huma sets an unexpected property's value to the whole request object.
A refused policy, or another 400, now carries its reason in message,
and a failed test run one data entry per failing test naming its src.
A stream back within the reconnect grace sent peers an online patch,
a router's sent every node a policy response, and a relogin on
unchanged keys sent a key patch; nothing had changed.
The flag moves from the key to the node, so a login with another key no
longer changes it. A user claiming a tagged node still clears it. v1
nodes carry the flag.
As on Tailscale SaaS, the node's own entry keeps Hostname, RequestTags,
RoutableIPs and Services; peers get Hostname, OS, Services without
peerapi-dns-proxy, SSH host keys and AppConnector, and resend on those.
Only a key that speaks for a tagged node re-authenticates it: a tagged
key, or one of the user it was tagged from, which takes it back with a
new node key. Another user's key or login adds that user's own device.
Registration approval runs on the node the writer replaces. A policy
reload approves nothing, and a map request only when its announced
routes change, so neither re-grants a route an admin revoked.
Every destination overlaps /0, so any rule offered a peer's exit routes.
They now need a rule to the internet, the test exit-node visibility
uses; via steering defers them to a regular grant only on that test.
Adjacent node addresses merge into one prefix, and each node's filter
kept all of it. A prefix made only of node addresses now shrinks to the
node's own; a prefix the policy wrote, or one the node routes, stays.
Routes are matched as written, so such a prefix never equals the one a
client announces. The approval APIs answer 400 and autoApprovers refuses
it at load and write, with Tailscale's text.
Such a route names a node, not a subnet: it stays approved and listed
but no viewer gets it. Via inclusions skip the election, so the rule
sits on everything RoutesForPeer returns.
A router that reconnects joins as a standby; one that kept its session
takes its routes back once available again, as on Tailscale. Both the
global and the via election use it, in place of anti-flap stickiness.
Peers keep the routes of an offline or expired router, as on Tailscale.
The previous primary keeps the prefix, else the lowest-ID approver;
never one the prober declared unreachable.
An accept passes only when each node behind the dst is reached, as on
Tailscale SaaS; a deny keeps its rule. A CIDR, "*" or autogroup:tagged
src names no user or host, so its test fails.
Read-only and key-making OAuth tokens of each tag set list auth keys
with and without all=true, over admin- and token-made keys of every tag
relation, one admin key made after the token-made ones.
Labels under taken hostnames, case-only renames, hostname changes, long
hostnames and a Service's name; API, peer and self per step, and State
labels as a restart would load them.
One policy over joins, a via router swap, an admin tag, a delete and a
group edit; filter, SSH, peers and routes per step, and the manager
against a fresh one.
Kristoffer Dalby