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Author SHA1 Message Date
Jeremy Daer 0141eae018 Address review: assert uploaded bytes in disk update test
direct_upload_url_for now returns [blob, url] so the authenticated update
test can assert blob.download matches the uploaded payload, not just the
204 status — guarding against a write landing at the wrong key or with the
wrong content. Both update call sites destructure the tuple.
2026-06-15 13:24:38 -07:00
Jeremy Daer c49c41a0d7 Address review: cover DiskController#update in tests
Add integration coverage for the disk service PUT now that the initializer
relies on it being both session-gated and CSRF-exempt:

- unauthenticated PUT -> redirected to login (write blocked)
- authenticated PUT with forgery protection enabled and no authenticity
  token -> 204 (proves the signed-token service PUT stays CSRF-exempt and
  guards against the concern's protect_from_forgery re-arming it)
2026-06-15 13:18:40 -07:00
Jeremy Daer 49f06d0b22 Address review: keep disk PUT CSRF-exempt, use intent helpers
- Including Authentication re-arms protect_from_forgery on DiskController.
  Active Storage's direct-upload service PUT (#update) sends only signed
  service headers and no CSRF token, so a real authenticated upload would
  422 storing bytes. Re-exempt #update from forgery protection; the signed
  URL token and session check still gate the write.
- Swap the raw skip_before_action for the Authentication concern's
  intent-revealing allow_unauthenticated_access / allow_bot_access helpers
  on #show, matching the rest of the app.
- Scope the test's ActiveStorage::Current.url_options override to a
  set { } block so it can't leak thread-local state into later tests.
2026-06-15 13:10:59 -07:00
Jeremy Daer ed5a172871 Require authentication for ActiveStorage direct-upload write endpoints
ActiveStorage's direct-upload endpoints ship unauthenticated by Rails
default: ActiveStorage::DirectUploadsController and DiskController inherit
from ActionController::Base, so they bypass the app's Authentication
concern. That leaves the write path open — anyone could mint blob records
and PUT bytes to local disk storage.

Campfire never uses direct upload for legitimate attachments. Those flow
through MessagesController#create (already authenticated), and Trix file
drops are disabled in the composer. Gating the write path is therefore
pure defense-in-depth with no functional cost.

Require an authenticated session on the two write actions
(DirectUploadsController#create and DiskController#update) by including the
existing Authentication concern. Blob serving stays public —
DiskController#show keeps its auth skip, and the Blobs/Representations
controllers are untouched — so message attachments and the account logo
keep loading. Because these controllers live in ActiveStorage::Engine and
only see the engine's url helpers, also include the application route
helpers so the concern can redirect to new_session_url on failure (302,
write blocked).
2026-06-15 13:00:29 -07:00
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@@ -2,4 +2,30 @@ ActiveSupport.on_load(:active_storage_blob) do
ActiveStorage::DiskController.after_action only: :show do
response.set_header("Cache-Control", "max-age=3600, public")
end
# Gate the ActiveStorage write path behind app authentication. These endpoints
# ship unauthenticated by Rails default; Campfire never uses direct upload for
# legit attachments (those go through MessagesController#create, and Trix file
# drops are disabled in the composer). Requiring a session on the write actions
# blocks anonymous blob writes and disk-fill while leaving blob serving public.
#
# ActiveStorage controllers live in ActiveStorage::Engine, so they see the
# engine's url helpers, not the main app's. Include the application helpers
# first so Authentication#request_authentication can redirect to new_session_url.
ActiveStorage::DirectUploadsController.include Rails.application.routes.url_helpers
ActiveStorage::DirectUploadsController.include Authentication # only action: #create
ActiveStorage::DiskController.include Rails.application.routes.url_helpers
ActiveStorage::DiskController.include Authentication
# Blob serving (#show) stays public so signed-token attachment URLs keep
# resolving for unauthenticated and bot clients alike.
ActiveStorage::DiskController.allow_unauthenticated_access only: :show
ActiveStorage::DiskController.allow_bot_access only: :show
# Including Authentication re-adds protect_from_forgery, but Active Storage's
# direct-upload service PUT (#update) carries only signed service headers and
# no authenticity token. Re-exempt it from CSRF so authenticated uploads can
# still store bytes; the signed URL token and the session check remain.
ActiveStorage::DiskController.skip_forgery_protection only: :update
end
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
require "test_helper"
class ActiveStorage::DirectUploadsControllerTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest
setup do
host! "once.campfire.test"
end
test "create requires authentication" do
assert_no_difference -> { ActiveStorage::Blob.count } do
post rails_direct_uploads_url, params: { blob: blob_params }
end
assert_redirected_to new_session_url
end
test "create succeeds for an authenticated session" do
sign_in :david
assert_difference -> { ActiveStorage::Blob.count }, 1 do
post rails_direct_uploads_url, params: { blob: blob_params }
end
assert_response :success
end
test "disk show stays reachable without authentication" do
blob = ActiveStorage::Blob.create_and_upload! \
io: StringIO.new("hello"), filename: "hello.txt", content_type: "text/plain"
ActiveStorage::Current.set(url_options: { host: "once.campfire.test", protocol: "http" }) do
get blob.url
end
assert_response :success
end
test "disk update requires authentication" do
_blob, url = direct_upload_url_for("hello")
put url, params: "hello", headers: { "Content-Type" => "text/plain" }
assert_redirected_to new_session_url
end
test "disk update stores bytes for an authenticated session without a CSRF token" do
sign_in :david
blob, url = direct_upload_url_for("hello")
# Forgery protection is off in test by default; turn it on so this proves the
# signed-token service PUT stays CSRF-exempt even when the concern re-arms it.
with_forgery_protection do
put url, params: "hello", headers: { "Content-Type" => "text/plain" }
end
assert_response :no_content
assert_equal "hello", blob.download
end
private
def blob_params
content = "hello"
{ filename: "hello.txt", byte_size: content.bytesize, content_type: "text/plain", \
checksum: Digest::MD5.base64digest(content) }
end
def direct_upload_url_for(content)
blob = ActiveStorage::Blob.create_before_direct_upload! \
filename: "hello.txt", byte_size: content.bytesize, \
checksum: Digest::MD5.base64digest(content), content_type: "text/plain"
url = ActiveStorage::Current.set(url_options: { host: "once.campfire.test", protocol: "http" }) do
blob.service_url_for_direct_upload
end
[ blob, url ]
end
def with_forgery_protection
original = ActionController::Base.allow_forgery_protection
ActionController::Base.allow_forgery_protection = true
yield
ensure
ActionController::Base.allow_forgery_protection = original
end
end