* Upgrade runtime to Ruby 4.0.9
Ruby 4.0.9 fixes the Regexp compilation bug behind GitLab's
CVE-2026-110264. Move `.ruby-version`, `Dockerfile` and
`Dockerfile-export` to it.
ref: https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/10/23/ruby-4-0-9-released/
* Bump setup-ruby to v1.334.0 for Ruby 4.0.9
The pinned v1.327.0 and v1.324.0 did not know Ruby 4.0.9, so every CI
job failed at Ruby setup. v1.334.0 is the first release that does.
ruby:4.0.7-slim already ships ca-certificates 20250419+deb13u1, which removes
emSign ECC Root CA - G3 and AAA Certificate Services. Fail the build if either
root comes back in the store Ruby's OpenSSL loads.
Every page parsed the importmap and joined each of its URLs against the
request's base URL, about a millisecond of CPU a page, though the answer
changes only with the importmap and the host. Keep the last answer, keyed
by both. One entry, so a request with a made-up Host header can't grow it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Check a cable connection's session while it's open
Signing out or changing the password ends sessions and then disconnects
their connections. A connection that found its session just before isn't
subscribed to its disconnects yet, so it missed that and stayed open.
Each connection now looks its session up every minute while it's open, and
closes once the session is gone, asking the browser to reconnect so one
holding a current session comes back. That also covers any other way a
connection misses the disconnect, such as a subscription that takes long to
register, and a lookup that fails is simply tried again.
* Check the session on the server's heartbeat rather than a timer of its own
A connection's own timer could outlive it: closing can run before opening finishes, or a channel's teardown can fail before the connection's. The heartbeat only reaches connections that are open, so nothing is left to stop.
* Skip the session check on a rejected connection
A rejected connection stays registered until its socket closes, and has no session to check, so its heartbeat mustn't fail and stop the heartbeat reaching the connections after it.
If the password changes again between this browser's change and its new session, that session is refused, and the browser is sent to sign in instead of an error.
A password change ends every session, but a sign-in or sign-in link checked
against the old password just before the change could still save its session
just after, and that session outlived the change.
The session now checks, as it's saved, that the user's password is still the
one the request loaded. The save's transaction holds SQLite's write lock from
the start, so a change commits either before the check, which fails it, or
after the insert, and ends this session with the others. Sessions start
through the user's association so the check sees the user that was
authenticated, and a refused sign-in is answered like a wrong password.
The profile asked for the current password when the request's password
field was filled in. The check now follows the save itself: the model
checks the challenge whenever the password digest is about to change,
and the profile always hands it the challenge. Editing a name, avatar
or email without a new password still needs none, and scripts that
reset a password, which set no challenge, are unaffected.
Only a string counts as a challenge, and the rate limit counts every
non-empty one, so what's limited is exactly what gets checked.
The lookup under the write lock repeated the one made before
validation, so the query cache could answer it with that earlier miss
even after another connection had registered the endpoint. It runs
uncached now.
Enabling notifications unsubscribed the browser on any refusal, so a
session signed out between authenticating and saving lost the browser's
subscription too, and the next session had nothing to post. Only a
refused endpoint unsubscribes it now.
Only room pages posted the subscription again, so a browser that
changed its password and closed the profile page went without
notifications until it next opened a room. A small controller in the
layout does it now, still once per session, and the bell is back to how
it was.
Two tabs posting at once after a password change could both miss the
row and insert two, so the endpoint is looked up again under the same
write lock as the session check.
The browser is shared across system tests, and a script added to every
new document stays until it's removed, so later tests would have seen
the granted permission and the fake subscription too.
A push subscription belongs to the user, not a session, so a device
signed out by a password change kept getting notifications. Changing
the password now removes every subscription along with the sessions,
in the same transaction.
A browser still signed in keeps its own subscription in its service
worker, so the notifications controller posts it once per session: the
bell names the session by a digest of its id, never its token, and the
browser remembers the last one it posted for. That post never
unsubscribes the browser when the server refuses it.
A request that authenticated just before the change could put a
subscription back after it. The create action now checks the session
still exists and saves in one immediate transaction, after validating
the endpoint outside it.
Changing the password now ends every other session, so whoever holds
one could shut the owner out of their own account with a new password.
The profile asks for the current password whenever the password
changes; without it, or with a wrong one, nothing is saved and the page
says why. Other profile edits don't need it, and the admin
reset-password script still works without it.
Attempts are rate limited like signing in, 10 in 3 minutes per address,
so the current password can't be guessed here instead.
A transfer link signed only the user id, so one copied before the
password changed still started a session for up to four hours after.
Bind it to the password salt with generates_token_for, so a new
password ends those links too. Links made before this upgrade stop
working; they last four hours at most.
An after_commit condition reads the record's last save, so another save
of the user in the same transaction skipped the disconnect even though
the sessions were gone. The callback that deletes them now registers
the disconnect on the transaction itself, which also leaves a rolled
back change alone. A password changed along with the avatar is covered
too: the attachment's touch doesn't hide the change.
Keeping the session the password was changed from also kept any copy of
its cookie working, and a copied cookie is one of the ways someone else
gets into an account. Every session ends now, and the profile page
signs the browser that changed the password back in with a new one.
The sessions end wherever the password changes, but only the profile
page closed the live connections, so a change from a console left a
signed-out device receiving messages until it dropped. Close them after
commit from User, logging rather than failing if the realtime service
can't be reached, since the password is saved by then.
Changing the password is how someone shuts out whoever else is signed
in to their account, but every session opened with the old password
stayed valid. Now the others end and their live connections close, as
on sign-out. The session the password was changed from stays signed in.
Changing the password outside a request, as from a console, ends every
session.
An asset host's path can contain the asset directory too, as in
https://cdn.example.com/assets, and cutting each URL at the first one would
allow everything the host serves under it. Cut at the last one instead.
Behind a proxy that terminates TLS without X-Forwarded-Proto, Rails sees
http while the page is https, and an http source on a non-default port
doesn't match. A source without a scheme takes the page's own.
Uploads are served from this origin too, so script-src 'self' would run one
that a cache still holds under a script type from before the upload guard.
Application pages now allow each importmap URL up to its asset directory
(relative root and asset host included), the inline importmap by hash, and
the service worker by worker-src.
With DISABLE_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY=true there's no application policy,
and the hash callback started an empty one, so pages sent an empty
Content-Security-Policy header. Skip the callback then.
A request for several byte ranges gets a 206 multipart/byteranges whose
boundary the client needs to split the body. Rewriting it to
octet-stream lost the boundary. No browser runs that type as a script,
so it passes through.
Disk URLs are cached for an hour, but blob proxy URLs are cached
publicly and as immutable for a hundred years, so a copy taken that way
before the upgrade doesn't expire.
script-src 'self', object-src 'none' and base-uri 'self', enforced. The
two inline scripts the importmap helper emits are allowed by their
SHA-256, and the origins its URLs point to (a configured asset host, in
any form Rails accepts) are allowed by name. There is no per-request
nonce, so cached pages stay valid.
DISABLE_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY=true leaves the policy off, for an
install whose proxy or customization injects scripts.
Uploaded files come from this origin, so one served with a JavaScript
type could run as one of the app's own scripts. Browsers accept sixteen
spellings of that type, and Disk URLs sign the type they were minted
with, so refusing a list of types at upload can't cover links already
out there. Instead, a middleware rewrites the type of anything Active
Storage reads out that isn't plainly media, a PDF or plain text to
application/octet-stream, whatever the URL says.
That's exactly what it was given before, with quotes and apostrophes
left as they are, rather than relying on its own sanitize pass to undo
h's '. Covers an email address with an apostrophe.
A <pre> whose text starts with a newline needs one more written out to
survive being parsed again, as the html5 serializer does with
preserve_newline. Without it, linking text dropped one more of a code
block's leading blank lines than rendering did before.
Replying swaps each mention in the quoted copy for its text. Assigning
that text to outerHTML parsed it as html; replace the mention with a
text node instead.
auto_link finds URLs and email addresses with regular expressions over
the rendered html, which can't tell an attribute value from text, so it
could put a link inside an attribute. Hand it each text node on its own,
escaped, after the final sanitize, so links only ever land between tags.
Bump the presentation cache versions so nothing rendered the old way is
served again.
