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Author SHA1 Message Date
Jeremy Daer ae7a34113f Block IPv6 encapsulation and CGNAT ranges in SSRF guard
Add NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96), 6to4 (2002::/16), and CGNAT shared address
space (100.64.0.0/10) to the private-network guard. These ranges can
smuggle requests toward internal networks and were not covered by the
existing predicates, leaving an SSRF bypass. Introduce DISALLOWED_RANGES
and OR it into private_ip?, preserving LOCAL_IP behavior.

Ref: weekend run #3873122 (IPv6 encapsulation SSRF ranges)
2026-07-20 02:17:12 -07:00
3 changed files with 28 additions and 95 deletions

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+10 -53
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@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
require "ipaddr"
require "resolv" require "resolv"
module RestrictedHTTP module RestrictedHTTP
@@ -7,32 +6,15 @@ module RestrictedHTTP
module PrivateNetworkGuard module PrivateNetworkGuard
extend self extend self
# IPv4 special-use ranges (RFC 5735/6890) not already covered by the LOCAL_IP = IPAddr.new("0.0.0.0/8") # "This" network
# private?/loopback?/link_local? predicates in #disallowed_ipv4?.
DISALLOWED_IPV4 = %w[
0.0.0.0/8 100.64.0.0/10 192.0.0.0/24 192.0.2.0/24 192.88.99.0/24
198.18.0.0/15 198.51.100.0/24 203.0.113.0/24 224.0.0.0/4 240.0.0.0/4
].map { |cidr| IPAddr.new(cidr) }.freeze
# IPv6 special-use ranges not caught by the predicates. 6to4 (2002::/16) and # IPv6 transition/encapsulation and shared-address ranges that can smuggle
# Teredo (2001::/32) are deprecated transition mechanisms with no legitimate # requests toward internal networks and must never be reachable.
# fetch target, so they are blocked outright. ULA (fc00::/7, incl. the AWS DISALLOWED_RANGES = [
# IMDSv6 address fd00:ec2::254), link-local, and loopback are covered by the IPAddr.new("64:ff9b::/96"), # NAT64 (RFC 6052) — embeds IPv4 in IPv6
# predicates in #disallowed_ipv6?. IPAddr.new("2002::/16"), # 6to4 (RFC 3056) — embeds IPv4 in IPv6
DISALLOWED_IPV6 = %w[ IPAddr.new("100.64.0.0/10") # CGNAT / shared address space (RFC 6598)
::/128 100::/64 2001::/32 2001:2::/48 2001:db8::/32 2002::/16 ]
fec0::/10 ff00::/8
].map { |cidr| IPAddr.new(cidr) }.freeze
# NAT64 prefixes: the well-known prefix (RFC 6052/6146) and the local-use
# prefix (RFC 8215). An address here embeds an IPv4 target in its low 32
# bits; we extract it and re-check against the IPv4 rules so NAT64 to a
# public address still resolves while NAT64 to an internal address is
# blocked.
NAT64_PREFIXES = [
IPAddr.new("64:ff9b::/96"),
IPAddr.new("64:ff9b:1::/48")
].freeze
def resolve(hostname) def resolve(hostname)
Resolv.getaddress(hostname).tap do |ip| Resolv.getaddress(hostname).tap do |ip|
@@ -41,36 +23,11 @@ module RestrictedHTTP
end end
def private_ip?(ip) def private_ip?(ip)
ipaddr = IPAddr.new(ip) IPAddr.new(ip).then do |ipaddr|
ipaddr.private? || ipaddr.loopback? || ipaddr.link_local? || ipaddr.ipv4_mapped? || ipaddr.ipv4_compat? || LOCAL_IP.include?(ipaddr) || DISALLOWED_RANGES.any? { |range| range.include?(ipaddr) }
# DNS never legitimately returns these embedded forms, so block them all
# regardless of the address they wrap.
if ipaddr.ipv4_mapped? || ipaddr.ipv4_compat?
true
elsif ipaddr.ipv4?
disallowed_ipv4?(ipaddr)
elsif NAT64_PREFIXES.any? { |prefix| prefix.include?(ipaddr) }
disallowed_ipv4?(embedded_ipv4(ipaddr))
else
disallowed_ipv6?(ipaddr)
end end
rescue IPAddr::InvalidAddressError rescue IPAddr::InvalidAddressError
true true
end end
private
def disallowed_ipv4?(ipaddr)
ipaddr.private? || ipaddr.loopback? || ipaddr.link_local? ||
DISALLOWED_IPV4.any? { |range| range.include?(ipaddr) }
end
def disallowed_ipv6?(ipaddr)
ipaddr.private? || ipaddr.loopback? || ipaddr.link_local? ||
DISALLOWED_IPV6.any? { |range| range.include?(ipaddr) }
end
def embedded_ipv4(ipaddr)
IPAddr.new([ ipaddr.to_i & 0xffffffff ].pack("N").unpack("C4").join("."))
