Files
headscale/hscontrol/mapper/mapper_test.go
T
Kristoffer Dalby 4c6a2dff52 state: resolve changed peers through adjacency
ListPeers now filters named peers against the recipient's adjacency, so
a node the policy hides is never delivered.

Updates #3417
2026-09-10 13:06:13 +02:00

816 lines
25 KiB
Go

package mapper
import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp/cmpopts"
"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/db"
"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/state"
"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types/change"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"tailscale.com/tailcfg"
"tailscale.com/types/dnstype"
)
var iap = func(ipStr string) *netip.Addr {
ip := netip.MustParseAddr(ipStr)
return &ip
}
func TestDNSConfigMapResponse(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
magicDNS bool
want *tailcfg.DNSConfig
}{
{
magicDNS: true,
want: &tailcfg.DNSConfig{
Routes: map[string][]*dnstype.Resolver{},
Domains: []string{
"foobar.headscale.net",
},
Proxied: true,
},
},
{
magicDNS: false,
want: &tailcfg.DNSConfig{
Domains: []string{"foobar.headscale.net"},
Proxied: false,
},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("with-magicdns-%v", tt.magicDNS), func(t *testing.T) {
mach := func(hostname, username string, userid uint) *types.Node {
return &types.Node{
Hostname: hostname,
UserID: new(userid),
User: &types.User{
Name: username,
},
}
}
baseDomain := "foobar.headscale.net"
dnsConfigOrig := tailcfg.DNSConfig{
Routes: make(map[string][]*dnstype.Resolver),
Domains: []string{baseDomain},
Proxied: tt.magicDNS,
}
nodeInShared1 := mach("test_get_shared_nodes_1", "shared1", 1)
got := generateDNSConfig(
&types.Config{
TailcfgDNSConfig: &dnsConfigOrig,
},
nodeInShared1.View(),
nil,
)
if diff := cmp.Diff(tt.want, got, cmpopts.EquateEmpty()); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("expandAlias() unexpected result (-want +got):\n%s", diff)
}
})
}
}
func TestNextDNSCapMapRendering(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
mkConfig := func(addrs ...string) *types.Config {
resolvers := make([]*dnstype.Resolver, len(addrs))
for i, a := range addrs {
resolvers[i] = &dnstype.Resolver{Addr: a}
}
return &types.Config{
TailcfgDNSConfig: &tailcfg.DNSConfig{
Resolvers: resolvers,
},
}
}
mkNode := func() types.NodeView {
return (&types.Node{
ID: 1,
Hostname: "node1",
IPv4: iap("100.64.0.1"),
Hostinfo: &tailcfg.Hostinfo{OS: "linux"},
}).View()
}
// resolverAddr extracts the first resolver's address with a
// bounds check. Without it, a regression that drops the
// resolver list would nil-panic instead of failing cleanly.
resolverAddr := func(t *testing.T, got *tailcfg.DNSConfig) string {
t.Helper()
if got == nil {
t.Fatalf("generateDNSConfig returned nil")
}
if len(got.Resolvers) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("generateDNSConfig returned no Resolvers")
}
return got.Resolvers[0].Addr
}
t.Run("no_capmap_metadata_appended", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
got := generateDNSConfig(
mkConfig("https://dns.nextdns.io/abc"),
mkNode(),
nil,
)
want := "https://dns.nextdns.io/abc?device_ip=100.64.0.1&device_model=linux&device_name=node1"
if addr := resolverAddr(t, got); addr != want {
t.Errorf("addr = %q, want %q", addr, want)
}
})
t.Run("profile_overrides_global", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
capMap := tailcfg.NodeCapMap{
"nextdns:override": []tailcfg.RawMessage{},
}
got := generateDNSConfig(
mkConfig("https://dns.nextdns.io/global"),
mkNode(),
capMap,
)
want := "https://dns.nextdns.io/override?device_ip=100.64.0.1&device_model=linux&device_name=node1"
if addr := resolverAddr(t, got); addr != want {
t.Errorf("addr = %q, want %q", addr, want)
}
})
t.Run("no_device_info_skips_metadata", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
capMap := tailcfg.NodeCapMap{
"nextdns:abc": []tailcfg.RawMessage{},
"nextdns:no-device-info": []tailcfg.RawMessage{},
}
got := generateDNSConfig(
mkConfig("https://dns.nextdns.io/global"),
mkNode(),
capMap,
)
want := "https://dns.nextdns.io/abc"
if addr := resolverAddr(t, got); addr != want {
t.Errorf("addr = %q, want %q", addr, want)
}
})
t.Run("non_nextdns_resolver_untouched", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
capMap := tailcfg.NodeCapMap{
"nextdns:abc": []tailcfg.RawMessage{},
}
got := generateDNSConfig(
mkConfig("https://dns.example.org/dns-query"),
mkNode(),
capMap,
)
want := "https://dns.example.org/dns-query"
if addr := resolverAddr(t, got); addr != want {
t.Errorf("non-nextdns resolver was rewritten: %q", addr)
}
})
}
// TestBuildFromChangeFiltersPeerPatchesByVisibility proves that incremental
// peer-change patches (online/offline, endpoint, key-expiry) are restricted to
// the recipient's ACL-visible peer set, the same way buildTailPeers filters
// full peer objects via policy.ReduceNodes. Without it, a node receives the
// existence, presence, and addresses of peers its policy forbids accessing.