The rejection cases built plain Net::HTTP connections that were also
unpinned or proxied, so they failed the guard either way. They're built
as WebPush::Connections::HTTP now, so each fails only for its stated
reason, and a pinned, direct, TLS plain Net::HTTP is refused for being
one. The error says which class is required.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebPush::Connections mixed Stages into each new connection with
`http.extend Stages` just before starting it. The connection is built in
one place, WebPush::PersistentRequest, so it can be built from a class
that already includes Stages: the same method lookup, without giving
every pooled connection its own singleton class. Connections#request
now also refuses a connection that isn't one, so a caller that builds a
plain Net::HTTP gets the ArgumentError rather than a connection whose
failures can't be told apart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Opengraph::Fetch connects to the IP it checked, not to a fresh lookup of
the host. With http_proxy set, Net::HTTP would instead send the hostname
to the proxy, which looks it up again, so the connection could end up
somewhere other than the checked address. Pass nil as the proxy address,
as web push delivery already does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Apply the Laravel implementation’s MessageWriter architecture to Rails creation: save native Action Text and attachment metadata, insert the search entry and update unread memberships in the message transaction. Keep notification jobs after commit and preserve Room#receive and existing serialized jobs.
Cover native HTML/mentions, attachment-only search, derived-write failures, outer rollback and SQL commit ordering. Updates and destruction retain their current indexing behavior.
ensure! now rechecks trigger presence under BEGIN IMMEDIATE, backfills
drifted rooms.messages_count, and reinstalls all three triggers before
commit so concurrent writers and concurrent boot repairs cannot observe
a partial install or keep a wrong total. install! uses the same
immediate write lock for drop/recreate. Lifecycle regressions cover
missing/partial trigger drift, concurrent ensure!, and writes racing
repair.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
Drop the explicit fixture list and prepend module. Override load_fixtures
only long enough to ensure! + backfill after alphabetical fixture load.
Move destructive trigger DDL into its own test file so parallel CI workers
do not strip triggers from the counter examples.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
Require all three SQLite triggers before treating the counter as installed,
drop the schema.rb / dump-rewrite install paths in favor of rake ensure after
schema load, isolate destructive trigger tests, and cover foreign room moves
plus fixture baseline counts.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
X-Total-Count on GET /rooms/:id/:bot_key/messages was COUNT(*) of the
room on every page. Serve it from rooms.messages_count updated by SQLite
triggers so Rails, bulk SQL, and foreign writers stay in step — without
ActiveRecord counter_cache callbacks those paths skip.
Fixes#309.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
stop joins until the contender finishes so before_fork never inherits an
open flock or SQLite connection. Skip acquire when the database file is
missing, and sleep if with_database no-ops after a race.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
Keep the module under lib/rails_ext, use before_worker_boot, shorten the
SQLite busy timeout under stop's join, and PASSIVE-checkpoint on exit for
short-lived writers.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
Unify startup: initializer starts every non-test process, Puma and Resque
stop before fork and start again in the child. Only the contender thread
releases the lock. Drop Puma::CLI / single_puma_process? special cases.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
Disable wal_autocheckpoint and run PASSIVE checkpoints from one elected
writer process. Contenders start in console/rake (initializer), Puma
workers (including WEB_CONCURRENCY=auto), and Resque children, with
failover, capped error backoff, and tests for lock takeover.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
Banning a user deletes their sessions and closes their connections but
keeps their push subscriptions, and Room::MessagePusher chose recipients
by membership alone. A banned user's browser or phone therefore went on
receiving the room name, sender and text of new direct messages,
mentions, and messages in rooms they had set to everything.
Choose subscriptions from active users only. The subscriptions are kept,
so unbanning brings notifications back without the user having to
subscribe again (the client doesn't resubscribe while the browser still
holds a subscription).
Co-authored-by: Marcello Costagliola <176920116+namespaceMarcello@users.noreply.github.com>
Transfer the C completed-response cache lesson into Rails, keeping authentication, room checks and cookies per request. A persistent read-only SQLite observer detects local and foreign commits and rejects racing admission. Whole-page misses render fresh to avoid stale nested fragments; message ETags reflect token-neutral presentation.
Every message rewrote the row of every disconnected member of the room,
including the ones who were unread already and stay unread. Open rooms
take in the whole account, so in steady state that is every member on
every message: 325 WAL pages per post at 10,000 members, against 16 when
only the members who had read the room are written.
Directs keep touching all their members: a direct's sidebar row is
cached by its membership and carries the room's recency, so it has to
be refreshed on every message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017dFSDHrgrLoBELwjV3Qunq
* Derive message DOM ids from the server id, not client_message_id
A message's DOM id was derived from the browser-chosen client_message_id
via a Message#to_key override, so dom_id(message) was
"message_<client_message_id>". Turbo's append de-dups by DOM id, so a room
member who posted a message reusing a victim's client_message_id displaced
the victim's message element in every connected member's live view; editing
the attacker's own message then broadcast onto the victim's presentation id.
Drop the to_key override so every message DOM id and broadcast target derives
from the record's primary key. Two distinct records can no longer share a DOM
id regardless of stored client_message_id, so the collision is impossible with
no data migration and no uniqueness constraint. to_param and the fragment
cache key already used the primary key, so message URLs and per-message cache
entries are unchanged.
The composer's optimistic pending message still uses client_message_id as its
placeholder DOM id, which no longer matches the server broadcast's PK-based id.
Reconcile instead by rendering data-client-message-id on the real message and
having the messages controller drop the matching pending placeholder on
connect. Only client-side placeholders (data-pending-message) are removed, so a
message another member posts reusing the same client_message_id can never
displace a real one through the reconciliation path either.
Also point the boost broadcast target at the PK-based dom_id(message, :boosts)
to match the rebuilt container id.
GHSA-3v99-4vxh-xg84
* Bust cached message fragments rendered with client_message_id DOM ids
The message fragment cache keys on the record and the template digest, and
removing the to_key override changes neither. Fragments cached by an earlier
release would keep their message_<client_message_id> ids, so edit, delete and
boost broadcasts, which now target primary-key ids, would miss those messages
in other members' live views until the cache entry expired.
* Locate messages by record id in the client_message_id collision tests
Assert on data-message-id rather than the new primary-key DOM ids, so the tests
describe the behavior instead of the fix and fail on the vulnerable code for the
real reason. Edit the attacker's message to new text and wait for it to arrive,
so the edit path is exercised rather than passing vacuously. Add a request test
that two messages sharing a client_message_id render as distinct elements.
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Daer <jeremy@37signals.com>
QrCodeController#show is open without signing in and decodes its id as
URL-safe base64. An id that isn't base64 raised ArgumentError, and a
URL longer than a QR code holds raised QRCodeRunTimeError, so both
answered 500 and reached error reporting as server errors. Answer them
with 400 instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LwoX7uRy5vFZSNKJhSqMSG
The Rust port creates index_messages_on_room_id_and_created_at on boot,
under the same name and on the same columns, with CREATE INDEX IF NOT
EXISTS. On a database the port opened before this migration ran,
db:prepare stopped with "index ... already exists" and the app didn't
start. With if_not_exists the migration skips an index that is already
there and creates it everywhere else.
Databases that already ran the migration don't run it again, and the
dumped schema is the same, so db/schema.rb doesn't change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LwoX7uRy5vFZSNKJhSqMSG
The Rust port creates index_messages_on_room_id_and_updated_at on boot,
under the same name, with CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS
(basecamp/once-campfire-rust#45). On a database the port has opened,
this migration stopped db:prepare with "index ... already exists" and
the app didn't start. With if_not_exists it skips an index that is
already there and creates it everywhere else, and the dumped schema
stays the same.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LwoX7uRy5vFZSNKJhSqMSG
Showing an image's preview when its variant had already been made tied the cached message to state
that changes without touching it: a variant made after the message was cached would never show. It also
cost a query per embedded image, since Action Text loads the embeds without their variant records.
Nothing in the app makes those variants, so the partial no longer looks at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bj8KnxpTf9sj2Ysa8aLAVa
Files are posted as a message's own attachment, and the composer puts none in the rich text: it permits
only mentions and link embeds. The server still keeps any attachment whose signed id resolves, a blob
included, and Action Text's blob partial links to a representation URL that makes the preview on the
first request, without the limits the POST has, and on every request while it fails.
