25 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Sam RubyandClaude Opus 5.5 c8f74a0b0e Compute a page's script sources once per importmap and host
Every page parsed the importmap and joined each of its URLs against the
request's base URL, about a millisecond of CPU a page, though the answer
changes only with the importmap and the host. Keep the last answer, keyed
by both. One entry, so a request with a made-up Host header can't grow it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 21:06:01 +09:00
Jeremy Daer 19319a1cff Refuse a session for a password that changed after it was checked
A password change ends every session, but a sign-in or sign-in link checked
against the old password just before the change could still save its session
just after, and that session outlived the change.

The session now checks, as it's saved, that the user's password is still the
one the request loaded. The save's transaction holds SQLite's write lock from
the start, so a change commits either before the check, which fails it, or
after the insert, and ends this session with the others. Sessions start
through the user's association so the check sees the user that was
authenticated, and a refused sign-in is answered like a wrong password.
2026-10-20 08:37:07 -07:00
Jeremy Daer 2ba940c683 Allow an asset host only up to its own asset directory
An asset host's path can contain the asset directory too, as in
https://cdn.example.com/assets, and cutting each URL at the first one would
allow everything the host serves under it. Cut at the last one instead.
2026-10-15 19:13:26 -07:00
Jeremy Daer 0a494a10cb Leave the scheme off this origin's script sources
Behind a proxy that terminates TLS without X-Forwarded-Proto, Rails sees
http while the page is https, and an http source on a non-default port
doesn't match. A source without a scheme takes the page's own.
2026-10-15 19:01:12 -07:00
Jeremy Daer 2be2227f40 Allow scripts only from the asset directory, not the whole origin
Uploads are served from this origin too, so script-src 'self' would run one
that a cache still holds under a script type from before the upload guard.
Application pages now allow each importmap URL up to its asset directory
(relative root and asset host included), the inline importmap by hash, and
the service worker by worker-src.
2026-10-15 19:01:12 -07:00
Jeremy Daer 2a449401ec Leave a request without a policy when the policy is turned off
With DISABLE_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY=true there's no application policy,
and the hash callback started an empty one, so pages sent an empty
Content-Security-Policy header. Skip the callback then.
2026-10-15 19:01:12 -07:00
Jeremy Daer 562888251e Enforce a script policy that allows the importmap by hash
script-src 'self', object-src 'none' and base-uri 'self', enforced. The
two inline scripts the importmap helper emits are allowed by their
SHA-256, and the origins its URLs point to (a configured asset host, in
any form Rails accepts) are allowed by name. There is no per-request
nonce, so cached pages stay valid.

DISABLE_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY=true leaves the policy off, for an
install whose proxy or customization injects scripts.
2026-10-15 19:01:12 -07:00
GPT on behalf of DHH a0d72938f3 Keep transaction guards temporary and simplify quick boost forms 2026-10-08 12:40:31 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH a9007010c1 Check cache transactions without leasing a database connection 2026-10-08 12:34:18 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH bbee420097 Reuse epoch-verified record snapshots and avoid empty push payloads 2026-10-08 12:26:50 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH 74381e8b58 Retain content-validated message fragments across unrelated commits 2026-10-08 12:00:45 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH 2c53c46767 Reuse token-free message controls and render posting deliveries once 2026-10-08 11:43:27 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH 0f5d0b2b6e Use header-only forgery protection and cache complete responses 2026-10-08 09:05:10 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH 105f4b8fd1 Digest session credentials in instrumented fragment keys 2026-10-07 21:45:31 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH a95361dd15 Recheck captured snapshot before native fragment lookup 2026-10-07 21:43:26 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH 8d02540e31 Bound native fragment caching and collapse concurrent page renders 2026-10-07 21:38:36 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH b220486c16 Admit paginated HTML and hydrate CSRF tokens outside presentation keys 2026-10-07 20:58:54 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH ac73267b07 Reuse authorized read pages without stale presentation or CSRF masks
Transfer the C completed-response cache lesson into Rails, keeping authentication, room checks and cookies per request. A persistent read-only SQLite observer detects local and foreign commits and rejects racing admission. Whole-page misses render fresh to avoid stale nested fragments; message ETags reflect token-neutral presentation.
2026-10-07 20:02:20 +02:00
GPT on behalf of DHH 765711f27d Preserve request ports in message copy links 2026-10-07 16:37:53 +02:00
Jeremy Daer 9dd19d0c95 Close live Action Cable connections on sign out (#268)
Action Cable authorizes a Connection once at the WebSocket handshake and
never re-checks it. Destroying the session record refuses future handshakes
and HTTP requests bearing the cookie, but a socket opened before sign out
keeps its handshake-time current_user and keeps authorizing new
subscriptions and delivering frames as the signed-out user.

