Files
headscale/hscontrol/realip.go
Kristoffer Dalby c6c29c05e5 hscontrol: gate proxy header trust on trusted_proxies
chi middleware.RealIP was mounted unconditionally on both the
public router and the noise router, so any client could send
X-Real-IP or X-Forwarded-For and have the spoofed value land in
r.RemoteAddr and the access-log remote= field.

Add a top-level trusted_proxies config option (list of CIDRs) and
replace middleware.RealIP with a gated middleware that:

  - honours True-Client-IP / X-Real-IP / X-Forwarded-For only when
    r.RemoteAddr is inside one of the configured prefixes;
  - strips those three headers from every request whose peer is
    not trusted, so downstream handlers cannot read them.

X-Forwarded-For is parsed via realclientip-go's
RightmostTrustedRangeStrategy so a prepended value cannot win in a
proxy chain. trustedProxies() rejects 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 at config
load.

Empty trusted_proxies (the default) skips the mount entirely;
r.RemoteAddr is the directly-connecting TCP peer.
2026-05-18 17:17:55 +02:00

125 lines
3.0 KiB
Go

package hscontrol
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
realclientip "github.com/realclientip/realclientip-go"
)
const (
headerTrueClientIP = "True-Client-IP"
headerXRealIP = "X-Real-IP"
headerXForwardedFor = "X-Forwarded-For"
)
var proxyHeaders = [...]string{headerTrueClientIP, headerXRealIP, headerXForwardedFor}
// trustedProxyRealIP rewrites r.RemoteAddr from proxy headers when the
// peer is in trusted; for any other peer the headers are stripped so a
// downstream handler cannot read a spoofed value. X-Forwarded-For uses
// RightmostTrustedRangeStrategy so prepending a value cannot win in a
// proxy chain.
func trustedProxyRealIP(trusted []netip.Prefix) (func(http.Handler) http.Handler, error) {
ranges := make([]net.IPNet, 0, len(trusted))
for _, p := range trusted {
ranges = append(ranges, prefixToIPNet(p))
}
trueClientIP, err := realclientip.NewSingleIPHeaderStrategy(headerTrueClientIP)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s strategy: %w", headerTrueClientIP, err)
}
xRealIP, err := realclientip.NewSingleIPHeaderStrategy(headerXRealIP)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s strategy: %w", headerXRealIP, err)
}
xForwardedFor, err := realclientip.NewRightmostTrustedRangeStrategy(headerXForwardedFor, ranges)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s strategy: %w", headerXForwardedFor, err)
}
strategy := realclientip.NewChainStrategy(trueClientIP, xRealIP, xForwardedFor)
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !peerTrusted(r.RemoteAddr, trusted) {
for _, h := range proxyHeaders {
r.Header.Del(h)
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// Proxy headers carry no port; write the IP alone so
// `remote=` logs the resolved client, not the proxy's
// ephemeral TCP port.
if ip := strategy.ClientIP(r.Header, r.RemoteAddr); ip != "" {
r.RemoteAddr = ip
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}, nil
}
// peerTrusted returns false on unparseable input so callers fall
// through to the header-stripping path.
func peerTrusted(remoteAddr string, trusted []netip.Prefix) bool {
addr, ok := parsePeerAddr(remoteAddr)
if !ok {
return false
}
for _, p := range trusted {
if p.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func parsePeerAddr(remoteAddr string) (netip.Addr, bool) {
if remoteAddr == "" {
return netip.Addr{}, false
}
ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(remoteAddr)
if err == nil {
return ap.Addr(), true
}
host, _, splitErr := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr)
if splitErr != nil {
host = remoteAddr
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
if err != nil {
return netip.Addr{}, false
}
return addr, true
}
// prefixToIPNet bridges to realclientip-go, which predates net/netip.
func prefixToIPNet(p netip.Prefix) net.IPNet {
addr := p.Addr()
if addr.Is4() {
b := addr.As4()
return net.IPNet{IP: b[:], Mask: net.CIDRMask(p.Bits(), 32)}
}
b := addr.As16()
return net.IPNet{IP: b[:], Mask: net.CIDRMask(p.Bits(), 128)}
}