The app's own partial shows an image's preview only if it was already made, and otherwise the file's
name and size, as it does for a file that isn't an image. The cached presentation's version goes up,
since Action Text renders the partial by name and the template digest doesn't see it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bj8KnxpTf9sj2Ysa8aLAVa
ActiveStorage::Preview#processed? is true as soon as ffmpeg's frame is attached, but the poster is a
variant of that frame and can fail on its own: the POST rescues a Vips::Error and leaves the frame
attached. The view then emitted the poster's URL, and every view retried the resize. It now checks the
variant too, from the variant records with_attached_attachment already preloads.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bj8KnxpTf9sj2Ysa8aLAVa
A video's preview and a picture's thumbnail are made inside the request that posts the message, and
nothing bounded how long either could take.
- The video preview filter also selects any frame from 5 seconds on. Rails' filter takes the second
frame it selects, which a video with a single keyframe and no scene change only gives at its end, so
ffmpeg decoded all of it.
- TimeLimitedVideoPreviewer gives ffmpeg 10 seconds of wall-clock time, kills it past that, and reports
a failed preview, so the message is posted without one.
- Pictures and videos above 250 megapixels, or whose size couldn't be read, get no preview: decoding
costs in proportion to the pixels, however small the file.
- The view shows a preview only if it was made when the message was posted. Its URL used to make it on
view, so a preview that failed or was skipped would be attempted again on every view. The cached
presentation's version goes up, so cached messages pick this up.
- A video's poster is made, when the message is posted, at the size the view shows it. The full-size WebP
made until now wasn't shown anywhere, and encoding it costs in proportion to the frame's pixels.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bj8KnxpTf9sj2Ysa8aLAVa
Deleting the memberships with delete_all skips Membership's after_destroy_commit, which resets a member's
connections when one membership is revoked. Until the job ran, a member who had the room open kept its
streams, and a message that still landed in the room (a request already past the membership check, a bot's
reply) reached them. The request now reads the members' ids in the transaction that deletes their
memberships, and the job resets their connections before it destroys the messages. It costs a Redis round
trip per member, about 1.5 s for 10,000, so it's done in the job rather than in the request.
User#grant_membership_to_open_rooms read the open rooms and inserted in a separate statement, so a user
created while a room was being closed could read it as open and be granted it after the close. It's now a
single insert ... select, which SQLite runs under the write lock, skipping duplicates as insert_all did.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bj8KnxpTf9sj2Ysa8aLAVa
The deadline in Opengraph::Fetch started after the lookup of the pasted
host, and an unfurl looks up more hosts outside any fetch: the canonical
URL's, and the image's, once to check its content type and again to
validate it. Each of those waits as long as the resolver takes to give
up. Move the deadline up to UnfurlLinksController, around everything the
link leads to; Opengraph::Fetch keeps its per-operation timeouts and
makes no retries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bj8KnxpTf9sj2Ysa8aLAVa
Room#destroy destroyed every message inside the room's own
transaction, which holds SQLite's write lock until the last one: on a
room with many messages, every other write in the app waited and
failed. The request now takes the room away from its members and
leaves the rest to Room::DestroyJob, which destroys the messages one
at a time, each in its own short transaction, and then the room.
An open room is closed in the request, so that someone who joins the
account before the job ends isn't given it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bj8KnxpTf9sj2Ysa8aLAVa
Opengraph::Fetch runs inside POST /unfurl_link, against a host the member
picked, with Net::HTTP's defaults: 60 s to connect, 60 s for each read, and
one retry of the GET. A per-read timeout doesn't bound a host that sends a
byte at a time, in its headers or its body, so nothing limited how long a
fetch could hold the request thread.
Give each operation 7 s, as Webhook does, turn off the retry, and put the
whole fetch, redirects included, under one 10 s deadline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bj8KnxpTf9sj2Ysa8aLAVa
Only a failure while Net::HTTP checks a reused idle socket means the
push service closed it, and a new connection can take the push. A
failure while connecting again, such as a certificate for another
name, or before the request is written on a new connection, is raised
as it is, so the subscription is invalidated as before. After the
request is written, a dropped connection raises ConnectionLost on new
connections too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
Since push delivery was pinned to the IP resolved and guarded for it,
every push opens a new TCP and TLS connection: Net::HTTP::Persistent
looks the host up itself and can't be pinned. The handshake is one or
two extra round trips for every push.
WebPush::Connections keeps the pinned connections open for 30 seconds
and hands one out again only to a delivery whose own, fresh resolution
returned the same address for the same host. Net::HTTP only ever
reconnects to that address, so no request goes to an address the guard
didn't just approve. A connection the push service closed while idle is
replaced before the push is written; once it's written, a dropped
connection raises ConnectionLost instead of sending the push twice or
invalidating the subscription. A delivery without a resolved IP is no
longer sent at all, and net-http-persistent goes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
Rails 8.2 compiles HTML templates through Herb in strict mode, so a
template that doesn't compile fails to render. herb:check boots the app,
which loads ruby-vips, hence libvips.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rails main (e3d5c569) moves Campfire's pin forward ten months. Because
Campfire loads the 8.2 framework defaults, the ones added since then take
effect too, among them header-only forgery protection, Herb as the HTML
template engine, strict Accept headers and immediate blob analysis.
Changes it needed:
- Minitest 6 has no minitest/unit; the test helper no longer requires it.
- Rack::Sendfile is no longer in the middleware stack; DebugLocks goes
before ActionDispatch::Executor, as the Rails guide now says.
- Time::DATE_FORMATS is deprecated; :epoch is registered through
ActiveSupport::TimeFormats.
- Channel test subscriptions expose stream_names; streams is private.
- sentry-rails declares its Action Cable handle_open and handle_close
wrappers private, which Rails 8.2 calls from outside the connection, so
no /cable connection succeeded. An initializer makes them public until
getsentry/sentry-ruby#2972 ships (issue #2975).
- Lexxy renders editor content through Rails' editor adapter when Rails
has one, which asks a mention for its editor partial. It is the same
users/mention partial the mention prompt already inserts.
- redis-client moves to 0.30.1: Rails main's Redis cache store, which
production uses, requires 0.28.0 or later, and assets:precompile
(the Docker build) aborted on 0.25.2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit b4d3880a3d88059dd5b0b884f1f5f1a6f82aa95c)
Rails main compiles HTML templates through Herb under the 8.2 framework
defaults, which Campfire loads. Herb rejects `case` and its first `when`
in a single ERB tag, so the three pwa/ partials failed to compile, and
`herb:check` rejects ERB output in attribute names, which the account
settings' switch used for `checked`. Give `case` its own tag and build
the switch with tag.input; both render the same under Erubi.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 244e77241b)
An attachment message is indexed by its file name, and the update
action still accepts a new attachment. Active Storage clears
attachment_changes in its own after_commit, which runs before this one,
so the replacement is noted in before_update.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
Pages of messages load them with_presentation, which preloads each
message's boosts with their boosters and avatars, but the boosts partial
asked for message.boosts.ordered: a new query for every message, and the
preloaded boosts went unused. Sort the preloaded boosts in Ruby. The
boosts frame, whose message comes without them, still queries them in
order with their boosters.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
Boosting and unboosting touch the message, so after_update_commit
rewrote its row in the full-text index with the same text, loading the
rich text again to rebuild it, on every boost. The index only needs a
new row when the rich text body was saved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
Each push notification carries the subscriber's unread room count as its
badge. The pool built it per subscription, loading the user and counting
their unread memberships: two queries for every subscriber, all in the job
before the deliveries reach the threads. With 1,000 subscribed members the
job spent ~180 ms and 2,000 queries there; with 5,000, a second.
The pool now counts the unread rooms of a whole batch with one grouped query
and hands each subscription its badge; nothing else in the notification needs
the user. The queries still run before the work is posted to the threads,
which run outside the Rails executor. Push::Subscription#notification still
counts by itself when no badge is given, as for the test notification.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
Every boost had its own fragment, nested inside the message fragment that
already holds it. With a cold cache, a read and a write per boost plus a
read_multi and a write_multi per message: a room page of 40 messages with
120 boosts takes ~410 ms instead of ~290 ms. Redis runs without persistence
(config/redis.conf), so every page is cold after a restart.
A boost touches its message, so adding or removing one rewrites the message
fragment anyway. The inner fragments only paid off when a message with many
boosts was drawn again, and there they hid a lookup per booster. The boosters
are now loaded with the boosts, one query per message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
The job picks the room's members once and then publishes to them one at a
time, as the request did before it. A member who opens the room during that
loop gets the read event in their other tabs and then the older notice,
which marked the room unread again. Both events now carry the server time,
and the sidebar ignores a notice dated before the room's latest read. The
notice still moves a direct room to the top.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
Administrators see banned users in the account settings, but only the
first page counted them: the next pages listed active users alone. A
banned member before the page boundary shifted the offset, so one active
member was never listed. Both pages now share User.visible_to.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
Since administrators were grouped apart from members (b52c318), the account
settings page loads every user to split them and renders all of them. The
lazy next page still starts at the 501st user, so on an account with more
than 500 people, scrolling down lists those users a second time.