func TestBuildFromChangeFiltersPeerPatchesByVisibility(t *testing.T) {
tmp := t.TempDir()
p4 := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10")
p6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48")
cfg := &types.Config{
Database: types.DatabaseConfig{
Type: types.DatabaseSqlite,
Sqlite: types.SqliteConfig{Path: tmp + "/h.db"},
},
PrefixV4: &p4,
PrefixV6: &p6,
IPAllocation: types.IPAllocationStrategySequential,
BaseDomain: "headscale.test",
Policy: types.PolicyConfig{Mode: types.PolicyModeDB},
DERP: types.DERPConfig{
DERPMap: &tailcfg.DERPMap{
Regions: map[tailcfg.DERPRegionID]*tailcfg.DERPRegion{999: {RegionID: 999}},
},
},
Tuning: types.Tuning{
NodeStoreBatchSize: state.TestBatchSize,
NodeStoreBatchTimeout: state.TestBatchTimeout,
},
}
database, err := db.NewHeadscaleDatabase(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
user1 := database.CreateUserForTest("u1")
user2 := database.CreateUserForTest("u2")
n1 := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user1, "n1")
n1b := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user1, "n1b")
n2 := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user2, "n2")
require.NoError(t, database.Close())
s, err := state.NewState(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() })
// Each user may reach only its own devices, so n1 cannot access n2.
policy := `{"acls":[
{"action":"accept","src":["u1@"],"dst":["u1@:*"]},
{"action":"accept","src":["u2@"],"dst":["u2@:*"]}
]}`
_, err = s.SetPolicy([]byte(policy))
require.NoError(t, err)
m := &mapper{state: s, cfg: cfg}
// n2 (user2) comes online; n1 (user1) must NOT receive its patch.
leakChange := change.NodeOnline(n2.ID)
resp, err := m.buildFromChange(n1.ID, tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion, &leakChange)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, resp)
for _, p := range resp.PeersChangedPatch {
assert.NotEqual(t, n2.ID.NodeID(), p.NodeID,
"n1 must not receive an online patch for n2, which its policy forbids accessing")
}
// Control: n1b (same user) coming online IS visible to n1.
okChange := change.NodeOnline(n1b.ID)
resp2, err := m.buildFromChange(n1.ID, tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion, &okChange)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, resp2)
var gotVisible bool
for _, p := range resp2.PeersChangedPatch {
if p.NodeID == n1b.ID.NodeID() {
gotVisible = true
}
}
assert.True(t, gotVisible,
"n1 must receive the online patch for visible same-user peer n1b")
}
// TestBuildFromChangeFiltersUserProfilesByVisibility proves the incremental
// PeersChanged path restricts UserProfiles to the recipient's ACL-visible
// peers, like the full-map path (whose ListPeers returns the
// BuildPeerMap-filtered set). Without it, a changed node broadcast to all
// nodes leaks its owner's identity (login name, display name, avatar) to
// recipients whose policy forbids accessing that node.
