Dependabot version updates are disabled for this repo, so the weekly
github-actions group never proposed these. The pins had been frozen since
March: zizmor-action v0.5.2 ships zizmor 1.23.1, which flags
secrets-outside-env at the default persona -- that moved to the auditor
persona in zizmor 1.24.0. v0.6.2 ships zizmor 1.29.0.
Both linters pass locally at the new versions.
* Take the SSRF address policy from surfguard instead of keeping our own copy
Four other apps carried this same classification and the five had drifted into
four different ideas of what "internal" means. It now comes from the surfguard
gem, which is their union. resolve and Violation keep their shapes, so the
opengraph callers are unchanged.
Two verdicts change.
SIIT (::ffff:0:0:0/96) is now recognised. It is the third way an IPv4 address
rides inside an IPv6 one and the only one Ruby has no predicate for --
ipv4_mapped?, ipv4_compat?, private?, loopback? and link_local? are all false
for ::ffff:0:a9fe:a9fe, so it fell through to the IPv6 branch unrecognised and
reached the metadata endpoint. Note the extra group: ::ffff:0:0:0/96 is not the
IPv4-mapped ::ffff:0:0/96 the guard already refused, and the two do not overlap.
The RFC 8215 local-use NAT64 block is now refused whole rather than decoded.
Reading its low 32 bits as an embedded IPv4 is only correct for a /96 Pref64;
the block can host any length from /32 to /96 and the position is not
recoverable from the address alone (RFC 6052 2.2), so the decode reads the
wrong octets. It is never globally routed, so refusing it costs nothing. The
well-known /96 is still decoded and re-checked, so DNS64 for public sites on
IPv6-only hosts keeps working.
Resolution moves from Resolv.getaddress to Resolv.getaddresses, so the guard
sees every address a host answers with rather than only the first.
* Distinguish a DNS lookup failure from a private-IP block in the guard
Advance the surfguard pin so resolve_public_ips raises Unresolvable when a
host resolves to nothing and returns an empty list only when it resolves to a
blocked address. The shim lets Unresolvable propagate as a lookup failure --
matching the old Resolv.getaddress behavior -- and reserves Violation for a
resolved-but-blocked address, so a transient DNS miss is no longer reported as
an SSRF attempt.
* Bump brakeman to 8.0.6
Brakeman 8.0.6 shipped 2026-08-12: corrected Rails 8.0 EOL date, added
Rails 8.1 and Ruby 4.0 EOL dates, and fixed command-injection false
positives.
brakeman's only runtime dependency is racc and its required ruby is
>= 3.2.0, both unchanged since 7.1.2, so this is a version bump with no
other movement in the graph.
* Give brakeman's --ensure-latest a 15-day grace period
Bare --ensure-latest exits 5 the moment a newer brakeman exists, so a
release turns this build red before anyone has a chance to react. That
is what happened on 2026-08-12 when 8.0.6 shipped.
The flag takes an optional minimum age in days and only complains once
the latest release is at least that old. 15 is the maximum it accepts;
brakeman rejects anything outside 1-15.
* Exempt brakeman from the dependabot cooldown
The grace period on --ensure-latest is only headroom if the bump lands
inside it. A weekly schedule plus a 7-day cooldown can take 14 days to
so much as open the PR, leaving a single day to merge it.
Excluding brakeman from the cooldown caps the delay at the weekly
schedule, comfortably inside the 15 days.
The advisory (email address spoofing via malformed RFC 2047
encoded-words, CVE-2026-63435) landed in ruby-advisory-db on
2026-08-18, turning the gem audit red since the audit pulls a live
advisory DB. 2.9.1 is the patch release for exactly this CVE.
Bots can only create. A lifecycle notification — an alert that fires and then
resolves, a deploy that starts and finishes, a backup that runs — therefore has
to post a second message, and the room becomes an append-only log of states
rather than a view of the current one.
Adds PATCH and DELETE inside the existing bot_key scope, routed to
Messages::ByBotsController. The body is read the way create reads it, so
updating a message is the same request shape as posting one.
No new authorization: both actions already run through ensure_can_administer,
and can_administer? grants access only to a record the user created, so a bot
key reaches that bot's own messages and no others. set_room narrows it again by
looking the room up through the bot's own memberships. A leaked bot key gains
what it could already do by posting: write to rooms that bot belongs to.
update answers head :ok rather than the redirect, which meant extracting the
update and its broadcast into update_message — calling super and then head
would double render, since the parent redirects inside the action. destroy
needs no split, because the parent renders implicitly like create does.
- Use jbuilder instead of hashes
- Use resource instead of direct HTTP verbs
Verbs only make sense if you have one or two routes, if there are
multiple that emulate what resource does then it's better to use resource.
- Paginate using link headers
- Cache responses
* Bump thruster 0.1.15 → 0.1.23
* Scrub disallowed attributes on allowed tags in message rendering
SanitizeTags removes disallowed tags from message presentation, but
attributes on the tags it allows passed through untouched. Extend the
content-filter chain with a SanitizeAttributes filter that runs Rails'
safe-list sanitizer over the remaining markup, stripping event-handler
attributes and unsafe URI schemes as defense-in-depth alongside the
existing Content-Security-Policy.