Load administrators on their own and page only members, both on the settings
page and on the pages that follow it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0142qgjggdJ2KDdGk7RF9Xm9
Directs merge Room.directs and order by recency. Shared rooms reuse
with_ordered_room and without_direct_rooms, with the STI filter coming
from Room.without_directs so the join alias stays rooms.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
Chaining without_direct_rooms with with_ordered_room joined rooms as
`room` while still ordering on `rooms.name`. Load shared rooms in one
scope instead.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
Load visible direct memberships ordered by room recency and other
rooms ordered by name, instead of hydrating every membership and
splitting them in Ruby.
Fixes#307.
Co-authored-by: Thomas Klemm <github@tklemm.eu>
Every room visit and every reconnection asks for the messages updated
since the page was rendered. That query filtered the room by updated_at
and sorted it by created_at, so SQLite walked every message in the room:
about 220-360 ms in a room of a million messages. An index on
(room_id, updated_at) finds the few updated messages directly.
Sorting on +created_at keeps SQLite on that index once messages are also
indexed by (room_id, created_at): with both, the planner otherwise walks
the room in creation order looking for updated rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JVFo3Lt9T8M5NR7KxVvsZ2
The thumbnail or video preview is generated while the message is posted.
When ffmpeg or libvips can't decode the file (a truncated upload, an .mp4
holding only audio), the error escaped after the message had been saved:
the request failed with a 500, the message was never broadcast, and the
sender's upload stayed at 100% while the rest of the files in that drop
were never sent. Posting the message without a preview keeps the file and
lets everyone see it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JVFo3Lt9T8M5NR7KxVvsZ2
Opening a direct room looked for an existing one by loading every direct
room on the account and comparing its member ids in Ruby, two queries per
room, on each click. The cost grows with the account: about 0.3 s at 1,000
direct rooms and 3 s at 10,000. Asking SQL for the room among the first
user's memberships whose member set is exactly the given users finds the
same room in one query, however many direct rooms there are.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JVFo3Lt9T8M5NR7KxVvsZ2
A bot's reply becomes a message when the status is 200 and the type is text,
and an attachment otherwise, but the attachment branch never looked at the
status. Whenever a bot's endpoint failed, its error page landed in the room as
a file: a proxy's 502 page as attachment.html, a 404 as attachment.text.
Apply the text branch's 200 check to attachments too. The error reply test
answered without a content type, which skipped the attachment branch, so it
now answers with an HTML error page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JVFo3Lt9T8M5NR7KxVvsZ2
Search showed the last 100 matches by created_at, so SQLite collected every
message containing the words and sorted them before keeping a page. A common
word in a large account meant sorting most of its history on every search.
Ordering by the full-text index's rowid, which is the message id, lets SQLite
walk the index from the newest match and stop once the page is full.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JVFo3Lt9T8M5NR7KxVvsZ2
Rails main compiles HTML templates through Herb under the 8.2 framework
defaults, which Campfire loads. Herb rejects `case` and its first `when`
in a single ERB tag, so the three pwa/ partials failed to compile, and
`herb:check` rejects ERB output in attribute names, which the account
settings' switch used for `checked`. Give `case` its own tag and build
the switch with tag.input; both render the same under Erubi.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Now that the unread fanout runs in a job, it can run after a member has
already opened the room and moved on to another one. Their sidebar would
then mark the room unread for a message they have seen.
The job now notifies only members who still have the room unread or are
in it now. Room#receive marks members who aren't in the room unread, and
opening the room clears it, so a member who caught up in the meantime is
skipped. When the
job runs right away this is the same set of people as before, except
members who have hidden the room, whose sidebar doesn't list it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JVFo3Lt9T8M5NR7KxVvsZ2
install-edge.svg lives in app/assets/images/external/, alongside the
other install icons, but the Edge branch of pwa/_install_instructions
asked for it at the top level. Propshaft raises MissingAssetError, so a
browser the useragent gem reports as Edge got a 500 on the profile page
and anywhere else the partial renders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The flash icons were followed by `</span>` with no opening tag.
Browsers discard them, so nothing renders differently, but HTML-aware
tools such as Herb report them as errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`as: "json"` is a @rails/request.js option; plain fetch ignores it and
sends `Accept: */*`, so Autocompletable::UsersController answered with
its HTML format and response.json() threw. The new ping form never
showed any suggestions. Send an explicit Accept header instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
link_to passed `action: "soft-keyboard#open"` as a plain option, so it
rendered as an `action` attribute, which Stimulus never reads. The link
in messages/_actions.html.erb already passes it under `data:`; this one
now does too, so tapping "Add a boost" on a touch device opens the
keyboard for the boost form as the menu's link does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The composite index doesn't serve everything the room_id one did. In
SQLite that index is (room_id, rowid), so it also reads a room's messages
in id order, and it is the narrower one to count a room with. Keeping both,
as memberships already does, leaves those lookups as they were.
The migration was named after local time, two hours ahead of the UTC
timestamp Rails generates; it now carries a UTC one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NuTtwJKhb77Dv7EQqv2C3C
Since the unread rooms stream was scoped per user, posting a message
publishes the room id once to each member of the room. Each publish is a
round trip to Redis, made one after another inside the request, so the time
to post a message grows with the size of the room and in a big room is far
more than the rest of the request.
The fanout now runs in Message::BroadcastUnreadRoomJob, so the poster no
longer waits for it. Who gets the notice and what it says are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NuTtwJKhb77Dv7EQqv2C3C
The search box keeps only word characters, but FTS5 still reads AND, OR,
NOT and NEAR in the query as operators, so searching for "AND" or for
"salt AND" raised "fts5: syntax error" and answered with a 500. Quoting
each word makes FTS5 look for it as text, which is how it already treats
the same words in lower case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NuTtwJKhb77Dv7EQqv2C3C
The original room shows its welcome box until it holds more than a page of
messages, and paged? answered that with a COUNT(*) over every message in
the room on each visit. Asking whether there is a row past the first page
answers the same question while reading at most a page of index entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NuTtwJKhb77Dv7EQqv2C3C
Every page of a room's messages (opening the room, scrolling back, the
refresh after reconnecting, the bot API) selects WHERE room_id = ? ORDER BY
created_at LIMIT 40. With only the room_id index, SQLite reads every
message in the room and sorts them in a temporary B-tree to return 40, so
these requests grow with the room's history.
A composite index on (room_id, created_at) lets SQLite read the 40 rows in
order straight from the index. It covers every lookup the room_id index
served, so that one goes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NuTtwJKhb77Dv7EQqv2C3C
* Document other Campfire implementations and benchmarks
* Remeasure README benchmarks with the latest Ruby optimizations
* Shorten the README benchmark context
* Preload only uncached messages and reduce rendering overhead
* Keep benchmark summaries without raw JSON results
* Use Ruby benchmark drivers and keep generated results out of the repo
The composer editor carries the lexxy-content class, so the !important
list rules for message bodies hit the menu's ul and li too, leaving the
items cramped and pushed in from the left.
The editor keeps an attachment's content as it finds it, so a hand-written
embed with a url but no href reached the editor with its markup unvalidated,
and a mention saved under Trix's editor carried the generic octet-stream
content type the editor doesn't permit and was dropped on save. Rebuilding
each attachment from its attachable renders the hardened preview partial
and restores the mention content type.
Main strips a javascript: href from a preview node before it's parsed, so
tell legacy Trix attachments apart by their filename instead. escapeHTML
moved to the string helpers, and the unfurling system test now drives
the Lexxy editor.
The companion to #279: the same per-instance `extend` appeared in
test/lib/rails_ext/action_text_attachables_test.rb. `attachable_sgid` is
`to_sgid(expires_in: nil, for: ActionText::Attachable::LOCATOR_NAME).to_s`,
so mint that directly; the minted bytes and the assertion are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agent worktrees under .claude/worktrees are whole extra checkouts of
this repo, and the build context picks them up. .claude is local
session state and never belongs in an image.