func TestBuildFromChangeFiltersUserProfilesByVisibility(t *testing.T) {
tmp := t.TempDir()
p4 := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10")
p6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48")
cfg := &types.Config{
Database: types.DatabaseConfig{
Type: types.DatabaseSqlite,
Sqlite: types.SqliteConfig{Path: tmp + "/h.db"},
},
PrefixV4: &p4,
PrefixV6: &p6,
IPAllocation: types.IPAllocationStrategySequential,
BaseDomain: "headscale.test",
Policy: types.PolicyConfig{Mode: types.PolicyModeDB},
DERP: types.DERPConfig{
DERPMap: &tailcfg.DERPMap{
Regions: map[tailcfg.DERPRegionID]*tailcfg.DERPRegion{999: {RegionID: 999}},
},
},
Tuning: types.Tuning{
NodeStoreBatchSize: state.TestBatchSize,
NodeStoreBatchTimeout: state.TestBatchTimeout,
},
}
database, err := db.NewHeadscaleDatabase(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
user1 := database.CreateUserForTest("u1")
user2 := database.CreateUserForTest("u2")
n1 := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user1, "n1")
n2 := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user2, "n2")
require.NoError(t, database.Close())
s, err := state.NewState(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() })
// Each user may reach only its own devices, so n1 cannot access n2.
policy := `{"acls":[
{"action":"accept","src":["u1@"],"dst":["u1@:*"]},
{"action":"accept","src":["u2@"],"dst":["u2@:*"]}
]}`
_, err = s.SetPolicy([]byte(policy))
require.NoError(t, err)
m := &mapper{state: s, cfg: cfg}
// n2 (user2) is added and broadcast. n1 (user1) cannot access it, so n1
// must NOT receive user2's profile.
c := change.NodeAdded(n2.ID)
resp, err := m.buildFromChange(n1.ID, tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion, &c)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, resp)
for _, up := range resp.UserProfiles {
assert.NotEqual(t, user2.TailscaleUserProfile().ID, up.ID,
"n1 must not receive user2's profile; n2 is not ACL-visible to n1")
}
}
// TestBuildFromChangeVisibilityMatchesFullMap is the consolidation guard for
// PR #3304: the incremental change paths (peer patches via NodeOnline, changed
// peers via NodeAdded) must expose exactly the same ACL-visible peer set as the
// full-map path under every policy shape, and a cross-user UserProfile must not
// leak. If a future refactor lets one path drift from another, this fails.
//
// It pins two behaviours the scattered per-path filters get wrong today and the
// consolidation onto the snapshot peer map must fix: deny-all (empty matchers)
// must hide every peer on the incremental path rather than fall open to "no
// matchers => all visible", and per-node policies (autogroup:self) must agree
// across paths.
func TestBuildFromChangeVisibilityMatchesFullMap(t *testing.T) {
tmp := t.TempDir()
p4 := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10")
p6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48")
cfg := &types.Config{
Database: types.DatabaseConfig{
Type: types.DatabaseSqlite,
Sqlite: types.SqliteConfig{Path: tmp + "/h.db"},
},
PrefixV4: &p4,
PrefixV6: &p6,
IPAllocation: types.IPAllocationStrategySequential,
BaseDomain: "headscale.test",
Policy: types.PolicyConfig{Mode: types.PolicyModeDB},
DERP: types.DERPConfig{
DERPMap: &tailcfg.DERPMap{
Regions: map[tailcfg.DERPRegionID]*tailcfg.DERPRegion{999: {RegionID: 999}},
},
},
Tuning: types.Tuning{
NodeStoreBatchSize: state.TestBatchSize,
NodeStoreBatchTimeout: state.TestBatchTimeout,
},
}
database, err := db.NewHeadscaleDatabase(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
user1 := database.CreateUserForTest("u1")
user2 := database.CreateUserForTest("u2")
n1 := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user1, "n1")
n1b := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user1, "n1b")
n2 := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user2, "n2")
require.NoError(t, database.Close())
s, err := state.NewState(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() })
m := &mapper{state: s, cfg: cfg}
capVer := tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion
// fullVisible returns the peer IDs n1 sees in the full map.
fullVisible := func(t *testing.T) map[tailcfg.NodeID]bool {
t.Helper()
resp, err := m.fullMapResponse(n1.ID, capVer)
require.NoError(t, err)
got := map[tailcfg.NodeID]bool{}
for _, p := range resp.Peers {
got[p.ID] = true
}
return got
}
// patchReaches reports whether a NodeOnline patch for id is delivered to n1.
patchReaches := func(t *testing.T, id types.NodeID) bool {
t.Helper()
c := change.NodeOnline(id)
resp, err := m.buildFromChange(n1.ID, capVer, &c)
require.NoError(t, err)
if resp == nil {
return false
}
for _, p := range resp.PeersChangedPatch {
if p.NodeID == id.NodeID() {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// changedReaches reports whether a NodeAdded changed-peer for id reaches n1.