Running it after SanitizeTags with the same allowed-tags list makes the
sanitizer's tag pass a no-op, preserving SanitizeTags' remove-not-unwrap
semantics while scrubbing attributes. The attribute allowlist is the
standard ActionText set (which keeps attachments intact) plus class,
which presentation styling relies on.
UnreadRoomsChannel streamed from a hardcoded global name, and every message
published its room id to it. Any authenticated user, including one with no
memberships at all, could subscribe and watch which rooms were active and exactly
when, across every closed room and direct conversation on the account. The browser
filters ids it doesn't recognise, but that happens after delivery.
Its sibling ReadRoomsChannel is already scoped per user; this mirrors it, and
message creation fans the notice out to the room's members instead of broadcasting
it to everyone. No message content was exposed either way, only the timing.
Message content is delivered over turbo streams, which ran on the stock
Turbo::StreamsChannel. That channel verifies the signature on the stream name and
nothing else. The name carries no expiry and no binding to a user, so one read off
the page while a member kept working after the membership was revoked.
Revocation made this worse rather than better. Membership#after_destroy_commit
disconnects the user with reconnect: true, and the client replays its subscriptions
on the new socket: RoomChannel re-checks membership and rejects, while the turbo
subscription re-verified only the signature and was accepted.
RoomMessagesChannel re-checks membership on every subscribe, deriving the room from
the verified stream name so there is no parameter to point elsewhere. Since the
subscriber names the channel it wants, the stock channel would otherwise be a way
around that check, so it now turns these stream names away and this is the only door.
Rooms::DirectsController relaxes ensure_can_administer to true, because every
participant in a direct room may administer it. set_room was inherited unscoped,
though, so that relaxation applied to any room the caller was merely a member of:
DELETE /rooms/directs/<id> destroyed open and closed rooms and all their messages.
The same unscoped lookup let a direct room be loaded by the opens and closeds
controllers, where force_room_type promoted it. Promoting a DM to open grants every
user on the account membership and republishes the whole conversation, including the
other participant's messages; converting it to closed lets the initiator revise who
is in it and lock the other participant out.
Each controller now narrows room_scope to the types it may act on. Opens and closeds
keep reach into each other, since converting between them is a feature. Neither can
reach a direct room, and directs can only reach directs.
Room also refuses to change type away from Rooms::Direct, so the invariant holds for
any future caller of becomes! rather than only these two controllers.
By default, ONCE pauses the application container when taking a backup.
This guarantees a consistent snapshot of the data, but for a large
installation and/or a slow destination path (like a network mount), that
pause could be a bit disruptive to live traffic.
But ONCE also support a pause-free path: if a `pre-backup` hook is
present in the container, ONCE will run that and skip the pause. So by
supplying necessary hooks, we can avoid any disruption from backups.
- `pre-backup` runs the existing script/admin/prepare-backup, which uses
SQLite's online backup API to get a consistent snapshop.
- `post-restore` moves our snaphotted file back into place, and removes
the orphaned sidecar files
Nothing in the repository records that unrestricted bot webhook delivery is
deliberate, so the missing private-network guard reads as an oversight next to
the guarded unfurl path. Researchers report it as server-side request forgery,
repeatedly.
and add test coverage for (un)supported file types.
The avatar and logo variants move into the models and return nil for content
types that are no longer variable, so the controllers fall back to the initials
avatar and stock logo icon instead of raising `ActiveStorage::InvariableError`.
The guard uses IPAddr but relied on something else loading it first;
require it explicitly. And the rebinding tests lost their port assertion
when the matchers were loosened for newer Net::HTTP keyword args, so
check the port alongside the IP again.
The RFC1918, loopback, and link-local ranges in DISALLOWED_IPV4
duplicated the private?/loopback?/link_local? checks that run right
before the list scan, so they could never be the deciding factor. Keep
only the ranges the predicates don't catch.
Matches the fizzy guard: the local-use NAT64 prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48,
RFC 8215) embeds an IPv4 target in its low 32 bits just like the
well-known prefix, so run it through the same embedded-IPv4 recheck.
Local-use NAT64 to a public address now resolves (keeping unfurls
working for self-hosters on such networks) while local-use NAT64 to an
internal address stays blocked.
The local-use NAT64 prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215) embeds an IPv4
target like the well-known prefix does, but at a deployment-chosen
position we can't extract, so block the whole range outright.
Also block the IPv6 benchmarking range (2001:2::/48, RFC 5180) to match
the IPv4 benchmarking block on 198.18.0.0/15.
Net::HTTP now passes an open_timeout: option to TCPSocket.open, so the mock
that matched exact positional arguments no longer matches. Match on the
host instead.
The guard blocked the usual private, loopback, and link-local ranges (and
the IPv4-mapped/-compatible IPv6 forms), but let through NAT64, 6to4, and
Teredo addresses, which can point at an internal IPv4, and CGNAT.
Now it pulls the IPv4 out of a NAT64 address and checks that (so NAT64 to a
public site still works), blocks 6to4 and Teredo outright, and adds the
missing IPv4 and IPv6 ranges.
Fixes a heap buffer overflow in the JSON generator when streaming an
oversized object to an IO (JSON.dump(obj, io) / JSON::State#generate).
Affects json 2.9.0-2.19.8; patched in 2.19.9. Bumps to the current
2.20.0 line via `bundle update json --conservative` (lockfile-only).
GHSA-x2f5-4prf-w687 / https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54696
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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