.validate()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("policy validation failed: %v", err)
}
// Test compilation for user1's first node
node1 := nodes[0].View()
rules, err := policy2.compileFilterRulesForNode(users, node1, nodes.ViewSlice())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(rules) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 rule, got %d", len(rules))
}
// Check that the rule includes:
// - Sources: only user1's untagged devices (filtered by autogroup:self semantics)
// - Destinations: only user1's untagged devices (autogroup:self)
rule := rules[0]
// Sources should ONLY include user1's untagged devices (100.64.0.1, 100.64.0.2)
expectedSourceIPs := []string{"100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.2"}
for _, expectedIP := range expectedSourceIPs {
found := false
addr := netip.MustParseAddr(expectedIP)
for _, prefix := range rule.SrcIPs {
pref := netip.MustParsePrefix(prefix)
if pref.Contains(addr) {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
t.Errorf("expected source IP %s to be covered by generated prefixes %v", expectedIP, rule.SrcIPs)
}
}
// Verify that other users' devices and tagged devices are not included in sources
excludedSourceIPs := []string{"100.64.0.3", "100.64.0.4", "100.64.0.5", "100.64.0.6"}
for _, excludedIP := range excludedSourceIPs {
addr := netip.MustParseAddr(excludedIP)
for _, prefix := range rule.SrcIPs {
pref := netip.MustParsePrefix(prefix)
if pref.Contains(addr) {
t.Errorf("SECURITY VIOLATION: source IP %s should not be included but found in prefix %s", excludedIP, prefix)
}
}
}
expectedDestIPs := []string{"100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.2"}
actualDestIPs := make([]string, 0, len(rule.DstPorts))
for _, dst := range rule.DstPorts {
actualDestIPs = append(actualDestIPs, dst.IP)
}
for _, expectedIP := range expectedDestIPs {
found := false
for _, actualIP := range actualDestIPs {
if actualIP == expectedIP {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
t.Errorf("expected destination IP %s to be included, got: %v", expectedIP, actualDestIPs)
}
}
// Verify that other users' devices and tagged devices are not in destinations
excludedDestIPs := []string{"100.64.0.3", "100.64.0.4", "100.64.0.5", "100.64.0.6"}
for _, excludedIP := range excludedDestIPs {
for _, actualIP := range actualDestIPs {
if actualIP == excludedIP {
t.Errorf("SECURITY: destination IP %s should not be included but found in destinations", excludedIP)
}
}
}
}
func TestAutogroupSelfInSourceIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
// Test that autogroup:self cannot be used in sources (per Tailscale spec)
policy := &Policy{
ACLs: []ACL{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: []Alias{agp("autogroup:self")},
Destinations: []AliasWithPorts{
aliasWithPorts(agp("autogroup:member"), tailcfg.PortRangeAny),
},
},
},
}
err := policy.validate()
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected validation error when using autogroup:self in sources")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "autogroup:self") {
t.Errorf("expected error message to mention autogroup:self, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestAutogroupSelfWithSpecificUserSource verifies that when autogroup:self is in
// the destination and a specific user is in the source, only that user's devices
// are allowed (and only if they match the target user).
func TestAutogroupSelfWithSpecificUserSource(t *testing.T) {
users := types.Users{
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "user1"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 2}, Name: "user2"},
}
nodes := types.Nodes{
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.1")},
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.2")},
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.3")},
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.4")},
}
policy := &Policy{
ACLs: []ACL{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: []Alias{up("user1@")},
Destinations: []AliasWithPorts{
aliasWithPorts(agp("autogroup:self"), tailcfg.PortRangeAny),
},
},
},
}
err := policy.validate()
require.NoError(t, err)
// For user1's node: sources should be user1's devices
node1 := nodes[0].View()
rules, err := policy.compileFilterRulesForNode(users, node1, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, rules, 1)
expectedSourceIPs := []string{"100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.2"}
for _, expectedIP := range expectedSourceIPs {
found := false
addr := netip.MustParseAddr(expectedIP)
for _, prefix := range rules[0].SrcIPs {
pref := netip.MustParsePrefix(prefix)
if pref.Contains(addr) {
found = true
break
}
}
assert.True(t, found, "expected source IP %s to be present", expectedIP)
}
actualDestIPs := make([]string, 0, len(rules[0].DstPorts))
for _, dst := range rules[0].DstPorts {
actualDestIPs = append(actualDestIPs, dst.IP)
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, expectedSourceIPs, actualDestIPs)
node2 := nodes[2].View()
rules2, err := policy.compileFilterRulesForNode(users, node2, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, rules2, "user2's node should have no rules (user1@ devices can't match user2's self)")
}
// TestAutogroupSelfWithGroupSource verifies that when a group is used as source
// and autogroup:self as destination, only group members who are the same user
// as the target are allowed.