changedReaches := func(t *testing.T, id types.NodeID) bool {
t.Helper()
c := change.NodeAdded(id)
resp, err := m.buildFromChange(n1.ID, capVer, &c)
require.NoError(t, err)
if resp == nil {
return false
}
for _, p := range resp.PeersChanged {
if p.ID == id.NodeID() {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// profileReaches reports whether want's profile is delivered to n1 when n
// is added. Use a cross-user node so the result is not masked by n1's own
// always-present user profile.
profileReaches := func(t *testing.T, n *types.Node, want tailcfg.UserID) bool {
t.Helper()
c := change.NodeAdded(n.ID)
resp, err := m.buildFromChange(n1.ID, capVer, &c)
require.NoError(t, err)
if resp == nil {
return false
}
for _, up := range resp.UserProfiles {
if up.ID == want {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// wantFull pins the actual peer-visibility semantics so the cross-path
// check below cannot pass vacuously (e.g. if every path broke to zero
// identically).
// Note deny_all: an empty ACL set yields no peer adjacency, so nothing is
// visible on any path. user_isolation and autogroup_self remain the
// discriminating cases that prove filtering works.
tests := []struct {
name string
policy string
wantFull int
}{
{"allow_all", `{"acls":[{"action":"accept","src":["*"],"dst":["*:*"]}]}`, 2},
{
"user_isolation",
`{"acls":[
{"action":"accept","src":["u1@"],"dst":["u1@:*"]},
{"action":"accept","src":["u2@"],"dst":["u2@:*"]}
]}`,
1,
},
{"deny_all", `{"acls":[]}`, 0},
{
"autogroup_self",
`{"acls":[{"action":"accept","src":["autogroup:member"],"dst":["autogroup:self:*"]}]}`,
1,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
_, err := s.SetPolicy([]byte(tt.policy))
require.NoError(t, err)
full := fullVisible(t)
require.Lenf(t, full, tt.wantFull,
"%s: unexpected full-map visible peer count", tt.name)
for _, peer := range []*types.Node{n1b, n2} {
want := full[peer.ID.NodeID()]
assert.Equalf(t, want, patchReaches(t, peer.ID),
"%s: NodeOnline patch for %s must reach n1 iff full-map shows it",
tt.name, peer.Hostname)
assert.Equalf(t, want, changedReaches(t, peer.ID),
"%s: NodeAdded changed-peer for %s must reach n1 iff full-map shows it",
tt.name, peer.Hostname)
}
// Cross-user profile (user2) must appear iff n2 is visible to n1.
assert.Equalf(t, full[n2.ID.NodeID()], profileReaches(t, n2, user2.TailscaleUserProfile().ID),
"%s: user2 profile must be sent iff n2 is visible to n1", tt.name)
})
}
}
// TestFullMapResponseSurvivesPeerWithInvalidName proves a single node with an
// FQDN-invalid GivenName must not break map generation for its peers.
//
// A node whose stored GivenName is empty (ErrNodeHasNoGivenName) or yields an
// FQDN longer than MaxHostnameLength (ErrHostnameTooLong) makes GetFQDN, and
// therefore TailNode, return an error. buildTailPeers used to abort the entire
// peer list on the first such error, so MapResponseBuilder.Build() failed for
// every node that could see the bad peer; on the initial-connection path that
// surfaced as "PollNetMap: ... unexpected EOF" and the "Unable to connect to
// the Tailscale coordination server" health warning. A legacy DB row loads
// verbatim (NewNodeStore reads db.ListNodes() without re-sanitising names), so
// the bad peer persists across restart. The build for an unaffected viewer
// must succeed: the bad peer is dropped, valid peers and self survive.
