Document the self-hosted trust model in SECURITY.md (#230)

Nothing in the repository records that unrestricted bot webhook delivery is
deliberate, so the missing private-network guard reads as an oversight next to
the guarded unfurl path. Researchers report it as server-side request forgery,
repeatedly.
This commit is contained in:
Mike Dalessio
2026-07-31 13:09:59 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 50f25cea80
commit d28ab55bf4
3 changed files with 28 additions and 0 deletions
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@@ -53,3 +53,7 @@ If you'd rather run the Docker image yourself, you can read more about that in t
You are welcome - and encouraged - to modify Campfire to your liking.
Please see our [development guide](docs/development.md) for how to get Campfire set up for local development.
## Security
See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for how to report a vulnerability and a description of our trust model.
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# Security
Report vulnerabilities through our [HackerOne program](https://hackerone.com/basecamp) or at
https://github.com/basecamp/once-campfire/security. Note that Campfire is in scope for our security
program, but is not bounty eligible.
## Trust model
Campfire is self-hosted and single-tenant, so the administrator is the server operator,
with shell, network, and database access already. Anything requiring the administrator
role grants nothing they do not already have, and is not a vulnerability.
We do want reports of anything a **non-administrator** can reach, and of any credential or
network path held by the Campfire process but not by the operator's own shell.
## Intentional behavior
Bot webhook URLs are unrestricted: an administrator can point one at any address,
including internal ones, because operators legitimately wire bots to their own services.
Link unfurling is different because any member can trigger it by pasting a URL, so it
validates destinations through `RestrictedHTTP::PrivateNetworkGuard`. The difference is who
picks the destination.
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@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ class Webhook < ApplicationRecord
Net::HTTP::Post.new(uri, "Content-Type" => "application/json").tap { |request| request.body = payload }
end
# No PrivateNetworkGuard, unlike Opengraph::Fetch: only an administrator sets this URL,
# and operators legitimately point bots at their own internal services.
def http
Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port).tap do |http|
http.use_ssl = (uri.scheme == "https")