Moves the pin from the pre-release 910be91 (0.1.0) to 59e278c, the v0.2.0
tag Fizzy already runs. The default policy now admits IPv6 only inside
IANA-allocated unicast prefixes instead of default-allowing reserved and
unallocated space. No call-site changes: both shim entry points take the
new policy keyword's default.
The invalid-sgid test made one live Room attachable — `rooms(:pets).tap
{ |r| r.extend ActionText::Attachable }` — only to call
`attachable_sgid` on it. That method is `to_sgid(expires_in: nil,
for: ActionText::Attachable::LOCATOR_NAME).to_s`, so the test can mint
the same sgid directly and drop the per-instance extend; the assertion
(a signature that does not verify resolves to MissingAttachable) is
unchanged, and so are the bytes it tampers with.
Link previews fetch a page's OpenGraph title and description, and
Opengraph::Metadata strips tags from both before the values reach the
browser. When a field consists entirely of a markup tag, stripping
leaves it blank, the metadata fails its presence validation, and the
unfurl endpoint returns no content, so no preview is produced.
Add regression tests at the model and controller layers that pin this:
a title or description made only of a markup tag is stripped to blank
and rejected, and the endpoint answers 204. The existing sanitize tests
only cover fields that keep non-blank text after stripping, so this
blank-and-rejected path was previously untested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
There were two: the one in dom_helpers escaped through a text node, which
leaves double quotes alone, so it could not have closed the hole in the
link preview's img src.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
Pasting a link builds the preview by interpolating the unfurled metadata
into an HTML string. The image URL went into src="..." unescaped, so a
page whose og:image carries a double quote closes the attribute early and
everything after it becomes attributes on the preview's img element.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
A domain name ends in a word, which is what keeps it from reading as an
address. "0x7f.0.0.1" carries a dot and a letter, so the previous shape
check let it through while a browser fetched 127.0.0.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
A browser rewrites the many spellings of an address into one before it
fetches, so "http://2130706433/rooms/1" arrives at 127.0.0.1 while a
comparison here still reads the digits. A preview names a page on the
public internet, so require its host to look like a domain name and leave
the rewriting race alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
The room caches each message's rendered presentation, and its key can't
see the link preview partial, which ActionText renders by name rather than
through a render call the digestor can follow. Without a new version, a
message already in the cache would keep its old preview.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
Ruby leaves a percent-escape in URI#host, so "https://%77ww.example.com"
read as a different host than the one Campfire answers on while a browser
unescaped it straight back to us. A host that carries an escape, or a
trailing dot, is now measured the way the browser will read it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
A preview belongs to the page it previews, so both URLs point somewhere
else. An absolute URL on our own host passed the scheme and host checks,
and every reader's browser fetched it with their session attached, which
turns a message into a GET request made on the reader's behalf.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
Ruby parses "https:/rooms/1" as an HTTPS URL with no host, and a browser
resolves it against whatever origin Campfire is served from, so the scheme
check alone still let a message body aim the preview at a path here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
A link preview's link and image come from attributes on the message body,
which the composer fills in from the unfurl the server performed. A body
written by hand can put anything in those attributes, and the preview
partial rendered them as they were.
Keep the link and the image only when they parse as absolute http or https
URLs, so nothing in a message body can aim either one at another scheme or
at a path on this Campfire, and render the title and the description as
text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186eyzivcTn6wqjEE4Wnxdt
The bot HTTP API carries the bot key as a URL path segment
(/rooms/:room_id/:bot_key/...). config.filter_parameters redacts query
and form parameters but never path segments, so the key was written
verbatim to the request log (the "Started POST ..." line) and to any
log line echoing the pagination Link header.
Add a log formatter that redacts the bot-key path segment wherever it
appears in a formatted line, and wire it into the production logger.
Action Cable authorizes a Connection once at the WebSocket handshake and
never re-checks it. Destroying the session record refuses future handshakes
and HTTP requests bearing the cookie, but a socket opened before sign out
keeps its handshake-time current_user and keeps authorizing new
subscriptions and delivering frames as the signed-out user.
Reset the user's remote connections when the session is terminated. Clients
tear down and reconnect: the signed-out device carries a destroyed session
and cleared cookie and is rejected at the fresh handshake, while the user's
other devices with still-valid sessions reconnect and stay live. This reuses
the existing reset_remote_connections primitive already used on membership
removal, for the same reason.
Run the disconnect last and best-effort, after the session record and cookie
are already gone, so sign out completes even when the realtime service is
unreachable.
Active Storage mounts its direct-upload write endpoints -- POST
/rails/active_storage/direct_uploads and the disk-service PUT at
/rails/active_storage/disk/:token -- on framework controllers that inherit
from ActiveStorage::BaseController, so they never pass through
ApplicationController's require_authentication. Anyone who can read the
public login page can lift a CSRF token and Rails session cookie, POST to
the metadata endpoint, and receive a signed disk PUT URL without holding a
Campfire session_token.
That is enough to allocate ActiveStorage::Blob rows and persist bytes to
disk anonymously. The blobs stay unattached (no message can be created
without an account) and nothing purges them, so an unauthenticated caller
can grow storage without bound. Because the recommended self-host layout
co-locates uploaded files and the SQLite database on one /rails/storage
volume, that growth eventually makes database writes fail -- blocking login
and messaging until an administrator frees space and purges the blobs.
Campfire uploads attachments through MessagesController as a normal
multipart POST and does not use direct uploads at all, so these endpoints
have no legitimate anonymous caller. Require a valid Campfire session
before the metadata endpoint allocates a blob or the disk endpoint accepts
an upload; both return 401 to anonymous callers. Serving (disk#show,
representations, blob redirects) is unchanged.
* Guard push-subscription endpoints against SSRF
Web push delivery POSTed to the endpoint URL a user supplied when
registering a subscription, with no scheme, host, or private-network
check -- unlike the OpenGraph unfurl path, which already routes through
the shared SSRF address policy (surfguard). Any authenticated user could
register a subscription whose endpoint pointed at an internal address and
have the server fetch it on every chat message: blind SSRF for internal
recon and reachability probing, plus a thread-pool DoS on the delivery
pool.
Validate the endpoint when the subscription is saved: it must be HTTPS,
its host must belong to a known browser push service (allowlist), and it
must resolve to a public IP. On every delivery, re-resolve the host and
pin the connection to that public IP so a later DNS rebind can't redirect
the request to an internal address. If no public IP resolves at delivery
time -- a rebind, or a subscription that predates this validation --
delivery is skipped rather than falling back to re-resolving the raw
host.
Adds model, controller, and delivery-pinning tests, plus a DNS stub
helper for deterministic resolution in tests.
* Route push endpoint guarding through RestrictedHTTP::PrivateNetworkGuard
The endpoint SSRF check already delegated its private-network classification
to surfguard, but called Surfguard.resolve_public_ips directly rather than
through RestrictedHTTP::PrivateNetworkGuard -- the hostname-in, address-out
shim #241 established as the app's single guarded-outbound entry point and
that Opengraph::Fetch resolves through. Route push resolution through the same
guard so once-campfire keeps one place that resolves and classifies outbound
addresses. Behavior is unchanged: the guard raises Violation when a permitted
host resolves only to blocked addresses (previously an empty list -> nil) and
propagates Surfguard::Unresolvable for a host that resolves to nothing; both
map to a nil endpoint IP, which fails validation and skips delivery. The
allowlist, HTTPS/443 constraints, and per-delivery IP pinning are unchanged.
* Address push-SSRF review: defer DNS off enqueue path, disable proxy on pinned path, revalidate on re-registration
- Resolve the guarded endpoint IP lazily inside WebPush::Notification#deliver
(on the bounded delivery worker) instead of eagerly when the notification is
built on the serial enqueue path, so a slow resolver can't stall the push job
before any delivery starts. resolved_endpoint_ip only reads the already-loaded
endpoint attribute, so it is safe off the AR connection.
- Pin the delivery socket with an explicit nil proxy address so http_proxy/
https_proxy can't route the request through a proxy that re-resolves the host
and defeats the ipaddr pin.
- Revalidate an existing subscription on re-registration so a row predating
endpoint validation gets the same 422 as a fresh create instead of being kept
alive by touch.
- Regression tests: resolution deferred to delivery, pin survives proxy env,
legacy invalid row rejected with 422.
