hscontrol: gate proxy header trust on trusted_proxies

chi middleware.RealIP was mounted unconditionally on both the
public router and the noise router, so any client could send
X-Real-IP or X-Forwarded-For and have the spoofed value land in
r.RemoteAddr and the access-log remote= field.

Add a top-level trusted_proxies config option (list of CIDRs) and
replace middleware.RealIP with a gated middleware that:

  - honours True-Client-IP / X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For only when
    r.RemoteAddr is inside one of the configured prefixes;
  - strips those three headers from every request whose peer is
    not trusted, so downstream handlers cannot read them.

X-Forwarded-For is parsed via realclientip-go's
RightmostTrustedRangeStrategy so a prepended value cannot win in a
proxy chain. trustedProxies() rejects 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 at config
load.

Empty trusted_proxies (the default) skips the mount entirely;
r.RemoteAddr is the directly-connecting TCP peer.
This commit is contained in:
Kristoffer Dalby
2026-05-18 09:21:32 +00:00
parent 1f48ebb376
commit c6c29c05e5
6 changed files with 511 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ type Headscale struct {
DERPServer *derpServer.DERPServer
// realIPMiddleware is nil when cfg.TrustedProxies is empty; the
// router skips the mount and r.RemoteAddr stays as the TCP peer.
realIPMiddleware func(http.Handler) http.Handler
// Things that generate changes
extraRecordMan *dns.ExtraRecordsMan
authProvider AuthProvider
@@ -140,6 +144,13 @@ func NewHeadscale(cfg *types.Config) (*Headscale, error) {
state: s,
}
if len(cfg.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
app.realIPMiddleware, err = trustedProxyRealIP(cfg.TrustedProxies)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("building trusted_proxies middleware: %w", err)
}
}
// Initialize ephemeral garbage collector
ephemeralGC := db.NewEphemeralGarbageCollector(func(ni types.NodeID) {
node, ok := app.state.GetNodeByID(ni)
@@ -512,7 +523,11 @@ func (h *Headscale) createRouter(grpcMux *grpcRuntime.ServeMux) *chi.Mux {
},
}))
r.Use(middleware.RequestID)
r.Use(middleware.RealIP)
if h.realIPMiddleware != nil {
r.Use(h.realIPMiddleware)
}
r.Use(middleware.RequestLogger(&zerologRequestLogger{}))
r.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
r.Use(securityHeaders)

View File

@@ -158,7 +158,11 @@ func (h *Headscale) NoiseUpgradeHandler(
},
}))
r.Use(middleware.RequestID)
r.Use(middleware.RealIP)
if h.realIPMiddleware != nil {
r.Use(h.realIPMiddleware)
}
r.Use(middleware.RequestLogger(&zerologRequestLogger{}))
r.Use(middleware.Recoverer)