func TestAutogroupSelfWithGroupSource(t *testing.T) {
users := types.Users{
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "user1"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 2}, Name: "user2"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 3}, Name: "user3"},
}
nodes := types.Nodes{
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.1")},
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.2")},
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.3")},
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.4")},
{User: users[2], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.5")},
}
policy := &Policy{
Groups: Groups{
Group("group:admins"): []Username{Username("user1@"), Username("user2@")},
},
ACLs: []ACL{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: []Alias{gp("group:admins")},
Destinations: []AliasWithPorts{
aliasWithPorts(agp("autogroup:self"), tailcfg.PortRangeAny),
},
},
},
}
err := policy.validate()
require.NoError(t, err)
// (group:admins has user1+user2, but autogroup:self filters to same user)
node1 := nodes[0].View()
rules, err := policy.compileFilterRulesForNode(users, node1, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, rules, 1)
expectedSrcIPs := []string{"100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.2"}
for _, expectedIP := range expectedSrcIPs {
found := false
addr := netip.MustParseAddr(expectedIP)
for _, prefix := range rules[0].SrcIPs {
pref := netip.MustParsePrefix(prefix)
if pref.Contains(addr) {
found = true
break
}
}
assert.True(t, found, "expected source IP %s for user1", expectedIP)
}
node3 := nodes[4].View()
rules3, err := policy.compileFilterRulesForNode(users, node3, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, rules3, "user3 should have no rules")
}
// Helper function to create IP addresses for testing
func createAddr(ip string) *netip.Addr {
addr, _ := netip.ParseAddr(ip)
return &addr
}
// TestSSHWithAutogroupSelfInDestination verifies that SSH policies work correctly
// with autogroup:self in destinations
func TestSSHWithAutogroupSelfInDestination(t *testing.T) {
users := types.Users{
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "user1"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 2}, Name: "user2"},
}
nodes := types.Nodes{
// User1's nodes
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.1"), Hostname: "user1-node1"},
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.2"), Hostname: "user1-node2"},
// User2's nodes
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.3"), Hostname: "user2-node1"},
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.4"), Hostname: "user2-node2"},
// Tagged node for user1 (should be excluded)
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.5"), Hostname: "user1-tagged", ForcedTags: []string{"tag:server"}},
}
policy := &Policy{
SSHs: []SSH{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: SSHSrcAliases{agp("autogroup:member")},
Destinations: SSHDstAliases{agp("autogroup:self")},
Users: []SSHUser{"autogroup:nonroot"},
},
},
}
err := policy.validate()
require.NoError(t, err)
// Test for user1's first node
node1 := nodes[0].View()
sshPolicy, err := policy.compileSSHPolicy(users, node1, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, sshPolicy)
require.Len(t, sshPolicy.Rules, 1)
rule := sshPolicy.Rules[0]
// Principals should only include user1's untagged devices
require.Len(t, rule.Principals, 2, "should have 2 principals (user1's 2 untagged nodes)")
principalIPs := make([]string, len(rule.Principals))
for i, p := range rule.Principals {
principalIPs[i] = p.NodeIP
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.2"}, principalIPs)
// Test for user2's first node
node3 := nodes[2].View()
sshPolicy2, err := policy.compileSSHPolicy(users, node3, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, sshPolicy2)
require.Len(t, sshPolicy2.Rules, 1)
rule2 := sshPolicy2.Rules[0]
// Principals should only include user2's untagged devices
require.Len(t, rule2.Principals, 2, "should have 2 principals (user2's 2 untagged nodes)")
principalIPs2 := make([]string, len(rule2.Principals))
for i, p := range rule2.Principals {
principalIPs2[i] = p.NodeIP
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"100.64.0.3", "100.64.0.4"}, principalIPs2)
// Test for tagged node (should have no SSH rules)
node5 := nodes[4].View()
sshPolicy3, err := policy.compileSSHPolicy(users, node5, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
if sshPolicy3 != nil {
assert.Empty(t, sshPolicy3.Rules, "tagged nodes should not get SSH rules with autogroup:self")
}
}
// TestSSHWithAutogroupSelfAndSpecificUser verifies that when a specific user
// is in the source and autogroup:self in destination, only that user's devices
// can SSH (and only if they match the target user)
func TestSSHWithAutogroupSelfAndSpecificUser(t *testing.T) {
users := types.Users{
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "user1"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 2}, Name: "user2"},
}
nodes := types.Nodes{
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.1")},
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.2")},
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.3")},
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.4")},
}
policy := &Policy{
SSHs: []SSH{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: SSHSrcAliases{up("user1@")},