Reset the user's remote connections when the session is terminated. Clients
tear down and reconnect: the signed-out device carries a destroyed session
and cleared cookie and is rejected at the fresh handshake, while the user's
other devices with still-valid sessions reconnect and stay live. This reuses
the existing reset_remote_connections primitive already used on membership
removal, for the same reason.

Run the disconnect last and best-effort, after the session record and cookie
are already gone, so sign out completes even when the realtime service is
unreachable.
2026-08-31 18:21:16 -07:00
Jeremy Daer 79eb9a5516 Require authentication for Active Storage direct uploads (#267)
Active Storage mounts its direct-upload write endpoints -- POST
/rails/active_storage/direct_uploads and the disk-service PUT at
/rails/active_storage/disk/:token -- on framework controllers that inherit
from ActiveStorage::BaseController, so they never pass through
ApplicationController's require_authentication. Anyone who can read the
public login page can lift a CSRF token and Rails session cookie, POST to
the metadata endpoint, and receive a signed disk PUT URL without holding a
Campfire session_token.

That is enough to allocate ActiveStorage::Blob rows and persist bytes to
disk anonymously. The blobs stay unattached (no message can be created
without an account) and nothing purges them, so an unauthenticated caller
can grow storage without bound. Because the recommended self-host layout
co-locates uploaded files and the SQLite database on one /rails/storage
volume, that growth eventually makes database writes fail -- blocking login
and messaging until an administrator frees space and purges the blobs.

Campfire uploads attachments through MessagesController as a normal
multipart POST and does not use direct uploads at all, so these endpoints
have no legitimate anonymous caller. Require a valid Campfire session
before the metadata endpoint allocates a blob or the disk endpoint accepts
an upload; both return 401 to anonymous callers. Serving (disk#show,
representations, blob redirects) is unchanged.
2026-08-30 10:24:41 -07:00
Stanko K.R. 80c9e7fbfe Adjust to the in-house style
- Use jbuilder instead of hashes
- Use resource instead of direct HTTP verbs
    Verbs only make sense if you have one or two routes, if there are
    multiple that emulate what resource does then it's better to use resource.
- Paginate using link headers
- Cache responses
2026-08-11 13:15:38 +02:00
Rosa GutierrezandClaude Opus 4.5 dde94b06ed Delete server-side session on logout
When it's set. Also, store it in current attributes for convenience.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-16 09:31:22 +01:00
Kevin McConnell 30fe6ab121 Add IP-based user banning
This adds the ability to ban a user by their IP address.

When an admin is viewing a user profile, a new "Ban user" button is
present. Clicking on that will:

- Create a ban on the IP addresses that were tracked for that user's
  sessions
- Remove all the messages authored by that user
- Log the user out immediately

In addition, that user will no longer be shown in most user lists in the
app. They are still shown to admins, in account settings. Viewing their
profile from there will now show a "Remove ban" button which can be used
to restore their access (it doesn't restore their messages though --
those are already gone -- it just removes the blocks so they can log in
again).
2025-11-26 14:30:38 +00:00
Kevin McConnell df76a227dc Hello world
First open source release of Campfire 🎉
2025-08-21 09:31:59 +01:00