124
hscontrol/realip.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
package hscontrol
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
realclientip "github.com/realclientip/realclientip-go"
)
const (
headerTrueClientIP = "True-Client-IP"
headerXRealIP = "X-Real-IP"
headerXForwardedFor = "X-Forwarded-For"
)
var proxyHeaders = [...]string{headerTrueClientIP, headerXRealIP, headerXForwardedFor}
// trustedProxyRealIP rewrites r.RemoteAddr from proxy headers when the
// peer is in trusted; for any other peer the headers are stripped so a
// downstream handler cannot read a spoofed value. X-Forwarded-For uses
// RightmostTrustedRangeStrategy so prepending a value cannot win in a
// proxy chain.
func trustedProxyRealIP(trusted []netip.Prefix) (func(http.Handler) http.Handler, error) {
ranges := make([]net.IPNet, 0, len(trusted))
for _, p := range trusted {
ranges = append(ranges, prefixToIPNet(p))
}
trueClientIP, err := realclientip.NewSingleIPHeaderStrategy(headerTrueClientIP)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s strategy: %w", headerTrueClientIP, err)
}
xRealIP, err := realclientip.NewSingleIPHeaderStrategy(headerXRealIP)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s strategy: %w", headerXRealIP, err)
}
xForwardedFor, err := realclientip.NewRightmostTrustedRangeStrategy(headerXForwardedFor, ranges)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s strategy: %w", headerXForwardedFor, err)
}
strategy := realclientip.NewChainStrategy(trueClientIP, xRealIP, xForwardedFor)
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !peerTrusted(r.RemoteAddr, trusted) {
for _, h := range proxyHeaders {
r.Header.Del(h)
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Proxy headers carry no port; write the IP alone so
// `remote=` logs the resolved client, not the proxy's
// ephemeral TCP port.
if ip := strategy.ClientIP(r.Header, r.RemoteAddr); ip != "" {
r.RemoteAddr = ip
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}, nil
}
// peerTrusted returns false on unparseable input so callers fall
// through to the header-stripping path.
func peerTrusted(remoteAddr string, trusted []netip.Prefix) bool {
addr, ok := parsePeerAddr(remoteAddr)
if !ok {
return false
}
for _, p := range trusted {
if p.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func parsePeerAddr(remoteAddr string) (netip.Addr, bool) {
if remoteAddr == "" {
return netip.Addr{}, false
}
ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(remoteAddr)
if err == nil {
return ap.Addr(), true
}
host, _, splitErr := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr)
if splitErr != nil {
host = remoteAddr
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
if err != nil {
return netip.Addr{}, false
}
return addr, true
}
// prefixToIPNet bridges to realclientip-go, which predates net/netip.
func prefixToIPNet(p netip.Prefix) net.IPNet {
addr := p.Addr()
if addr.Is4() {
b := addr.As4()
return net.IPNet{IP: b[:], Mask: net.CIDRMask(p.Bits(), 32)}
}
b := addr.As16()
return net.IPNet{IP: b[:], Mask: net.CIDRMask(p.Bits(), 128)}
}

