and add test coverage for (un)supported file types.
The avatar and logo variants move into the models and return nil for content
types that are no longer variable, so the controllers fall back to the initials
avatar and stock logo icon instead of raising `ActiveStorage::InvariableError`.
The guard uses IPAddr but relied on something else loading it first;
require it explicitly. And the rebinding tests lost their port assertion
when the matchers were loosened for newer Net::HTTP keyword args, so
check the port alongside the IP again.
The RFC1918, loopback, and link-local ranges in DISALLOWED_IPV4
duplicated the private?/loopback?/link_local? checks that run right
before the list scan, so they could never be the deciding factor. Keep
only the ranges the predicates don't catch.
Matches the fizzy guard: the local-use NAT64 prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48,
RFC 8215) embeds an IPv4 target in its low 32 bits just like the
well-known prefix, so run it through the same embedded-IPv4 recheck.
Local-use NAT64 to a public address now resolves (keeping unfurls
working for self-hosters on such networks) while local-use NAT64 to an
internal address stays blocked.
The local-use NAT64 prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215) embeds an IPv4
target like the well-known prefix does, but at a deployment-chosen
position we can't extract, so block the whole range outright.
Also block the IPv6 benchmarking range (2001:2::/48, RFC 5180) to match
the IPv4 benchmarking block on 198.18.0.0/15.
Net::HTTP now passes an open_timeout: option to TCPSocket.open, so the mock
that matched exact positional arguments no longer matches. Match on the
host instead.
The guard blocked the usual private, loopback, and link-local ranges (and
the IPv4-mapped/-compatible IPv6 forms), but let through NAT64, 6to4, and
Teredo addresses, which can point at an internal IPv4, and CGNAT.
Now it pulls the IPv4 out of a NAT64 address and checks that (so NAT64 to a
public site still works), blocks 6to4 and Teredo outright, and adds the
missing IPv4 and IPv6 ranges.
Fixes a heap buffer overflow in the JSON generator when streaming an
oversized object to an IO (JSON.dump(obj, io) / JSON::State#generate).
Affects json 2.9.0-2.19.8; patched in 2.19.9. Bumps to the current
2.20.0 line via `bundle update json --conservative` (lockfile-only).
GHSA-x2f5-4prf-w687 / https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54696
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security bump for CVE-2026-47736 (PROXY Protocol v1 parser memory
exhaustion) and CVE-2026-47737 (PROXY v1 repeated headers). Not exposed:
PROXY protocol is opt-in via set_remote_address proxy_protocol:, which
campfire never calls — default remote_address :socket leaves the parser
unreachable. Thruster/kamal-proxy front campfire over HTTP X-Forwarded-*,
not PROXY protocol.
No 6.x fix exists, so this is a major v6→v7 bump:
- Gemfile pin "~> 6.6" → "~> 7.2", ">= 7.2.1"
- config/puma.rb needs NO changes — every DSL method used (threads,
worker_timeout, bind, environment, pidfile, workers, plugin
:tmp_restart) is unchanged in v7; tmp_restart.rb is byte-identical.
Behavior notes (no action): preload_app effectively defaults on for
clustered mode (safe — Rails eager-loaded in master, Membership.
disconnect_all handles pre-fork conns); persistent_timeout default
20→65s (internal keep-alive). Min Ruby 3.0; campfire runs 3.4.5.
Direct gem. 137 commits triaged, 0 mitigations. Verified green via full
unit + system suites (system tests boot Puma 7.2.1).
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-puma_v6.6.1..v7.2.1.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump clearing 3 advisories: GHSA-c4rq-3m3g-8wgx (High, CSS
selector tokenizer ReDoS), GHSA-v2fc-qm4h-8hqv (XSLT transform memory
leak), GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532 (unchecked xmlC14NExecute return). None
exposed: loofah/rails-html-sanitizer use DOM/XPath not CSS selectors,
every app CSS selector is a compile-time literal, and campfire uses no
XSLT or XML canonicalization.
The 1.18→1.19 minor bump is a Ruby-4-support/packaging milestone —
bundled libxml2 2.13.9 / libxslt 1.1.43 are unchanged, so HTML parsing
and ActionText sanitization output are identical. Ruby floor 3.2
(campfire runs 3.4.5); all 4 locked platforms still ship.
Transitive dep via Rails/loofah (no Gemfile change). 33 commits analyzed,
0 mitigations. Verified green via full unit + system suites.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-nokogiri_v1.18.10..v1.19.3.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump clearing ~11 CVEs (multipart parser differentials/DoS, Host
header validation, byte-range DoS, Forwarded injection, Rack::Static/
Directory/Sendfile disclosures). Reachable fixes (multipart uploads, AS
byte-range streaming, host parsing) apply transparently via corrective
behavior and generous new defaults; the Static/Directory/Sendfile/
Deflater CVEs are not reachable (campfire uses none of those middlewares).
No app changes required. Optional hardening noted in plan: new env knob
RACK_MULTIPART_PARSER_BYTESIZE_LIMIT (default 10 GiB) could be tuned to
campfire's real max attachment size — left at default here.
Transitive dep via Rails (no Gemfile change). 23 commits analyzed,
0 required mitigations. Verified green via full unit + system suites.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-rack_v3.2.4..v3.2.6.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2025-61921 (ReDoS via ETag header generation). Not
exposed: sinatra reaches campfire only through resque-web, which is never
mounted — config.ru runs plain Rails, no `require "resque/server"`
anywhere, so Sinatra::Base is never defined. Dead code at runtime.
Conservative update also bumped rack-protection 4.1.1 → 4.2.1 (same
monorepo); its shipped lib is byte-identical bar the version string.