func TestFullMapResponseSurvivesPeerWithInvalidName(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
badName string
}{
{"empty given name", ""},
{"over-long fqdn", strings.Repeat("a", types.MaxHostnameLength+1)},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
tmp := t.TempDir()
p4 := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10")
p6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48")
cfg := &types.Config{
Database: types.DatabaseConfig{
Type: types.DatabaseSqlite,
Sqlite: types.SqliteConfig{Path: tmp + "/h.db"},
},
PrefixV4: &p4,
PrefixV6: &p6,
IPAllocation: types.IPAllocationStrategySequential,
BaseDomain: "headscale.test",
Policy: types.PolicyConfig{Mode: types.PolicyModeDB},
DERP: types.DERPConfig{
DERPMap: &tailcfg.DERPMap{
Regions: map[tailcfg.DERPRegionID]*tailcfg.DERPRegion{999: {RegionID: 999}},
},
},
Tuning: types.Tuning{
NodeStoreBatchSize: state.TestBatchSize,
NodeStoreBatchTimeout: state.TestBatchTimeout,
},
}
database, err := db.NewHeadscaleDatabase(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
user := database.CreateUserForTest("u1")
n1 := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "n1") // viewer, valid
bad := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "bad") // peer, name corrupted below
good := database.CreateRegisteredNodeForTest(user, "good") // peer, valid control
// Simulate a legacy/corrupt row that v29 loads verbatim.
require.NoError(t, database.DB.
Model(&types.Node{}).
Where("id = ?", bad.ID).
Update("given_name", tt.badName).Error)
require.NoError(t, database.Close())
s, err := state.NewState(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = s.Close() })
// Allow-all so n1 sees both peers; the bad one must still be dropped.
_, err = s.SetPolicy([]byte(`{"acls":[{"action":"accept","src":["*"],"dst":["*:*"]}]}`))
require.NoError(t, err)
m := &mapper{state: s, cfg: cfg}
capVer := tailcfg.CurrentCapabilityVersion
resp, err := m.fullMapResponse(n1.ID, capVer)
require.NoError(t, err, "n1's map must build despite a peer with an invalid name")
require.NotNil(t, resp)
require.NotNil(t, resp.Node, "n1 must receive its own self node")
peers := map[tailcfg.NodeID]bool{}
for _, p := range resp.Peers {
peers[p.ID] = true
}
assert.False(t, peers[bad.ID.NodeID()], "the peer with an invalid name must be dropped")
assert.True(t, peers[good.ID.NodeID()], "valid peers must remain in the map")
})
}
}
// TestGenerateDNSConfigNilHostinfoNoPanic proves generateDNSConfig does not
// panic when a node's Hostinfo is nil (e.g. a legacy DB row with a NULL
// host_info column). addNextDNSMetadata dereferenced node.Hostinfo().OS()
// without the .Valid() guard its siblings (RequestTags, TailNode) apply, so
// building such a node's map crashed the server whenever a NextDNS resolver
// was configured.
func TestGenerateDNSConfigNilHostinfoNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
node := (&types.Node{
Hostname: "legacy-node",
IPv4: iap("100.64.0.1"),
// Hostinfo intentionally nil, as a legacy NULL host_info row loads.
}).View()
cfg := &types.Config{
TailcfgDNSConfig: &tailcfg.DNSConfig{
Resolvers: []*dnstype.Resolver{{Addr: "https://dns.nextdns.io/abc"}},
},
}
require.NotPanics(t, func() {
generateDNSConfig(cfg, node, nil)
}, "generateDNSConfig must not panic when a node has nil Hostinfo")
}
// policyShapes covers the paths that decide how the mapper filters peers: a
// global filter with matchers, a per-node (autogroup:self) filter, a policy
// that leaves every node with zero matchers, and no rules at all. The
// zero-matcher shape is the interesting one, because
// [MapResponseBuilder.buildTailPeers] skips [policy.ReduceNodes] there and
// emits its input as given.
var policyShapes = []struct {
name string
policy string
}{
{
name: "allow all",
policy: `{"acls":[{"action":"accept","src":["*"],"dst":["*:*"]}]}`,
},
{
name: "autogroup self",
policy: `{"acls":[{"action":"accept","src":["autogroup:member"],"dst":["autogroup:self:*"]}]}`,
},
{
name: "no rules",
policy: `{"acls":[]}`,
},
{
name: "empty policy",
policy: `{}`,
},
}
// assertSelfNotAPeer fails when a [tailcfg.MapResponse] addressed to nodeID
// mentions nodeID in any peer-carrying field.
