Files
headscale/hscontrol/oidc_test.go
T
Kristoffer Dalby 622e08f5e6 oidc: harden callback CSRF cookies, state reuse, and issuer config
Defence-in-depth fixes to the OIDC login flow.

Set the state/nonce cookie Secure flag from the configured server_url
scheme rather than req.TLS, so the cookies stay Secure behind a
TLS-terminating reverse proxy where the proxy-to-Headscale hop is plain
HTTP. Deriving it from config avoids trusting a spoofable
X-Forwarded-Proto header.

Make the OIDC state single-use: consume it from the cache on the
callback and clear the state/nonce cookies once validated, so a replayed
callback cannot resolve the same session and the cookies do not linger
until expiry.

Bound OIDC discovery to the caller's context so a slow or unreachable
issuer fails startup within the timeout instead of hanging, and validate
the issuer URL and required client_id/client_secret at config load so an
unworkable setup fails fast.
2026-06-26 09:18:06 +02:00

264 lines
8.5 KiB
Go

package hscontrol
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/expirable"
"github.com/juanfont/headscale/hscontrol/types"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestDoOIDCAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
testCases := []struct {
name string
cfg *types.OIDCConfig
claims *types.OIDCClaims
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "verified email domain",
wantErr: false,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{"test.com"},
AllowedUsers: []string{},
AllowedGroups: []string{},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{
Email: "user@test.com",
EmailVerified: true,
},
},
{
name: "verified email user",
wantErr: false,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{},
AllowedUsers: []string{"user@test.com"},
AllowedGroups: []string{},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{
Email: "user@test.com",
EmailVerified: true,
},
},
{
name: "unverified email domain",
wantErr: true,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{"test.com"},
AllowedUsers: []string{},
AllowedGroups: []string{},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{
Email: "user@test.com",
EmailVerified: false,
},
},
{
name: "group member",
wantErr: false,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{},
AllowedUsers: []string{},
AllowedGroups: []string{"test"},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{Groups: []string{"test"}},
},
{
name: "non group member",
wantErr: true,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{},
AllowedUsers: []string{},
AllowedGroups: []string{"nope"},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{Groups: []string{"testo"}},
},
{
name: "group member but bad domain",
wantErr: true,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{"user@good.com"},
AllowedUsers: []string{},
AllowedGroups: []string{"test group"},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{Groups: []string{"test group"}, Email: "bad@bad.com", EmailVerified: true},
},
{
name: "all checks pass",
wantErr: false,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{"test.com"},
AllowedUsers: []string{"user@test.com"},
AllowedGroups: []string{"test group"},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{Groups: []string{"test group"}, Email: "user@test.com", EmailVerified: true},
},
{
name: "all checks pass with unverified email",
wantErr: false,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: false,
AllowedDomains: []string{"test.com"},
AllowedUsers: []string{"user@test.com"},
AllowedGroups: []string{"test group"},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{Groups: []string{"test group"}, Email: "user@test.com", EmailVerified: false},
},
{
name: "fail on unverified email",
wantErr: true,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{"test.com"},
AllowedUsers: []string{"user@test.com"},
AllowedGroups: []string{"test group"},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{Groups: []string{"test group"}, Email: "user@test.com", EmailVerified: false},
},
{
name: "unverified email user only",
wantErr: true,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{},
AllowedUsers: []string{"user@test.com"},
AllowedGroups: []string{},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{
Email: "user@test.com",
EmailVerified: false,
},
},
{
name: "no filters configured",
wantErr: false,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{},
AllowedUsers: []string{},