Transitive dep (no Gemfile change). 14 commits analyzed, 0 mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-sinatra_v4.1.1..v4.2.1.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security fix for 3 stored/DOM XSS advisories in Trix:
GHSA-g9jg-w8vm-g96v (attachment attribute), GHSA-qmpg-8xg6-ph5q
(serialized attributes), GHSA-53p3-c7vp-4mcc (JSON deserialization
bypass in drag-and-drop).
EXPOSED: campfire's composer/editor use Trix for message bodies, and the
browser actually ran the hand-vendored vendor/javascript/trix.esm.min.js
pinned at 2.0.10 — which lacks the DOMPurify/isValidAttribute sanitizers.
The gem bump alone is a no-op for the browser; the real fix is
re-vendoring the ESM build:
- bump gem to 2.1.19 (Gemfile.lock)
- re-vendor vendor/javascript/trix.esm.min.js from Trix 2.1.19
(2.0.10 → 2.1.19; bundles DOMPurify 3.4.2, rangy 1.3.2)
- update importmap pin comment @2.0.10 → @2.1.19
89 commits analyzed. Verified green via full unit + system suites
(system tests drive the Trix composer via fill_in_rich_text_area).
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-action_text-trix_v2.1.15..v2.1.19.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump clearing 5 CVEs (CVE-2026-42245/42246/42256/42257/42258:
literal DoS, STARTTLS stripping, SCRAM DoS, command injection ×2). Not
exposed: all require acting as an IMAP client. net-imap is autoloaded by
mail only when retriever_method :imap is set; campfire configures no
retriever and has no inbound email — net/imap is never required.
Conservative update landed 0.6.4 (minor jump, dormant dep). Ruby floor
raised to >= 3.2.0; campfire runs 3.4.5. 206 commits triaged, 0
mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-net-imap_v0.5.12..v0.6.4.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2026-41316 (High, @_init deserialization guard
bypass via def_module/def_method/def_class). Not exposed: ActionView
renders via Erubi, not Ruby's ERB class; no def_* calls or Marshal of ERB
objects anywhere — vulnerable path absent.
Transitive dep (no Gemfile change). 24 commits analyzed, 0 mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-erb_v6.0.0..v6.0.4.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2026-45363 (High, empty-key HMAC bypass). Not
exposed: jwt reaches campfire only via web-push VAPID signing, which uses
ES256 (asymmetric ECDSA), not HMAC — the vulnerable JWA::Hmac path is
unreachable. web-push requires jwt ~> 3.0; minor bump, encode API
unchanged.
Transitive dep (no Gemfile change). 15 commits analyzed, 0 mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-jwt_v3.1.2..v3.2.0.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2026-33306 (integer overflow → zero KDF iterations
at Cost=31). Not exposed: JRuby-only bug; campfire runs MRI (Ruby 3.4.5),
no java platform in lockfile, ActiveModel default cost is 10-12.
Direct gem (no version constraint, unchanged). 33 commits analyzed,
2 no-action mitigations (constant-time password compare hardening on the
has_secure_password path) — auth tests green.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-bcrypt_v3.1.20..v3.1.22.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2026-35611 (High, ReDoS in Addressable::Template).
Not exposed: campfire never reaches Addressable::Template — runtime use
is geared_pagination's URI.parse; templates appear only in webmock test
stubs (all string/Regexp, never templates).
Transitive dep (no Gemfile change). 49 commits analyzed, 0 mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-addressable_2.8.7..2.9.0.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2025-58767 (DoS on malformed XML). Conservative
update landed 3.4.4 (latest patch, above advisory floor of 3.4.2).
Test/build-only transitive dep (webmock→crack, selenium-webdriver);
absent from app runtime. 34 commits analyzed, 1 test-only mitigation
(no-root-element parse change) — verified green via full unit + system
test suites.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-rexml_3.4.1..3.4.4.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
* Add GitHub Actions audit job (actionlint + zizmor) to CI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Configure dependabot for GitHub Actions, bundler, and Docker
Batches all action updates into a single weekly PR. Adds cooldown
periods to all ecosystems.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add local GitHub Actions linting (actionlint + zizmor) to bin/setup and bin/ci
Install actionlint, shellcheck, and zizmor in bin/setup. Run both
linters as CI steps in config/ci.rb alongside existing style checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Pin all GitHub Actions to SHA hashes
Run pinact to pin action versions to specific commit SHAs,
preventing supply chain attacks from tag mutation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix high severity zizmor findings
- Suppress unpinned-images for redis service containers (digest
pinning is nontrivial for service containers)
- Move workflow-level permissions to job-level in publish-image.yml
(build gets full set, manifest gets only what it needs)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix medium severity zizmor findings
- Add persist-credentials: false to all checkout steps
- Add permissions: {} at workflow level in ci.yml
- Add job-level permissions (contents: read) to all CI jobs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix informational template-injection findings in publish-image.yml
Move steps.meta.outputs.tags from inline ${{ }} expressions to env
vars in both the manifest creation and cosign signing steps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Update brakeman to 8.0.4
bin/brakeman uses --ensure-latest which fails if not on the newest version.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds ipv4_mapped? and ipv4_compat? checks to PrivateNetworkGuard.private_ip?
to block SSRF bypass attempts using IPv6 address formats like:
- ::ffff:169.254.169.254 (IPv4-mapped)
- ::169.254.169.254 (IPv4-compatible)
These formats could previously bypass the link_local? check since Ruby
treats them as IPv6 addresses, not IPv4.
Ref: HackerOne #3481701
Mike Dalessio
Donal McBreen
Donal McBreen
Stanko K.R.
Rosa Gutierrez
dependabot[bot]
Eric Hiler
Jeremy Daer