* Bound the web-push delivery queue (max_queue, not the ignored queue_size)
Concurrent::ThreadPoolExecutor takes :max_queue; :queue_size was silently
ignored, leaving the delivery backlog unbounded (max_queue: 0). A flood of
valid push subscriptions could accumulate queued deliveries without limit --
more acute now that each delivery task also resolves DNS. Using max_queue: 10000
activates the intended cap; overflow raises RejectedExecutionError under the
default :abort policy, which deliver_later already rescues (push is best-effort,
retried on the next message).
* Trim push-SSRF guard comments to match house style
Apply the review suggestions on the push-subscription SSRF guard: replace
the verbose rationale comments with terse one-liners (or drop them where
the code speaks for itself). No behavior change -- the Surfguard-shim
routing, per-delivery public-IP pin, and bounded delivery queue are
untouched.
Three pins, two values: Dockerfile said 3.4.5, Dockerfile-export said
3.4.7, .ruby-version said 3.4.5 — the export image had already been
bumped on its own and nobody noticed the other two lagging. Both
Dockerfiles carry a comment telling you to keep them in step.
3.4.10 is the current 3.4.x. CI resolves its Ruby from .ruby-version,
so this is the version the tests now run under.
v1.295.0 predates Ruby 3.4.10 — its baked-in version index stops at
3.4.9, so asking for anything newer fails with "Unknown version 3.4.10
for ruby on ubuntu-24.04". The next commit needs 3.4.10, and pinning
our Ruby to whatever an old action happens to know is backwards.
SHA verified against the v1.321.0 tag.
The base image tag is a build arg — `ARG RUBY_VERSION` plus
`FROM ruby:$RUBY_VERSION-slim` — and Dependabot's docker updater matches
literal tags, so this entry has never had anything to propose. It ran
green every week and reported nothing, which reads as coverage and
isn't.
No other repo in the fleet configures a docker ecosystem, and none
could: they all either interpolate a variable or pull from the internal
registry. Inlining the tag here to buy coverage would make this
Dockerfile the outlier instead, against Rails-generated boilerplate.
Ruby bumps stay a manual, human-decided step.
The docker block copied bundler's cooldown wholesale, but Dependabot only
accepts semver-major/minor/patch-days for ecosystems whose versions it
classifies as semver, and container tags aren't. One invalid property
invalidates the entire file rather than the block it sits in, so since
this config landed in #248 the version updater has not run for any
ecosystem at all:
Your .github/dependabot.yml contained invalid details
The property '#/updates/2/cooldown/semver-major-days' is not supported
for the package ecosystem 'docker'. (and -minor-, -patch-)
That is why #249's cooldown exclude for brakeman never took effect, and
why #250 had to bump the workflow linter pins by hand while every other
repo got a Dependabot PR. It also left `bin/brakeman --ensure-latest 15`
armed with nothing to disarm it: the lock pins brakeman 8.0.6, and CI
would have gone red roughly 15 days after 8.0.7 shipped.
Security updates were never affected — those don't read this file, which
is why the only four Dependabot runs here are single-gem security bumps.
docker keeps default-days, which is supported for every ecosystem.
Dependabot version updates are disabled for this repo, so the weekly
github-actions group never proposed these. The pins had been frozen since
March: zizmor-action v0.5.2 ships zizmor 1.23.1, which flags
secrets-outside-env at the default persona -- that moved to the auditor
persona in zizmor 1.24.0. v0.6.2 ships zizmor 1.29.0.
Both linters pass locally at the new versions.
* Take the SSRF address policy from surfguard instead of keeping our own copy
Four other apps carried this same classification and the five had drifted into
four different ideas of what "internal" means. It now comes from the surfguard
gem, which is their union. resolve and Violation keep their shapes, so the
opengraph callers are unchanged.
Two verdicts change.
SIIT (::ffff:0:0:0/96) is now recognised. It is the third way an IPv4 address
rides inside an IPv6 one and the only one Ruby has no predicate for --
ipv4_mapped?, ipv4_compat?, private?, loopback? and link_local? are all false
for ::ffff:0:a9fe:a9fe, so it fell through to the IPv6 branch unrecognised and
reached the metadata endpoint. Note the extra group: ::ffff:0:0:0/96 is not the
IPv4-mapped ::ffff:0:0/96 the guard already refused, and the two do not overlap.
The RFC 8215 local-use NAT64 block is now refused whole rather than decoded.
Reading its low 32 bits as an embedded IPv4 is only correct for a /96 Pref64;
the block can host any length from /32 to /96 and the position is not
recoverable from the address alone (RFC 6052 2.2), so the decode reads the
wrong octets. It is never globally routed, so refusing it costs nothing. The
well-known /96 is still decoded and re-checked, so DNS64 for public sites on
IPv6-only hosts keeps working.
Resolution moves from Resolv.getaddress to Resolv.getaddresses, so the guard
sees every address a host answers with rather than only the first.
* Distinguish a DNS lookup failure from a private-IP block in the guard
Advance the surfguard pin so resolve_public_ips raises Unresolvable when a
host resolves to nothing and returns an empty list only when it resolves to a
blocked address. The shim lets Unresolvable propagate as a lookup failure --
matching the old Resolv.getaddress behavior -- and reserves Violation for a
resolved-but-blocked address, so a transient DNS miss is no longer reported as
an SSRF attempt.
* Bump brakeman to 8.0.6
Brakeman 8.0.6 shipped 2026-08-12: corrected Rails 8.0 EOL date, added
Rails 8.1 and Ruby 4.0 EOL dates, and fixed command-injection false
positives.
brakeman's only runtime dependency is racc and its required ruby is
>= 3.2.0, both unchanged since 7.1.2, so this is a version bump with no
other movement in the graph.
* Give brakeman's --ensure-latest a 15-day grace period
Bare --ensure-latest exits 5 the moment a newer brakeman exists, so a
release turns this build red before anyone has a chance to react. That
is what happened on 2026-08-12 when 8.0.6 shipped.
The flag takes an optional minimum age in days and only complains once
the latest release is at least that old. 15 is the maximum it accepts;
brakeman rejects anything outside 1-15.
* Exempt brakeman from the dependabot cooldown
The grace period on --ensure-latest is only headroom if the bump lands
inside it. A weekly schedule plus a 7-day cooldown can take 14 days to
so much as open the PR, leaving a single day to merge it.
Excluding brakeman from the cooldown caps the delay at the weekly
schedule, comfortably inside the 15 days.
The advisory (email address spoofing via malformed RFC 2047
encoded-words, CVE-2026-63435) landed in ruby-advisory-db on
2026-08-18, turning the gem audit red since the audit pulls a live
advisory DB. 2.9.1 is the patch release for exactly this CVE.
Bots can only create. A lifecycle notification — an alert that fires and then
resolves, a deploy that starts and finishes, a backup that runs — therefore has
to post a second message, and the room becomes an append-only log of states
rather than a view of the current one.
Adds PATCH and DELETE inside the existing bot_key scope, routed to
Messages::ByBotsController. The body is read the way create reads it, so
updating a message is the same request shape as posting one.
No new authorization: both actions already run through ensure_can_administer,
and can_administer? grants access only to a record the user created, so a bot
key reaches that bot's own messages and no others. set_room narrows it again by
looking the room up through the bot's own memberships. A leaked bot key gains
what it could already do by posting: write to rooms that bot belongs to.
update answers head :ok rather than the redirect, which meant extracting the
update and its broadcast into update_message — calling super and then head
would double render, since the parent redirects inside the action. destroy
needs no split, because the parent renders implicitly like create does.
- Use jbuilder instead of hashes
- Use resource instead of direct HTTP verbs
Verbs only make sense if you have one or two routes, if there are
multiple that emulate what resource does then it's better to use resource.
- Paginate using link headers
- Cache responses
* Bump thruster 0.1.15 → 0.1.23
* Scrub disallowed attributes on allowed tags in message rendering
SanitizeTags removes disallowed tags from message presentation, but
attributes on the tags it allows passed through untouched. Extend the
content-filter chain with a SanitizeAttributes filter that runs Rails'
safe-list sanitizer over the remaining markup, stripping event-handler
attributes and unsafe URI schemes as defense-in-depth alongside the
existing Content-Security-Policy.
Running it after SanitizeTags with the same allowed-tags list makes the
sanitizer's tag pass a no-op, preserving SanitizeTags' remove-not-unwrap
semantics while scrubbing attributes. The attribute allowlist is the
standard ActionText set (which keeps attachments intact) plus class,
which presentation styling relies on.
UnreadRoomsChannel streamed from a hardcoded global name, and every message
published its room id to it. Any authenticated user, including one with no
memberships at all, could subscribe and watch which rooms were active and exactly
when, across every closed room and direct conversation on the account. The browser
filters ids it doesn't recognise, but that happens after delivery.