Destinations: SSHDstAliases{agp("autogroup:self")},
Users: []SSHUser{"ubuntu"},
},
},
}
err := policy.validate()
require.NoError(t, err)
// For user1's node: should allow SSH from user1's devices
node1 := nodes[0].View()
sshPolicy, err := policy.compileSSHPolicy(users, node1, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, sshPolicy)
require.Len(t, sshPolicy.Rules, 1)
rule := sshPolicy.Rules[0]
require.Len(t, rule.Principals, 2, "user1 should have 2 principals")
principalIPs := make([]string, len(rule.Principals))
for i, p := range rule.Principals {
principalIPs[i] = p.NodeIP
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.2"}, principalIPs)
// For user2's node: should have no rules (user1's devices can't match user2's self)
node3 := nodes[2].View()
sshPolicy2, err := policy.compileSSHPolicy(users, node3, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
if sshPolicy2 != nil {
assert.Empty(t, sshPolicy2.Rules, "user2 should have no SSH rules since source is user1")
}
}
// TestSSHWithAutogroupSelfAndGroup verifies SSH with group sources and autogroup:self destinations
func TestSSHWithAutogroupSelfAndGroup(t *testing.T) {
users := types.Users{
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "user1"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 2}, Name: "user2"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 3}, Name: "user3"},
}
nodes := types.Nodes{
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.1")},
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.2")},
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.3")},
{User: users[1], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.4")},
{User: users[2], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.5")},
}
policy := &Policy{
Groups: Groups{
Group("group:admins"): []Username{Username("user1@"), Username("user2@")},
},
SSHs: []SSH{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: SSHSrcAliases{gp("group:admins")},
Destinations: SSHDstAliases{agp("autogroup:self")},
Users: []SSHUser{"root"},
},
},
}
err := policy.validate()
require.NoError(t, err)
// For user1's node: should allow SSH from user1's devices only (not user2's)
node1 := nodes[0].View()
sshPolicy, err := policy.compileSSHPolicy(users, node1, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, sshPolicy)
require.Len(t, sshPolicy.Rules, 1)
rule := sshPolicy.Rules[0]
require.Len(t, rule.Principals, 2, "user1 should have 2 principals (only user1's nodes)")
principalIPs := make([]string, len(rule.Principals))
for i, p := range rule.Principals {
principalIPs[i] = p.NodeIP
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.2"}, principalIPs)
// For user3's node: should have no rules (not in group:admins)
node5 := nodes[4].View()
sshPolicy2, err := policy.compileSSHPolicy(users, node5, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
if sshPolicy2 != nil {
assert.Empty(t, sshPolicy2.Rules, "user3 should have no SSH rules (not in group)")
}
}
// TestSSHWithAutogroupSelfExcludesTaggedDevices verifies that tagged devices
// are excluded from both sources and destinations when autogroup:self is used
func TestSSHWithAutogroupSelfExcludesTaggedDevices(t *testing.T) {
users := types.Users{
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "user1"},
}
nodes := types.Nodes{
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.1"), Hostname: "untagged1"},
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.2"), Hostname: "untagged2"},
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.3"), Hostname: "tagged1", ForcedTags: []string{"tag:server"}},
{User: users[0], IPv4: ap("100.64.0.4"), Hostname: "tagged2", ForcedTags: []string{"tag:web"}},
}
policy := &Policy{
TagOwners: TagOwners{
Tag("tag:server"): Owners{up("user1@")},
Tag("tag:web"): Owners{up("user1@")},
},
SSHs: []SSH{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: SSHSrcAliases{agp("autogroup:member")},
Destinations: SSHDstAliases{agp("autogroup:self")},
Users: []SSHUser{"admin"},
},
},
}
err := policy.validate()
require.NoError(t, err)
// For untagged node: should only get principals from other untagged nodes
node1 := nodes[0].View()
sshPolicy, err := policy.compileSSHPolicy(users, node1, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, sshPolicy)
require.Len(t, sshPolicy.Rules, 1)
rule := sshPolicy.Rules[0]
require.Len(t, rule.Principals, 2, "should only have 2 principals (untagged nodes)")
principalIPs := make([]string, len(rule.Principals))
for i, p := range rule.Principals {
principalIPs[i] = p.NodeIP
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.2"}, principalIPs,
"should only include untagged devices")
// For tagged node: should get no SSH rules
node3 := nodes[2].View()
sshPolicy2, err := policy.compileSSHPolicy(users, node3, nodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
if sshPolicy2 != nil {
assert.Empty(t, sshPolicy2.Rules, "tagged node should get no SSH rules with autogroup:self")
}
}

170
hscontrol/policy/v2/policy.go
View File

@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ type PolicyManager struct {
// Lazy map of SSH policies
sshPolicyMap map[types.NodeID]*tailcfg.SSHPolicy
// Lazy map of per-node filter rules (when autogroup:self is used)
filterRulesMap map[types.NodeID][]tailcfg.FilterRule
usesAutogroupSelf bool
}
// NewPolicyManager creates a new PolicyManager from a policy file and a list of users and nodes.
