14 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jeremy Daer c860b51109 Take the SSRF address policy from surfguard instead of keeping our own copy (#241)
* Take the SSRF address policy from surfguard instead of keeping our own copy

Four other apps carried this same classification and the five had drifted into
four different ideas of what "internal" means. It now comes from the surfguard
gem, which is their union. resolve and Violation keep their shapes, so the
opengraph callers are unchanged.

Two verdicts change.

SIIT (::ffff:0:0:0/96) is now recognised. It is the third way an IPv4 address
rides inside an IPv6 one and the only one Ruby has no predicate for --
ipv4_mapped?, ipv4_compat?, private?, loopback? and link_local? are all false
for ::ffff:0:a9fe:a9fe, so it fell through to the IPv6 branch unrecognised and
reached the metadata endpoint. Note the extra group: ::ffff:0:0:0/96 is not the
IPv4-mapped ::ffff:0:0/96 the guard already refused, and the two do not overlap.

The RFC 8215 local-use NAT64 block is now refused whole rather than decoded.
Reading its low 32 bits as an embedded IPv4 is only correct for a /96 Pref64;
the block can host any length from /32 to /96 and the position is not
recoverable from the address alone (RFC 6052 2.2), so the decode reads the
wrong octets. It is never globally routed, so refusing it costs nothing. The
well-known /96 is still decoded and re-checked, so DNS64 for public sites on
IPv6-only hosts keeps working.

Resolution moves from Resolv.getaddress to Resolv.getaddresses, so the guard
sees every address a host answers with rather than only the first.

* Distinguish a DNS lookup failure from a private-IP block in the guard

Advance the surfguard pin so resolve_public_ips raises Unresolvable when a
host resolves to nothing and returns an empty list only when it resolves to a
blocked address. The shim lets Unresolvable propagate as a lookup failure --
matching the old Resolv.getaddress behavior -- and reserves Violation for a
resolved-but-blocked address, so a transient DNS miss is no longer reported as
an SSRF attempt.
2026-08-20 01:59:19 -07:00
Donal McBreen c0cade51a1 Address Copilot review: require ipaddr and re-assert the socket port
The guard uses IPAddr but relied on something else loading it first;
require it explicitly. And the rebinding tests lost their port assertion
when the matchers were loosened for newer Net::HTTP keyword args, so
check the port alongside the IP again.
2026-07-21 11:53:37 +01:00
Donal McBreen 80fdd44622 Remove IPv4 ranges the IPAddr predicates already cover
The RFC1918, loopback, and link-local ranges in DISALLOWED_IPV4
duplicated the private?/loopback?/link_local? checks that run right
before the list scan, so they could never be the deciding factor. Keep
only the ranges the predicates don't catch.
2026-07-21 11:37:17 +01:00
Donal McBreen 4cfcc2a370 Re-check the IPv4 embedded in local-use NAT64 instead of blocking outright
Matches the fizzy guard: the local-use NAT64 prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48,
RFC 8215) embeds an IPv4 target in its low 32 bits just like the
well-known prefix, so run it through the same embedded-IPv4 recheck.
Local-use NAT64 to a public address now resolves (keeping unfurls
working for self-hosters on such networks) while local-use NAT64 to an
internal address stays blocked.
2026-07-20 17:13:18 +01:00
Donal McBreen 9085adcbb3 Block local-use NAT64 and IPv6 benchmarking ranges
The local-use NAT64 prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215) embeds an IPv4
target like the well-known prefix does, but at a deployment-chosen
position we can't extract, so block the whole range outright.

Also block the IPv6 benchmarking range (2001:2::/48, RFC 5180) to match
the IPv4 benchmarking block on 198.18.0.0/15.
2026-07-20 16:49:40 +01:00
Donal McBreen 9fb419e469 Block IPv6 addresses that reach internal IPs in the unfurl guard
The guard blocked the usual private, loopback, and link-local ranges (and
the IPv4-mapped/-compatible IPv6 forms), but let through NAT64, 6to4, and
Teredo addresses, which can point at an internal IPv4, and CGNAT.

Now it pulls the IPv4 out of a NAT64 address and checks that (so NAT64 to a
public site still works), blocks 6to4 and Teredo outright, and adds the
missing IPv4 and IPv6 ranges.
2026-07-20 16:20:15 +01:00
Jeremy Daer e983e3f79f Block IPv6 SSRF bypass via ipv4_compat addresses (#153)
Adds ipv4_mapped? and ipv4_compat? checks to PrivateNetworkGuard.private_ip?
to block SSRF bypass attempts using IPv6 address formats like:
- ::ffff:169.254.169.254 (IPv4-mapped)
- ::169.254.169.254 (IPv4-compatible)

These formats could previously bypass the link_local? check since Ruby
treats them as IPv6 addresses, not IPv4.

Ref: HackerOne #3481701
2025-12-31 13:01:43 -08:00
Stanko K.R. 77bcad65b5 Try to decode SGIDs in multiple ways
This should avoid message decoding failures between different versions
of sgids
2025-12-15 17:00:50 +01:00
Stanko K.R. 0672673916 Disallow SSRF via IPv6 addresses mapped to IPv4 addresses 2025-12-03 08:08:34 +01:00
Jeremy Daer 5667262d1c Security: disallow blind SSRF to link-local IPs via URL unfurling 2025-12-02 21:33:44 -08:00
Stanko K.R. 4d04f9beee Use urlsafe base64 decode 2025-12-02 11:34:12 +01:00
Stanko K.R. bebe518c74 Parse Rails 7 GIDs 2025-12-02 11:06:23 +01:00
Stanko Krtalić eecdb29332 Upgrade to Rails 8 and Ruby 3.4.5 (#1)
* Bump Ruby to 3.4.5
* Update dependencies
* Adjust for Rails 8 and Ruby 3.5 API changes
* Mark params strings as mutable in prepapration for frozen strings in Ruby 3.5
* Update test for HTML5 sanitizer
    With Rails 7.1 the HTML5 sanitizer became the default, this breakts this test because the old sanitizer used to delete unpermitted nodes, while the new one returns their content
    The final string is safe, but different then it used to be in Rails 7.0
* Remove direct Turbo tesh helpers require & parallelize tests
* Fix Zeitwerk issues with rails extensions
* Update Resque setup for Redis 5+
* Remove unused views
* Remove GID v1 handler
2025-09-02 17:02:41 +02:00
Kevin McConnell df76a227dc Hello world
First open source release of Campfire 🎉
2025-08-21 09:31:59 +01:00