//
// The Tailscale client merges [tailcfg.MapResponse.PeersChanged] straight into
// its peer map (controlclient updatePeersStateFromResponse) and keeps the self
// node in a separate field, so a node present in its own peer list is rendered
// twice by clients that concatenate peers with self.
func assertSelfNotAPeer(t *testing.T, nodeID types.NodeID, resp *tailcfg.MapResponse, what string) {
t.Helper()
if resp == nil {
return
}
self := nodeID.NodeID()
for _, p := range resp.Peers {
assert.NotEqualf(t, self, p.ID, "%s: node %d listed in its own Peers", what, nodeID)
}
for _, p := range resp.PeersChanged {
assert.NotEqualf(t, self, p.ID, "%s: node %d listed in its own PeersChanged", what, nodeID)
}
for _, p := range resp.PeersChangedPatch {
assert.NotEqualf(t, self, p.NodeID, "%s: node %d patched in its own PeersChangedPatch", what, nodeID)
}
for _, id := range resp.PeersRemoved {
assert.NotEqualf(t, self, id, "%s: node %d listed in its own PeersRemoved", what, nodeID)
}
}
// TestMapResponseNeverContainsSelfAsPeer drives the [change.Change] shapes the
// server emits through the response builder for every node, under each policy
// shape, and asserts the recipient is never present in its own peer fields.
func TestMapResponseNeverContainsSelfAsPeer(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range policyShapes {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
testData, cleanup := setupBatcherWithTestData(t, NewBatcherAndMapper, 2, 3, largeBufferSize)
defer cleanup()
_, err := testData.State.SetPolicy([]byte(tt.policy))
require.NoError(t, err)
batcher := unwrapBatcher(testData.Batcher)
allIDs := make([]types.NodeID, 0, len(testData.Nodes))
for i := range testData.Nodes {
tn := &testData.Nodes[i]
require.NoError(t, testData.Batcher.AddNode(tn.n.ID, tn.ch, 100, nil))
allIDs = append(allIDs, tn.n.ID)
}
for _, recipient := range allIDs {
changes := map[string]change.Change{
"full self": change.FullSelf(recipient),
"full update": change.FullUpdate(),
"policy change": change.PolicyChange(),
"self added": change.NodeAdded(recipient),
"self online": change.NodeOnline(recipient),
"self offline": change.NodeOffline(recipient),
// A batch naming every node, the recipient included.
// change.PeersChanged carries no OriginNode, so the
// self-update short circuit in buildFromChange never fires
// and the peer lookup is the only thing left to drop self.
"all peers changed": change.PeersChanged("all peers", allIDs...),
}
for name, ch := range changes {
resp, err := batcher.MapResponseFromChange(recipient, ch)
require.NoError(t, err, "%s for node %d", name, recipient)
assertSelfNotAPeer(t, recipient, resp, name)
}
}
})
}
}
// TestNoSelfAsPeerDuringRealNodeChurn exercises the change flow poll.go drives
// (connect, disconnect, reconnect, policy reload, key expiry) and scans every
// delivered [tailcfg.MapResponse] for the recipient's own node.
func TestNoSelfAsPeerDuringRealNodeChurn(t *testing.T) {
// How long a node's stream must stay silent before the churn counts as
// settled and the scan moves on to the next node.
const quietPeriod = 500 * time.Millisecond
for _, tt := range policyShapes {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
testData, cleanup := setupBatcherWithTestData(t, NewBatcherAndMapper, 2, 3, largeBufferSize)
defer cleanup()
_, err := testData.State.SetPolicy([]byte(tt.policy))
require.NoError(t, err)
batcher := testData.Batcher
for i := range testData.Nodes {
tn := &testData.Nodes[i]
require.NoError(t, batcher.AddNode(tn.n.ID, tn.ch, 100, nil))
}
// Drop and re-add every node but the first, then reload the
// policy and expire the one node that never reconnected.
for i := 1; i < len(testData.Nodes); i++ {
tn := &testData.Nodes[i]
batcher.RemoveNode(tn.n.ID, tn.ch)
require.NoError(t, batcher.AddNode(tn.n.ID, tn.ch, 100, nil))
}
_, err = testData.State.SetPolicy([]byte(tt.policy))
require.NoError(t, err)
expiry := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
_, c, err := testData.State.SetNodeExpiry(testData.Nodes[0].n.ID, &expiry)
require.NoError(t, err)
batcher.AddWork(c)
for i := range testData.Nodes {
tn := &testData.Nodes[i]
for quiet := false; !quiet; {
select {
case resp := <-tn.ch:
assertSelfNotAPeer(t, tn.n.ID, resp, "churn")
case <-time.After(quietPeriod):
quiet = true
}
}
}
})
}
}