@@ -54,6 +58,8 @@ func NewPolicyManager(b []byte, users []types.User, nodes views.Slice[types.Node
users: users,
nodes: nodes,
sshPolicyMap: make(map[types.NodeID]*tailcfg.SSHPolicy, nodes.Len()),
filterRulesMap: make(map[types.NodeID][]tailcfg.FilterRule, nodes.Len()),
usesAutogroupSelf: policy.usesAutogroupSelf(),
}
_, err = pm.updateLocked()
@@ -72,8 +78,17 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) updateLocked() (bool, error) {
// policies for nodes that have changed. Particularly if the only difference is
// that nodes has been added or removed.
clear(pm.sshPolicyMap)
clear(pm.filterRulesMap)
filter, err := pm.pol.compileFilterRules(pm.users, pm.nodes)
// Check if policy uses autogroup:self
pm.usesAutogroupSelf = pm.pol.usesAutogroupSelf()
var filter []tailcfg.FilterRule
var err error
// Standard compilation for all policies
filter, err = pm.pol.compileFilterRules(pm.users, pm.nodes)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("compiling filter rules: %w", err)
}
@@ -218,6 +233,35 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) Filter() ([]tailcfg.FilterRule, []matcher.Match) {
return pm.filter, pm.matchers
}
// FilterForNode returns the filter rules for a specific node.
// If the policy uses autogroup:self, this returns node-specific rules for security.
// Otherwise, it returns the global filter rules for efficiency.
func (pm *PolicyManager) FilterForNode(node types.NodeView) ([]tailcfg.FilterRule, error) {
if pm == nil {
return nil, nil
}
pm.mu.Lock()
defer pm.mu.Unlock()
if !pm.usesAutogroupSelf {
return pm.filter, nil
}
if rules, ok := pm.filterRulesMap[node.ID()]; ok {
return rules, nil
}
rules, err := pm.pol.compileFilterRulesForNode(pm.users, node, pm.nodes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("compiling filter rules for node: %w", err)
}
pm.filterRulesMap[node.ID()] = rules
return rules, nil
}
// SetUsers updates the users in the policy manager and updates the filter rules.
func (pm *PolicyManager) SetUsers(users []types.User) (bool, error) {
if pm == nil {
@@ -255,6 +299,20 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) SetNodes(nodes views.Slice[types.NodeView]) (bool, erro
pm.mu.Lock()
defer pm.mu.Unlock()
// Clear cache based on what actually changed
if pm.usesAutogroupSelf {
// For autogroup:self, we need granular invalidation since rules depend on:
// - User ownership (node.User().ID)
// - Tag status (node.IsTagged())
// - IP addresses (node.IPs())
// - Node existence (added/removed)
pm.invalidateAutogroupSelfCache(pm.nodes, nodes)
} else {
// For non-autogroup:self policies, we can clear everything
clear(pm.filterRulesMap)
}
pm.nodes = nodes
return pm.updateLocked()
@@ -399,3 +457,113 @@ func (pm *PolicyManager) DebugString() string {
return sb.String()
}
// invalidateAutogroupSelfCache intelligently clears only the cache entries that need to be
// invalidated when using autogroup:self policies. This is much more efficient than clearing
// the entire cache.