242
hscontrol/realip_test.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
package hscontrol
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
//nolint:goconst // repeated test fixtures (addresses, headers), not refactor candidates
func TestPeerTrusted(t *testing.T) {
trusted := []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/16"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.1/32"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/8"),
}
tests := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
want bool
}{
{name: "v4-in-range", remoteAddr: "10.0.0.5:1234", want: true},
{name: "v4-edge", remoteAddr: "10.0.255.255:1", want: true},
{name: "v4-out-of-range", remoteAddr: "10.1.0.0:1234", want: false},
{name: "v4-loopback", remoteAddr: "127.0.0.1:443", want: true},
{name: "v6-in-range", remoteAddr: "[fd00::1]:443", want: true},
{name: "v6-out-of-range", remoteAddr: "[2001:db8::1]:443", want: false},
{name: "no-port", remoteAddr: "10.0.0.5", want: true},
{name: "empty", remoteAddr: "", want: false},
{name: "non-ip-host", remoteAddr: "localhost:8080", want: false},
{name: "garbage", remoteAddr: "not-a-thing", want: false},
{name: "unix-socket", remoteAddr: "@", want: false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := peerTrusted(tt.remoteAddr, trusted)
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got)
})
}
}
func TestPrefixToIPNet(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
in netip.Prefix
want string
}{
{name: "v4", in: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/16"), want: "10.0.0.0/16"},
{name: "v4-host", in: netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.1/32"), want: "127.0.0.1/32"},
{name: "v6", in: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/8"), want: "fd00::/8"},
{name: "v6-host", in: netip.MustParsePrefix("::1/128"), want: "::1/128"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := prefixToIPNet(tt.in)
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got.String())
})
}
}
//nolint:goconst // repeated test fixtures (addresses, headers), not refactor candidates
func TestTrustedProxyRealIP(t *testing.T) {
trusted := []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/16"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/8"),
}
mw, err := trustedProxyRealIP(trusted)
require.NoError(t, err)
tests := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
headers map[string]string
wantRemote string
wantStripped []string
wantKept map[string]string
}{
{
name: "untrusted/no-headers",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:1234",
wantRemote: "203.0.113.1:1234",
},
{
name: "untrusted/strips-x-real-ip",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:1234",
headers: map[string]string{"X-Real-IP": "1.2.3.4"},
wantRemote: "203.0.113.1:1234",
wantStripped: []string{"X-Real-IP"},
},
{
name: "untrusted/strips-x-forwarded-for",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:1234",
headers: map[string]string{"X-Forwarded-For": "1.2.3.4"},
wantRemote: "203.0.113.1:1234",
wantStripped: []string{"X-Forwarded-For"},
},
{
name: "untrusted/strips-true-client-ip",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:1234",
headers: map[string]string{"True-Client-IP": "1.2.3.4"},
wantRemote: "203.0.113.1:1234",
wantStripped: []string{"True-Client-IP"},
},
{
name: "untrusted/strips-all-three",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:1234",
headers: map[string]string{
"True-Client-IP": "1.2.3.4",
"X-Real-IP": "5.6.7.8",
"X-Forwarded-For": "9.10.11.12",
},
wantRemote: "203.0.113.1:1234",
wantStripped: []string{"True-Client-IP", "X-Real-IP", "X-Forwarded-For"},
},
{
name: "untrusted/keeps-unrelated-header",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.1:1234",
headers: map[string]string{"User-Agent": "curl/8", "X-Real-IP": "1.2.3.4"},
wantRemote: "203.0.113.1:1234",
wantStripped: []string{"X-Real-IP"},
wantKept: map[string]string{"User-Agent": "curl/8"},
},
{
name: "trusted/no-headers",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.5:1234",
wantRemote: "10.0.0.5:1234",
},
{
name: "trusted/x-real-ip",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.5:1234",
headers: map[string]string{"X-Real-IP": "1.2.3.4"},
wantRemote: "1.2.3.4",
},
{
name: "trusted/true-client-ip-wins-over-others",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.5:1234",
headers: map[string]string{
"True-Client-IP": "1.2.3.4",
"X-Real-IP": "5.6.7.8",
"X-Forwarded-For": "9.10.11.12",
},
wantRemote: "1.2.3.4",
},
{
name: "trusted/x-real-ip-wins-over-xff",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.5:1234",
headers: map[string]string{
"X-Real-IP": "1.2.3.4",
"X-Forwarded-For": "9.10.11.12",
},
wantRemote: "1.2.3.4",
},
{
name: "trusted/xff-rightmost-walk-discards-trusted-hop",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.5:1234",
headers: map[string]string{"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.99, 10.0.0.5"},
wantRemote: "203.0.113.99",
},
{
name: "trusted/xff-all-trusted-leaves-remote-alone",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.5:1234",
headers: map[string]string{"X-Forwarded-For": "10.0.0.99, 10.0.0.5"},
wantRemote: "10.0.0.5:1234",
},
{
name: "trusted/ipv6-peer-v6-real-ip",
remoteAddr: "[fd00::1]:1234",
headers: map[string]string{"X-Real-IP": "2001:db8::1"},
wantRemote: "2001:db8::1",
},
{
name: "ipv6-untrusted-strips-header",
remoteAddr: "[2001:db8::1]:1234",
headers: map[string]string{"X-Real-IP": "1.2.3.4"},
wantRemote: "[2001:db8::1]:1234",
wantStripped: []string{"X-Real-IP"},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var observed *http.Request
handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
observed = r
}))
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = tt.remoteAddr
for k, v := range tt.headers {
req.Header.Set(k, v)
}
handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
require.NotNil(t, observed, "handler must be invoked")
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantRemote, observed.RemoteAddr)
for _, h := range tt.wantStripped {
assert.Empty(t, observed.Header.Get(h), "header %s should be stripped", h)
}
for k, v := range tt.wantKept {
assert.Equal(t, v, observed.Header.Get(k), "header %s should be preserved", k)
}
})
}
}
func TestTrustedProxyRealIPEmptyTrusted(t *testing.T) {
// Sanity: factory accepts an empty slice without error. Wiring code is
// responsible for skipping the mount entirely, but the factory itself
// must remain safe for tests that compose it manually.
mw, err := trustedProxyRealIP(nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, mw)
var observed *http.Request
handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
observed = r
}))
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.5:1234"
req.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", "1.2.3.4")
handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
require.NotNil(t, observed)
// No prefix is trusted, so even an LAN-looking peer is not trusted; the
// spoofed header must be stripped and RemoteAddr left alone.
assert.Equal(t, "10.0.0.5:1234", observed.RemoteAddr)
assert.Empty(t, observed.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"))
}