Its sibling ReadRoomsChannel is already scoped per user; this mirrors it, and
message creation fans the notice out to the room's members instead of broadcasting
it to everyone. No message content was exposed either way, only the timing.
Message content is delivered over turbo streams, which ran on the stock
Turbo::StreamsChannel. That channel verifies the signature on the stream name and
nothing else. The name carries no expiry and no binding to a user, so one read off
the page while a member kept working after the membership was revoked.
Revocation made this worse rather than better. Membership#after_destroy_commit
disconnects the user with reconnect: true, and the client replays its subscriptions
on the new socket: RoomChannel re-checks membership and rejects, while the turbo
subscription re-verified only the signature and was accepted.
RoomMessagesChannel re-checks membership on every subscribe, deriving the room from
the verified stream name so there is no parameter to point elsewhere. Since the
subscriber names the channel it wants, the stock channel would otherwise be a way
around that check, so it now turns these stream names away and this is the only door.
Rooms::DirectsController relaxes ensure_can_administer to true, because every
participant in a direct room may administer it. set_room was inherited unscoped,
though, so that relaxation applied to any room the caller was merely a member of:
DELETE /rooms/directs/<id> destroyed open and closed rooms and all their messages.
The same unscoped lookup let a direct room be loaded by the opens and closeds
controllers, where force_room_type promoted it. Promoting a DM to open grants every
user on the account membership and republishes the whole conversation, including the
other participant's messages; converting it to closed lets the initiator revise who
is in it and lock the other participant out.
Each controller now narrows room_scope to the types it may act on. Opens and closeds
keep reach into each other, since converting between them is a feature. Neither can
reach a direct room, and directs can only reach directs.
Room also refuses to change type away from Rooms::Direct, so the invariant holds for
any future caller of becomes! rather than only these two controllers.
By default, ONCE pauses the application container when taking a backup.
This guarantees a consistent snapshot of the data, but for a large
installation and/or a slow destination path (like a network mount), that
pause could be a bit disruptive to live traffic.
But ONCE also support a pause-free path: if a `pre-backup` hook is
present in the container, ONCE will run that and skip the pause. So by
supplying necessary hooks, we can avoid any disruption from backups.
- `pre-backup` runs the existing script/admin/prepare-backup, which uses
SQLite's online backup API to get a consistent snapshop.
- `post-restore` moves our snaphotted file back into place, and removes
the orphaned sidecar files
Nothing in the repository records that unrestricted bot webhook delivery is
deliberate, so the missing private-network guard reads as an oversight next to
the guarded unfurl path. Researchers report it as server-side request forgery,
repeatedly.
and add test coverage for (un)supported file types.
The avatar and logo variants move into the models and return nil for content
types that are no longer variable, so the controllers fall back to the initials
avatar and stock logo icon instead of raising `ActiveStorage::InvariableError`.
The guard uses IPAddr but relied on something else loading it first;
require it explicitly. And the rebinding tests lost their port assertion
when the matchers were loosened for newer Net::HTTP keyword args, so
check the port alongside the IP again.
The RFC1918, loopback, and link-local ranges in DISALLOWED_IPV4
duplicated the private?/loopback?/link_local? checks that run right
before the list scan, so they could never be the deciding factor. Keep
only the ranges the predicates don't catch.
Matches the fizzy guard: the local-use NAT64 prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48,
RFC 8215) embeds an IPv4 target in its low 32 bits just like the
well-known prefix, so run it through the same embedded-IPv4 recheck.
Local-use NAT64 to a public address now resolves (keeping unfurls
working for self-hosters on such networks) while local-use NAT64 to an
internal address stays blocked.
The local-use NAT64 prefix (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215) embeds an IPv4
target like the well-known prefix does, but at a deployment-chosen
position we can't extract, so block the whole range outright.
Also block the IPv6 benchmarking range (2001:2::/48, RFC 5180) to match
the IPv4 benchmarking block on 198.18.0.0/15.
Net::HTTP now passes an open_timeout: option to TCPSocket.open, so the mock
that matched exact positional arguments no longer matches. Match on the
host instead.
The guard blocked the usual private, loopback, and link-local ranges (and
the IPv4-mapped/-compatible IPv6 forms), but let through NAT64, 6to4, and
Teredo addresses, which can point at an internal IPv4, and CGNAT.
Now it pulls the IPv4 out of a NAT64 address and checks that (so NAT64 to a
public site still works), blocks 6to4 and Teredo outright, and adds the
missing IPv4 and IPv6 ranges.
Fixes a heap buffer overflow in the JSON generator when streaming an
oversized object to an IO (JSON.dump(obj, io) / JSON::State#generate).
Affects json 2.9.0-2.19.8; patched in 2.19.9. Bumps to the current
2.20.0 line via `bundle update json --conservative` (lockfile-only).
GHSA-x2f5-4prf-w687 / https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54696
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security bump for CVE-2026-47736 (PROXY Protocol v1 parser memory
exhaustion) and CVE-2026-47737 (PROXY v1 repeated headers). Not exposed:
PROXY protocol is opt-in via set_remote_address proxy_protocol:, which
campfire never calls — default remote_address :socket leaves the parser
unreachable. Thruster/kamal-proxy front campfire over HTTP X-Forwarded-*,
not PROXY protocol.
No 6.x fix exists, so this is a major v6→v7 bump:
- Gemfile pin "~> 6.6" → "~> 7.2", ">= 7.2.1"
- config/puma.rb needs NO changes — every DSL method used (threads,
worker_timeout, bind, environment, pidfile, workers, plugin
:tmp_restart) is unchanged in v7; tmp_restart.rb is byte-identical.
Behavior notes (no action): preload_app effectively defaults on for
clustered mode (safe — Rails eager-loaded in master, Membership.
disconnect_all handles pre-fork conns); persistent_timeout default
20→65s (internal keep-alive). Min Ruby 3.0; campfire runs 3.4.5.
Direct gem. 137 commits triaged, 0 mitigations. Verified green via full
unit + system suites (system tests boot Puma 7.2.1).
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-puma_v6.6.1..v7.2.1.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump clearing 3 advisories: GHSA-c4rq-3m3g-8wgx (High, CSS
selector tokenizer ReDoS), GHSA-v2fc-qm4h-8hqv (XSLT transform memory
leak), GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532 (unchecked xmlC14NExecute return). None
exposed: loofah/rails-html-sanitizer use DOM/XPath not CSS selectors,
every app CSS selector is a compile-time literal, and campfire uses no
XSLT or XML canonicalization.
The 1.18→1.19 minor bump is a Ruby-4-support/packaging milestone —
bundled libxml2 2.13.9 / libxslt 1.1.43 are unchanged, so HTML parsing
and ActionText sanitization output are identical. Ruby floor 3.2
(campfire runs 3.4.5); all 4 locked platforms still ship.
Transitive dep via Rails/loofah (no Gemfile change). 33 commits analyzed,
0 mitigations. Verified green via full unit + system suites.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-nokogiri_v1.18.10..v1.19.3.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump clearing ~11 CVEs (multipart parser differentials/DoS, Host
header validation, byte-range DoS, Forwarded injection, Rack::Static/
Directory/Sendfile disclosures). Reachable fixes (multipart uploads, AS
byte-range streaming, host parsing) apply transparently via corrective
behavior and generous new defaults; the Static/Directory/Sendfile/
Deflater CVEs are not reachable (campfire uses none of those middlewares).
No app changes required. Optional hardening noted in plan: new env knob
RACK_MULTIPART_PARSER_BYTESIZE_LIMIT (default 10 GiB) could be tuned to
campfire's real max attachment size — left at default here.
Transitive dep via Rails (no Gemfile change). 23 commits analyzed,
0 required mitigations. Verified green via full unit + system suites.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-rack_v3.2.4..v3.2.6.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2025-61921 (ReDoS via ETag header generation). Not
exposed: sinatra reaches campfire only through resque-web, which is never
mounted — config.ru runs plain Rails, no `require "resque/server"`
anywhere, so Sinatra::Base is never defined. Dead code at runtime.
Conservative update also bumped rack-protection 4.1.1 → 4.2.1 (same
monorepo); its shipped lib is byte-identical bar the version string.