func (pm *PolicyManager) invalidateAutogroupSelfCache(oldNodes, newNodes views.Slice[types.NodeView]) {
// Build maps for efficient lookup
oldNodeMap := make(map[types.NodeID]types.NodeView)
for _, node := range oldNodes.All() {
oldNodeMap[node.ID()] = node
}
newNodeMap := make(map[types.NodeID]types.NodeView)
for _, node := range newNodes.All() {
newNodeMap[node.ID()] = node
}
// Track which users are affected by changes
affectedUsers := make(map[uint]struct{})
// Check for removed nodes
for nodeID, oldNode := range oldNodeMap {
if _, exists := newNodeMap[nodeID]; !exists {
affectedUsers[oldNode.User().ID] = struct{}{}
}
}
// Check for added nodes
for nodeID, newNode := range newNodeMap {
if _, exists := oldNodeMap[nodeID]; !exists {
affectedUsers[newNode.User().ID] = struct{}{}
}
}
// Check for modified nodes (user changes, tag changes, IP changes)
for nodeID, newNode := range newNodeMap {
if oldNode, exists := oldNodeMap[nodeID]; exists {
// Check if user changed
if oldNode.User().ID != newNode.User().ID {
affectedUsers[oldNode.User().ID] = struct{}{}
affectedUsers[newNode.User().ID] = struct{}{}
}
// Check if tag status changed
if oldNode.IsTagged() != newNode.IsTagged() {
affectedUsers[newNode.User().ID] = struct{}{}
}
// Check if IPs changed (simple check - could be more sophisticated)
oldIPs := oldNode.IPs()
newIPs := newNode.IPs()
if len(oldIPs) != len(newIPs) {
affectedUsers[newNode.User().ID] = struct{}{}
} else {
// Check if any IPs are different
for i, oldIP := range oldIPs {
if i >= len(newIPs) || oldIP != newIPs[i] {
affectedUsers[newNode.User().ID] = struct{}{}
break
}
}
}
}
}
// Clear cache entries for affected users only
// For autogroup:self, we need to clear all nodes belonging to affected users
// because autogroup:self rules depend on the entire user's device set
for nodeID := range pm.filterRulesMap {
// Find the user for this cached node
var nodeUserID uint
found := false
// Check in new nodes first
for _, node := range newNodes.All() {
if node.ID() == nodeID {
nodeUserID = node.User().ID
found = true
break
}
}
// If not found in new nodes, check old nodes
if !found {
for _, node := range oldNodes.All() {
if node.ID() == nodeID {
nodeUserID = node.User().ID
found = true
break
}
}
}
// If we found the user and they're affected, clear this cache entry
if found {
if _, affected := affectedUsers[nodeUserID]; affected {
delete(pm.filterRulesMap, nodeID)
}
} else {
// Node not found in either old or new list, clear it
delete(pm.filterRulesMap, nodeID)
}
}
if len(affectedUsers) > 0 {
log.Debug().
Int("affected_users", len(affectedUsers)).
Int("remaining_cache_entries", len(pm.filterRulesMap)).
Msg("Selectively cleared autogroup:self cache for affected users")
}
}

138
hscontrol/policy/v2/policy_test.go
View File

@@ -66,3 +66,141 @@ func TestPolicyManager(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
func TestInvalidateAutogroupSelfCache(t *testing.T) {
users := types.Users{
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 1}, Name: "user1", Email: "user1@headscale.net"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 2}, Name: "user2", Email: "user2@headscale.net"},
{Model: gorm.Model{ID: 3}, Name: "user3", Email: "user3@headscale.net"},
}
policy := `{
"acls": [
{
"action": "accept",
"src": ["autogroup:member"],
"dst": ["autogroup:self:*"]
}
]
}`
initialNodes := types.Nodes{
node("user1-node1", "100.64.0.1", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::1", users[0], nil),
node("user1-node2", "100.64.0.2", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::2", users[0], nil),
node("user2-node1", "100.64.0.3", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::3", users[1], nil),
node("user3-node1", "100.64.0.4", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::4", users[2], nil),
}
for i, n := range initialNodes {
n.ID = types.NodeID(i + 1)
}
pm, err := NewPolicyManager([]byte(policy), users, initialNodes.ViewSlice())
require.NoError(t, err)
// Add to cache by calling FilterForNode for each node
for _, n := range initialNodes {
_, err := pm.FilterForNode(n.View())
require.NoError(t, err)
}
require.Equal(t, len(initialNodes), len(pm.filterRulesMap))
tests := []struct {
name string
newNodes types.Nodes
expectedCleared int
description string
}{
{
name: "no_changes",
newNodes: types.Nodes{
node("user1-node1", "100.64.0.1", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::1", users[0], nil),
node("user1-node2", "100.64.0.2", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::2", users[0], nil),
node("user2-node1", "100.64.0.3", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::3", users[1], nil),
node("user3-node1", "100.64.0.4", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::4", users[2], nil),
},
expectedCleared: 0,
description: "No changes should clear no cache entries",
},
{
name: "node_added",
newNodes: types.Nodes{
node("user1-node1", "100.64.0.1", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::1", users[0], nil),
node("user1-node2", "100.64.0.2", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::2", users[0], nil),
node("user1-node3", "100.64.0.5", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::5", users[0], nil), // New node
node("user2-node1", "100.64.0.3", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::3", users[1], nil),
node("user3-node1", "100.64.0.4", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::4", users[2], nil),
},
expectedCleared: 2, // user1's existing nodes should be cleared