end
end end
end end
@@ -64,48 +64,24 @@ class RestrictedHTTP::PrivateNetworkGuardTest < ActiveSupport::TestCase
assert_private_ip "::93.184.216.34" assert_private_ip "::93.184.216.34"
end end
test "private_ip? returns true for carrier-grade NAT addresses (RFC6598)" do # IPv6/encapsulation and shared-address ranges (SSRF bypass prevention)
test "private_ip? returns true for NAT64 addresses" do
assert_private_ip "64:ff9b::a00:1" # NAT64-embedded 10.0.0.1
end
test "private_ip? returns true for 6to4 addresses" do
assert_private_ip "2002::1"
assert_private_ip "2002:0a00:0001::" # 6to4-embedded 10.0.0.1
end
test "private_ip? returns true for CGNAT / shared address space" do
assert_private_ip "100.64.0.1" assert_private_ip "100.64.0.1"
assert_private_ip "100.127.255.255" assert_private_ip "100.127.255.255"
end end
test "private_ip? returns true for NAT64 addresses embedding a private IPv4" do test "private_ip? returns false for public addresses outside the new ranges" do
assert_private_ip "64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe" # NAT64 -> 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata) assert_not RestrictedHTTP::PrivateNetworkGuard.private_ip?("93.184.216.34")
assert_private_ip "64:ff9b::a00:5" # NAT64 -> 10.0.0.5
end
test "private_ip? returns true for local-use NAT64 addresses embedding a private IPv4 (RFC8215)" do
assert_private_ip "64:ff9b:1::a00:1" # local-use NAT64 -> 10.0.0.1
end
test "private_ip? returns false for local-use NAT64 addresses embedding a public IPv4 (RFC8215)" do
assert_not RestrictedHTTP::PrivateNetworkGuard.private_ip?("64:ff9b:1::808:808") # -> 8.8.8.8
end
test "private_ip? returns false for NAT64 addresses embedding a public IPv4" do
# DNS64 legitimately synthesizes these for public sites on IPv6-only hosts.
assert_not RestrictedHTTP::PrivateNetworkGuard.private_ip?("64:ff9b::808:808") # -> 8.8.8.8
end
test "private_ip? returns true for 6to4 and Teredo transition addresses" do
assert_private_ip "2002:a9fe:a9fe::" # 6to4 embedding 169.254.169.254
assert_private_ip "2001::1" # Teredo
end
test "private_ip? returns true for IPv6 loopback, ULA, and link-local" do
assert_private_ip "::1"
assert_private_ip "fd00:ec2::254" # AWS IMDSv6 (ULA)
assert_private_ip "fe80::1"
end
test "private_ip? returns true for IPv6 multicast, documentation, and benchmarking ranges" do
assert_private_ip "ff02::1"
assert_private_ip "2001:db8::1"
assert_private_ip "2001:2::1" # benchmarking (RFC5180), matches 198.18.0.0/15
end
test "private_ip? returns false for public IPv6 addresses" do
assert_not RestrictedHTTP::PrivateNetworkGuard.private_ip?("2606:4700:4700::1111")
end end
test "private_ip? returns true for invalid addresses" do test "private_ip? returns true for invalid addresses" do
+4 -4
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@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ class Opengraph::FetchTest < ActiveSupport::TestCase
# to a resolved IP, not a hostname to re-resolve. # to a resolved IP, not a hostname to re-resolve.
WebMock.disable_net_connect! allow: [ @url.host ] WebMock.disable_net_connect! allow: [ @url.host ]
Resolv.stubs(:getaddress).with(@url.host).returns("1.2.3.4", "127.0.0.1") Resolv.stubs(:getaddress).with(@url.host).returns("1.2.3.4", "127.0.0.1")
TCPSocket.expects(:open).with { |*args, **| args.first == @url.host }.never TCPSocket.expects(:open).with(@url.host, 443, nil, nil).never
TCPSocket.expects(:open).with { |*args, **| args.first == "1.2.3.4" && args[1] == 443 }.throws(:dns_not_rebound) TCPSocket.expects(:open).with("1.2.3.4", 443, nil, nil).throws(:dns_not_rebound)
assert_throws :dns_not_rebound do assert_throws :dns_not_rebound do
@fetch.fetch_document(@url) @fetch.fetch_document(@url)
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ class Opengraph::FetchTest < ActiveSupport::TestCase
# to a resolved IP, not a hostname to re-resolve. # to a resolved IP, not a hostname to re-resolve.
WebMock.disable_net_connect! allow: [ @url.host ] WebMock.disable_net_connect! allow: [ @url.host ]
Resolv.stubs(:getaddress).with(@url.host).returns("1.2.3.4", "127.0.0.1") Resolv.stubs(:getaddress).with(@url.host).returns("1.2.3.4", "127.0.0.1")
TCPSocket.expects(:open).with { |*args, **| args.first == @url.host }.never TCPSocket.expects(:open).with(@url.host, 443, nil, nil).never
TCPSocket.expects(:open).with { |*args, **| args.first == "1.2.3.4" && args[1] == 443 }.throws(:dns_not_rebound) TCPSocket.expects(:open).with("1.2.3.4", 443, nil, nil).throws(:dns_not_rebound)
assert_throws :dns_not_rebound do assert_throws :dns_not_rebound do
@fetch.fetch_document(URI.parse("https://www.other.com/"), ip: "1.2.3.4") @fetch.fetch_document(URI.parse("https://www.other.com/"), ip: "1.2.3.4")