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ var (
errServerURLSuffix = errors.New("server_url cannot be part of base_domain in a way that could make the DERP and headscale server unreachable")
errServerURLSame = errors.New("server_url cannot use the same domain as base_domain in a way that could make the DERP and headscale server unreachable")
errInvalidPKCEMethod = errors.New("pkce.method must be either 'plain' or 'S256'")
errTrustedProxyZeroRange = errors.New("0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 are not allowed")
ErrNoPrefixConfigured = errors.New("no IPv4 or IPv6 prefix configured, minimum one prefix is required")
ErrInvalidAllocationStrategy = errors.New("invalid prefix allocation strategy")
)
@@ -98,6 +99,7 @@ type Config struct {
MetricsAddr string
GRPCAddr string
GRPCAllowInsecure bool
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
Node NodeConfig
PrefixV4 *netip.Prefix
PrefixV6 *netip.Prefix
@@ -1049,6 +1051,31 @@ func prefixV6() (*netip.Prefix, bool, error) {
return &prefixV6, !ipSet.ContainsPrefix(prefixV6), nil
}
// trustedProxies rejects 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 because they defeat the
// peer-trust gate and almost always indicate misconfiguration.
func trustedProxies() ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
raw := viper.GetStringSlice("trusted_proxies")
if len(raw) == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
out := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(raw))
for i, s := range raw {
p, err := netip.ParsePrefix(s)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted_proxies[%d] %q: %w", i, s, err)
}
if p.Bits() == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted_proxies[%d] %q: %w", i, s, errTrustedProxyZeroRange)
}
out = append(out, p.Masked())
}
return out, nil
}
// LoadCLIConfig returns the needed configuration for the CLI client
// of Headscale to connect to a Headscale server.
func LoadCLIConfig() (*Config, error) {
@@ -1088,6 +1115,11 @@ func LoadServerConfig() (*Config, error) {
return nil, err
}
trusted, err := trustedProxies()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if prefix4 == nil && prefix6 == nil {
return nil, ErrNoPrefixConfigured
}
@@ -1178,6 +1210,7 @@ func LoadServerConfig() (*Config, error) {
MetricsAddr: viper.GetString("metrics_listen_addr"),
GRPCAddr: viper.GetString("grpc_listen_addr"),
GRPCAllowInsecure: viper.GetBool("grpc_allow_insecure"),
TrustedProxies: trusted,
DisableUpdateCheck: false,
PrefixV4: prefix4,

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package types
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
@@ -510,3 +511,93 @@ func TestConfigJSONOmitsSecrets(t *testing.T) {
"marshalled Config must not contain secret %q", secret)
}
}
//nolint:goconst // repeated CIDR strings are test fixtures, not refactor candidates
func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
input any
want []netip.Prefix
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "unset",
input: nil,
want: nil,
},
{
name: "empty",
input: []string{},
want: nil,
},
{
name: "single-v4",
input: []string{"10.0.0.0/16"},
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/16")},
},
{
name: "single-v6",
input: []string{"fd00::/8"},
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/8")},
},
{
name: "mixed-v4-v6",
input: []string{"127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128", "10.0.0.0/16"},
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.1/32"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("::1/128"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/16"),
},
},
{
name: "non-canonical-masked",
input: []string{"10.0.0.5/16"},
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/16")},
},
{
name: "bare-ip-rejected",
input: []string{"10.0.0.1"},
wantErr: `trusted_proxies[0] "10.0.0.1"`,
},
{
name: "garbage-reports-index",
input: []string{"10.0.0.0/16", "not-an-ip"},
wantErr: `trusted_proxies[1] "not-an-ip"`,
},
{
name: "ipv4-zero-rejected",
input: []string{"0.0.0.0/0"},
wantErr: "0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 are not allowed",
},
{
name: "ipv6-zero-rejected",
input: []string{"::/0"},
wantErr: "0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 are not allowed",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
viper.Reset()
if tt.input != nil {
viper.Set("trusted_proxies", tt.input)
}
got, err := trustedProxies()
if tt.wantErr != "" {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), tt.wantErr)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
if diff := cmp.Diff(tt.want, got, cmpopts.EquateComparable(netip.Prefix{})); diff != "" {
t.Errorf("trustedProxies() mismatch (-want +got):\n%s", diff)
}
})
}
}