description: "Adding a node should clear cache for that user's existing nodes",
},
{
name: "node_removed",
newNodes: types.Nodes{
node("user1-node1", "100.64.0.1", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::1", users[0], nil),
// user1-node2 removed
node("user2-node1", "100.64.0.3", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::3", users[1], nil),
node("user3-node1", "100.64.0.4", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::4", users[2], nil),
},
expectedCleared: 2, // user1's remaining node + removed node should be cleared
description: "Removing a node should clear cache for that user's remaining nodes",
},
{
name: "user_changed",
newNodes: types.Nodes{
node("user1-node1", "100.64.0.1", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::1", users[0], nil),
node("user1-node2", "100.64.0.2", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::2", users[2], nil), // Changed to user3
node("user2-node1", "100.64.0.3", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::3", users[1], nil),
node("user3-node1", "100.64.0.4", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::4", users[2], nil),
},
expectedCleared: 3, // user1's node + user2's node + user3's nodes should be cleared
description: "Changing a node's user should clear cache for both old and new users",
},
{
name: "ip_changed",
newNodes: types.Nodes{
node("user1-node1", "100.64.0.10", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::10", users[0], nil), // IP changed
node("user1-node2", "100.64.0.2", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::2", users[0], nil),
node("user2-node1", "100.64.0.3", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::3", users[1], nil),
node("user3-node1", "100.64.0.4", "fd7a:115c:a1e0::4", users[2], nil),
},
expectedCleared: 2, // user1's nodes should be cleared
description: "Changing a node's IP should clear cache for that user's nodes",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
for i, n := range tt.newNodes {
found := false
for _, origNode := range initialNodes {
if n.Hostname == origNode.Hostname {
n.ID = origNode.ID
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
n.ID = types.NodeID(len(initialNodes) + i + 1)
}
}
pm.filterRulesMap = make(map[types.NodeID][]tailcfg.FilterRule)
for _, n := range initialNodes {
_, err := pm.FilterForNode(n.View())
require.NoError(t, err)
}
initialCacheSize := len(pm.filterRulesMap)
require.Equal(t, len(initialNodes), initialCacheSize)
pm.invalidateAutogroupSelfCache(initialNodes.ViewSlice(), tt.newNodes.ViewSlice())
// Verify the expected number of cache entries were cleared
finalCacheSize := len(pm.filterRulesMap)
clearedEntries := initialCacheSize - finalCacheSize
require.Equal(t, tt.expectedCleared, clearedEntries, tt.description)
})
}
}

58
hscontrol/policy/v2/types.go
View File

@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ var policyJSONOpts = []json.Options{
const Wildcard = Asterix(0)
var ErrAutogroupSelfRequiresPerNodeResolution = errors.New("autogroup:self requires per-node resolution and cannot be resolved in this context")
type Asterix int
func (a Asterix) Validate() error {
@@ -485,8 +487,6 @@ const (
AutoGroupMember AutoGroup = "autogroup:member"
AutoGroupNonRoot AutoGroup = "autogroup:nonroot"
AutoGroupTagged AutoGroup = "autogroup:tagged"
// These are not yet implemented.
AutoGroupSelf AutoGroup = "autogroup:self"
)
@@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ var autogroups = []AutoGroup{
AutoGroupMember,
AutoGroupNonRoot,
AutoGroupTagged,
AutoGroupSelf,
}
func (ag AutoGroup) Validate() error {
@@ -590,6 +591,12 @@ func (ag AutoGroup) Resolve(p *Policy, users types.Users, nodes views.Slice[type
return build.IPSet()
case AutoGroupSelf:
// autogroup:self represents all devices owned by the same user.
// This cannot be resolved in the general context and should be handled
// specially during policy compilation per-node for security.
return nil, ErrAutogroupSelfRequiresPerNodeResolution
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown autogroup %q", ag)
}
@@ -1586,11 +1593,11 @@ type Policy struct {
var (
// TODO(kradalby): Add these checks for tagOwners and autoApprovers.
autogroupForSrc = []AutoGroup{AutoGroupMember, AutoGroupTagged}
autogroupForDst = []AutoGroup{AutoGroupInternet, AutoGroupMember, AutoGroupTagged}
autogroupForDst = []AutoGroup{AutoGroupInternet, AutoGroupMember, AutoGroupTagged, AutoGroupSelf}
autogroupForSSHSrc = []AutoGroup{AutoGroupMember, AutoGroupTagged}
autogroupForSSHDst = []AutoGroup{AutoGroupMember, AutoGroupTagged}
autogroupForSSHDst = []AutoGroup{AutoGroupMember, AutoGroupTagged, AutoGroupSelf}
autogroupForSSHUser = []AutoGroup{AutoGroupNonRoot}
autogroupNotSupported = []AutoGroup{AutoGroupSelf}
autogroupNotSupported = []AutoGroup{}
)
func validateAutogroupSupported(ag *AutoGroup) error {
@@ -1614,6 +1621,10 @@ func validateAutogroupForSrc(src *AutoGroup) error {
return errors.New(`"autogroup:internet" used in source, it can only be used in ACL destinations`)
}
if src.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
return errors.New(`"autogroup:self" used in source, it can only be used in ACL destinations`)
}
if !slices.Contains(autogroupForSrc, *src) {
return fmt.Errorf("autogroup %q is not supported for ACL sources, can be %v", *src, autogroupForSrc)
}
@@ -2112,3 +2123,40 @@ func validateProtocolPortCompatibility(protocol Protocol, destinations []AliasWi
return nil
}
// usesAutogroupSelf checks if the policy uses autogroup:self in any ACL or SSH rules.
