mirror of
https://github.com/basecamp/once-campfire.git
synced 2026-08-07 15:28:45 +09:00
Document the self-hosted trust model in SECURITY.md (#230)
Nothing in the repository records that unrestricted bot webhook delivery is deliberate, so the missing private-network guard reads as an oversight next to the guarded unfurl path. Researchers report it as server-side request forgery, repeatedly.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -53,3 +53,7 @@ If you'd rather run the Docker image yourself, you can read more about that in t
|
||||
|
||||
You are welcome - and encouraged - to modify Campfire to your liking.
|
||||
Please see our [development guide](docs/development.md) for how to get Campfire set up for local development.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security
|
||||
|
||||
See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for how to report a vulnerability and a description of our trust model.
|
||||
|
||||
+22
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
# Security
|
||||
|
||||
Report vulnerabilities through our [HackerOne program](https://hackerone.com/basecamp) or at
|
||||
https://github.com/basecamp/once-campfire/security. Note that Campfire is in scope for our security
|
||||
program, but is not bounty eligible.
|
||||
|
||||
## Trust model
|
||||
|
||||
Campfire is self-hosted and single-tenant, so the administrator is the server operator,
|
||||
with shell, network, and database access already. Anything requiring the administrator
|
||||
role grants nothing they do not already have, and is not a vulnerability.
|
||||
|
||||
We do want reports of anything a **non-administrator** can reach, and of any credential or
|
||||
network path held by the Campfire process but not by the operator's own shell.
|
||||
|
||||
## Intentional behavior
|
||||
|
||||
Bot webhook URLs are unrestricted: an administrator can point one at any address,
|
||||
including internal ones, because operators legitimately wire bots to their own services.
|
||||
Link unfurling is different because any member can trigger it by pasting a URL, so it
|
||||
validates destinations through `RestrictedHTTP::PrivateNetworkGuard`. The difference is who
|
||||
picks the destination.
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ class Webhook < ApplicationRecord
|
||||
Net::HTTP::Post.new(uri, "Content-Type" => "application/json").tap { |request| request.body = payload }
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
# No PrivateNetworkGuard, unlike Opengraph::Fetch: only an administrator sets this URL,
|
||||
# and operators legitimately point bots at their own internal services.
|
||||
def http
|
||||
Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port).tap do |http|
|
||||
http.use_ssl = (uri.scheme == "https")
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user