AllowedGroups: []string{},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{
Email: "anyone@anywhere.com",
EmailVerified: false,
},
},
{
name: "multiple allowed groups second matches",
wantErr: false,
cfg: &types.OIDCConfig{
EmailVerifiedRequired: true,
AllowedDomains: []string{},
AllowedUsers: []string{},
AllowedGroups: []string{"group1", "group2", "group3"},
},
claims: &types.OIDCClaims{Groups: []string{"group2"}},
},
}
for _, tC := range testCases {
t.Run(tC.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := doOIDCAuthorization(tC.cfg, tC.claims)
if ((err != nil) && !tC.wantErr) || ((err == nil) && tC.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("bad authorization: %s > want=%v | got=%v", tC.name, tC.wantErr, err)
}
})
}
}
// TestSetCSRFCookieSameSite verifies the OIDC state/nonce CSRF cookies carry an
// explicit SameSite=Lax attribute. Lax (not Strict) is required because the
// OIDC callback is a cross-site top-level GET navigation from the IdP that must
// still carry the cookie — Strict would drop it and break login. The cookie
// previously set no SameSite (despite a comment claiming it did), leaving
// browsers that do not default to Lax sending it on cross-site requests.
func TestSetCSRFCookieSameSite(t *testing.T) {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/auth/abcdef0123456789", nil)
setCSRFCookie(w, r, "state", false)
cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
require.Len(t, cookies, 1)
assert.Equal(t, http.SameSiteLaxMode, cookies[0].SameSite,
"OIDC CSRF cookie must explicitly set SameSite=Lax")
}
// TestExtractCodeAndStateParam covers the callback's first trust-boundary
// checks: both params required, and a too-short state is rejected before
// getCookieName can slice out of range.
func TestExtractCodeAndStateParam(t *testing.T) {
_, _, err := extractCodeAndStateParamFromRequest(
httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/oidc/callback", nil))
require.Error(t, err)
_, _, err = extractCodeAndStateParamFromRequest(
httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/oidc/callback?code=c&state=abc", nil))
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errOIDCStateTooShort)
code, state, err := extractCodeAndStateParamFromRequest(
httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/oidc/callback?code=c&state=abcdef0123", nil))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "c", code)
assert.Equal(t, "abcdef0123", state)
}
// TestGetAuthInfoFromStateSingleUse asserts a consumed OIDC state cannot be
// resolved twice, so a replayed callback cannot re-bind the same session.
func TestGetAuthInfoFromStateSingleUse(t *testing.T) {
a := &AuthProviderOIDC{
authCache: expirable.NewLRU[string, AuthInfo](16, nil, time.Minute),
}
a.authCache.Add("state-x", AuthInfo{Registration: true})
got := a.getAuthInfoFromState("state-x")
require.NotNil(t, got)
assert.True(t, got.Registration)
assert.Nil(t, a.getAuthInfoFromState("state-x"), "a consumed state must not resolve again")
}
// TestClearOIDCCallbackCookie asserts the cookie is expired (negative MaxAge) on
// the same path it was set with, so the browser drops it.
func TestClearOIDCCallbackCookie(t *testing.T) {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
clearOIDCCallbackCookie(w, "state_abcdef")
cookies := w.Result().Cookies()
require.Len(t, cookies, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "state_abcdef", cookies[0].Name)
assert.Negative(t, cookies[0].MaxAge, "deletion cookie must have negative MaxAge")
}
// TestSetCSRFCookieSecure verifies the Secure flag is driven by the secure
// argument (derived from the configured https server_url), not only req.TLS, so
// cookies stay Secure behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy where req.TLS is
// nil.
func TestSetCSRFCookieSecure(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/auth/abcdef0123456789", nil)
secureRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
setCSRFCookie(secureRec, r, "state", true)
require.Len(t, secureRec.Result().Cookies(), 1)
assert.True(t, secureRec.Result().Cookies()[0].Secure,
"https server_url must set Secure even when req.TLS is nil (proxy case)")
plainRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
setCSRFCookie(plainRec, r, "state", false)
require.Len(t, plainRec.Result().Cookies(), 1)
assert.False(t, plainRec.Result().Cookies()[0].Secure,
"plain-http server_url without req.TLS must not set Secure")
}