func (p *Policy) usesAutogroupSelf() bool {
if p == nil {
return false
}
// Check ACL rules
for _, acl := range p.ACLs {
for _, src := range acl.Sources {
if ag, ok := src.(*AutoGroup); ok && ag.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
return true
}
}
for _, dest := range acl.Destinations {
if ag, ok := dest.Alias.(*AutoGroup); ok && ag.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
return true
}
}
}
// Check SSH rules
for _, ssh := range p.SSHs {
for _, src := range ssh.Sources {
if ag, ok := src.(*AutoGroup); ok && ag.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
return true
}
}
for _, dest := range ssh.Destinations {
if ag, ok := dest.(*AutoGroup); ok && ag.Is(AutoGroupSelf) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}

34
hscontrol/policy/v2/types_test.go
View File

@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ func TestUnmarshalPolicy(t *testing.T) {
],
}
`,
wantErr: `AutoGroup is invalid, got: "autogroup:invalid", must be one of [autogroup:internet autogroup:member autogroup:nonroot autogroup:tagged]`,
wantErr: `AutoGroup is invalid, got: "autogroup:invalid", must be one of [autogroup:internet autogroup:member autogroup:nonroot autogroup:tagged autogroup:self]`,
},
{
name: "undefined-hostname-errors-2490",
@@ -1881,6 +1881,38 @@ func TestResolvePolicy(t *testing.T) {
mp("100.100.101.7/32"), // Multiple forced tags
},
},
{
name: "autogroup-self",
toResolve: ptr.To(AutoGroupSelf),
nodes: types.Nodes{
{
User: users["testuser"],
IPv4: ap("100.100.101.1"),
},
{
User: users["testuser2"],
IPv4: ap("100.100.101.2"),
},
{
User: users["testuser"],
ForcedTags: []string{"tag:test"},
IPv4: ap("100.100.101.3"),
},
{
User: users["testuser2"],
Hostinfo: &tailcfg.Hostinfo{
RequestTags: []string{"tag:test"},
},
IPv4: ap("100.100.101.4"),
},
},
pol: &Policy{
TagOwners: TagOwners{
Tag("tag:test"): Owners{ptr.To(Username("testuser@"))},
},
},
wantErr: "autogroup:self requires per-node resolution",
},
{
name: "autogroup-invalid",
toResolve: ptr.To(AutoGroup("autogroup:invalid")),

5
hscontrol/state/state.go
View File

@@ -793,6 +793,11 @@ func (s *State) Filter() ([]tailcfg.FilterRule, []matcher.Match) {
return s.polMan.Filter()
}
// FilterForNode returns filter rules for a specific node, handling autogroup:self per-node.
func (s *State) FilterForNode(node types.NodeView) ([]tailcfg.FilterRule, error) {
return s.polMan.FilterForNode(node)
}
// NodeCanHaveTag checks if a node is allowed to have a specific tag.
func (s *State) NodeCanHaveTag(node types.NodeView, tag string) bool {
return s.polMan.NodeCanHaveTag(node, tag)

97
integration/acl_test.go
View File

@@ -1536,3 +1536,100 @@ func TestACLAutogroupTagged(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// Test that only devices owned by the same user can access each other and cannot access devices of other users
func TestACLAutogroupSelf(t *testing.T) {
IntegrationSkip(t)
scenario := aclScenario(t,
&policyv2.Policy{
ACLs: []policyv2.ACL{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: []policyv2.Alias{ptr.To(policyv2.AutoGroupMember)},
Destinations: []policyv2.AliasWithPorts{
aliasWithPorts(ptr.To(policyv2.AutoGroupSelf), tailcfg.PortRangeAny),
},
},
},
},
2,
)
defer scenario.ShutdownAssertNoPanics(t)
err := scenario.WaitForTailscaleSyncWithPeerCount(1, integrationutil.PeerSyncTimeout(), integrationutil.PeerSyncRetryInterval())
require.NoError(t, err)
user1Clients, err := scenario.GetClients("user1")
require.NoError(t, err)
user2Clients, err := scenario.GetClients("user2")
require.NoError(t, err)
// Test that user1's devices can access each other
for _, client := range user1Clients {
for _, peer := range user1Clients {
if client.Hostname() == peer.Hostname() {
continue
}
fqdn, err := peer.FQDN()
require.NoError(t, err)
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/etc/hostname", fqdn)
t.Logf("url from %s (user1) to %s (user1)", client.Hostname(), fqdn)
result, err := client.Curl(url)
assert.Len(t, result, 13)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
}
// Test that user2's devices can access each other
for _, client := range user2Clients {
for _, peer := range user2Clients {
if client.Hostname() == peer.Hostname() {
continue
}
fqdn, err := peer.FQDN()
require.NoError(t, err)
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/etc/hostname", fqdn)
t.Logf("url from %s (user2) to %s (user2)", client.Hostname(), fqdn)
result, err := client.Curl(url)
assert.Len(t, result, 13)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
}
// Test that devices from different users cannot access each other
for _, client := range user1Clients {
for _, peer := range user2Clients {
fqdn, err := peer.FQDN()
require.NoError(t, err)
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/etc/hostname", fqdn)
t.Logf("url from %s (user1) to %s (user2) - should FAIL", client.Hostname(), fqdn)
result, err := client.Curl(url)
assert.Empty(t, result, "user1 should not be able to access user2's devices with autogroup:self")
assert.Error(t, err, "connection from user1 to user2 should fail")
}
}
for _, client := range user2Clients {
for _, peer := range user1Clients {
fqdn, err := peer.FQDN()
require.NoError(t, err)
url := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/etc/hostname", fqdn)
t.Logf("url from %s (user2) to %s (user1) - should FAIL", client.Hostname(), fqdn)
result, err := client.Curl(url)
assert.Empty(t, result, "user2 should not be able to access user1's devices with autogroup:self")
assert.Error(t, err, "connection from user2 to user1 should fail")
}
}
}

82
integration/ssh_test.go
View File

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
"tailscale.com/types/ptr"
)
func isSSHNoAccessStdError(stderr string) bool {
@@ -458,3 +459,84 @@ func assertSSHNoAccessStdError(t *testing.T, err error, stderr string) {
t.Errorf("expected stderr output suggesting access denied, got: %s", stderr)
}
}
// TestSSHAutogroupSelf tests that SSH with autogroup:self works correctly:
// - Users can SSH to their own devices
// - Users cannot SSH to other users' devices
func TestSSHAutogroupSelf(t *testing.T) {
IntegrationSkip(t)
scenario := sshScenario(t,
&policyv2.Policy{
ACLs: []policyv2.ACL{
{
Action: "accept",
Protocol: "tcp",
Sources: []policyv2.Alias{wildcard()},
Destinations: []policyv2.AliasWithPorts{
aliasWithPorts(wildcard(), tailcfg.PortRangeAny),
},
},
},
SSHs: []policyv2.SSH{
{
Action: "accept",
Sources: policyv2.SSHSrcAliases{
ptr.To(policyv2.AutoGroupMember),
},
Destinations: policyv2.SSHDstAliases{
ptr.To(policyv2.AutoGroupSelf),
},
Users: []policyv2.SSHUser{policyv2.SSHUser("ssh-it-user")},
},
},
},
2, // 2 clients per user
)
defer scenario.ShutdownAssertNoPanics(t)
user1Clients, err := scenario.ListTailscaleClients("user1")
assertNoErrListClients(t, err)
user2Clients, err := scenario.ListTailscaleClients("user2")
assertNoErrListClients(t, err)
err = scenario.WaitForTailscaleSync()
assertNoErrSync(t, err)
// Test that user1's devices can SSH to each other
for _, client := range user1Clients {
for _, peer := range user1Clients {
if client.Hostname() == peer.Hostname() {
continue
}
assertSSHHostname(t, client, peer)
}
}
// Test that user2's devices can SSH to each other
for _, client := range user2Clients {
for _, peer := range user2Clients {
if client.Hostname() == peer.Hostname() {
continue
}
assertSSHHostname(t, client, peer)
}
}
// Test that user1 cannot SSH to user2's devices
for _, client := range user1Clients {
for _, peer := range user2Clients {
assertSSHPermissionDenied(t, client, peer)
}
}
// Test that user2 cannot SSH to user1's devices
for _, client := range user2Clients {
for _, peer := range user1Clients {
assertSSHPermissionDenied(t, client, peer)
}
}
}