Transitive dep (no Gemfile change). 14 commits analyzed, 0 mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-sinatra_v4.1.1..v4.2.1.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security fix for 3 stored/DOM XSS advisories in Trix:
GHSA-g9jg-w8vm-g96v (attachment attribute), GHSA-qmpg-8xg6-ph5q
(serialized attributes), GHSA-53p3-c7vp-4mcc (JSON deserialization
bypass in drag-and-drop).
EXPOSED: campfire's composer/editor use Trix for message bodies, and the
browser actually ran the hand-vendored vendor/javascript/trix.esm.min.js
pinned at 2.0.10 — which lacks the DOMPurify/isValidAttribute sanitizers.
The gem bump alone is a no-op for the browser; the real fix is
re-vendoring the ESM build:
- bump gem to 2.1.19 (Gemfile.lock)
- re-vendor vendor/javascript/trix.esm.min.js from Trix 2.1.19
(2.0.10 → 2.1.19; bundles DOMPurify 3.4.2, rangy 1.3.2)
- update importmap pin comment @2.0.10 → @2.1.19
89 commits analyzed. Verified green via full unit + system suites
(system tests drive the Trix composer via fill_in_rich_text_area).
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-action_text-trix_v2.1.15..v2.1.19.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump clearing 5 CVEs (CVE-2026-42245/42246/42256/42257/42258:
literal DoS, STARTTLS stripping, SCRAM DoS, command injection ×2). Not
exposed: all require acting as an IMAP client. net-imap is autoloaded by
mail only when retriever_method :imap is set; campfire configures no
retriever and has no inbound email — net/imap is never required.
Conservative update landed 0.6.4 (minor jump, dormant dep). Ruby floor
raised to >= 3.2.0; campfire runs 3.4.5. 206 commits triaged, 0
mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-net-imap_v0.5.12..v0.6.4.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2026-41316 (High, @_init deserialization guard
bypass via def_module/def_method/def_class). Not exposed: ActionView
renders via Erubi, not Ruby's ERB class; no def_* calls or Marshal of ERB
objects anywhere — vulnerable path absent.
Transitive dep (no Gemfile change). 24 commits analyzed, 0 mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-erb_v6.0.0..v6.0.4.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2026-45363 (High, empty-key HMAC bypass). Not
exposed: jwt reaches campfire only via web-push VAPID signing, which uses
ES256 (asymmetric ECDSA), not HMAC — the vulnerable JWA::Hmac path is
unreachable. web-push requires jwt ~> 3.0; minor bump, encode API
unchanged.
Transitive dep (no Gemfile change). 15 commits analyzed, 0 mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-jwt_v3.1.2..v3.2.0.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2026-33306 (integer overflow → zero KDF iterations
at Cost=31). Not exposed: JRuby-only bug; campfire runs MRI (Ruby 3.4.5),
no java platform in lockfile, ActiveModel default cost is 10-12.
Direct gem (no version constraint, unchanged). 33 commits analyzed,
2 no-action mitigations (constant-time password compare hardening on the
has_secure_password path) — auth tests green.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-bcrypt_v3.1.20..v3.1.22.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2026-35611 (High, ReDoS in Addressable::Template).
Not exposed: campfire never reaches Addressable::Template — runtime use
is geared_pagination's URI.parse; templates appear only in webmock test
stubs (all string/Regexp, never templates).
Transitive dep (no Gemfile change). 49 commits analyzed, 0 mitigations.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-addressable_2.8.7..2.9.0.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Security bump for CVE-2025-58767 (DoS on malformed XML). Conservative
update landed 3.4.4 (latest patch, above advisory floor of 3.4.2).
Test/build-only transitive dep (webmock→crack, selenium-webdriver);
absent from app runtime. 34 commits analyzed, 1 test-only mitigation
(no-root-element parse change) — verified green via full unit + system
test suites.
https://github.com/basecamp/37signals-hq/blob/main/upgrade-analysis/campfire-20260609-rexml_3.4.1..3.4.4.md🤖 Assisted by Claude
Adds a new endpoint that allows bots to add emoji reactions (boosts) to messages:
POST /rooms/:room_id/:bot_key/messages/:message_id/boosts
This enables bots to acknowledge messages with reactions like 👀 (eyes) when
mentioned, providing immediate feedback to users before generating a full response.
The endpoint:
- Validates the bot is a member of the room
- Validates the message exists in the room
- Broadcasts the boost to connected clients via Turbo Streams
- Returns 201 Created on success, 404 if room/message not found
Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev>
Changed `message.creator.role == "bot"` to `message.creator.bot?` per
Copilot code review. This is the idiomatic Rails pattern for enum checks
and consistent with how other role checks are done in the codebase.
Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev>
Fixed test bug identified by Copilot code review: pagination tests were
using Message.first and Message.last which could return messages from
different rooms than the test's @room (watercooler).
Now explicitly using messages(:fourth) and messages(:thirteenth) which
are fixtures belonging to the watercooler room where bender bot is a member.
Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev>
Both create and index now return HTTP 404 Not Found when a bot tries to
access a room it's not a member of. This is consistent with REST API
security best practices (not revealing resource existence) and ensures
read and write permissions are handled identically.
Changed create action to no longer call super (which rendered HTML) and
instead directly handle the request with proper JSON API error responses.
Added test to verify create returns 404 for non-member rooms.
Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev>
Added explicit RecordNotFound handling to return 404 when a bot tries to
read messages from a room it's not a member of. This matches the security
model used by the create action.
Added tests to verify:
- Bot gets 404 when trying to read from room it's not a member of
- Bot can successfully read from room it IS a member of
Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev>
Adds a new GET endpoint at /rooms/:room_id/:bot_key/messages that allows
bots to read messages from rooms they are members of.
The endpoint returns JSON with:
- Room info (id, name)
- Messages array with body (plain/html), created_at, and creator info
- Pagination info (oldest_id, newest_id, has_more)
Supports pagination via ?before=:id and ?after=:id query parameters,
consistent with the existing pagination in the messages controller.
This enables AI bots and other automated agents to understand conversation
context when responding to messages, rather than only receiving the single
message that triggered the webhook.
Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev>
* Add GitHub Actions audit job (actionlint + zizmor) to CI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Configure dependabot for GitHub Actions, bundler, and Docker
Batches all action updates into a single weekly PR. Adds cooldown
periods to all ecosystems.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add local GitHub Actions linting (actionlint + zizmor) to bin/setup and bin/ci
Install actionlint, shellcheck, and zizmor in bin/setup. Run both
linters as CI steps in config/ci.rb alongside existing style checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Pin all GitHub Actions to SHA hashes
Run pinact to pin action versions to specific commit SHAs,
preventing supply chain attacks from tag mutation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix high severity zizmor findings
- Suppress unpinned-images for redis service containers (digest
pinning is nontrivial for service containers)
- Move workflow-level permissions to job-level in publish-image.yml
(build gets full set, manifest gets only what it needs)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix medium severity zizmor findings
- Add persist-credentials: false to all checkout steps
- Add permissions: {} at workflow level in ci.yml
- Add job-level permissions (contents: read) to all CI jobs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix informational template-injection findings in publish-image.yml
Move steps.meta.outputs.tags from inline ${{ }} expressions to env
vars in both the manifest creation and cosign signing steps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Update brakeman to 8.0.4
bin/brakeman uses --ensure-latest which fails if not on the newest version.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds ipv4_mapped? and ipv4_compat? checks to PrivateNetworkGuard.private_ip?
to block SSRF bypass attempts using IPv6 address formats like:
- ::ffff:169.254.169.254 (IPv4-mapped)
- ::169.254.169.254 (IPv4-compatible)
These formats could previously bypass the link_local? check since Ruby
treats them as IPv6 addresses, not IPv4.
Ref: HackerOne #3481701
IMAGE_DESCRIPTION:Campfire is a web-based chat application with multiple rooms, direct messages, file attachments with previews, search, web push notifications, @mentions, and bot integrations. Single-tenant; production-ready image with web app, background jobs, caching, file serving, and SSL.
email_address:{"🇺🇸":"Enter your email address","🇪🇸":"Introduce tu correo electrónico","🇫🇷":"Entrez votre adresse courriel","🇮🇳":"अपना ईमेल पता दर्ज करें","🇩🇪":"Geben Sie Ihre E-Mail-Adresse ein","🇧🇷":"Insira seu endereço de email","🇯🇵":"メールアドレスを入力してください"},
password:{"🇺🇸":"Enter your password","🇪🇸":"Introduce tu contraseña","🇫🇷":"Saisissez votre mot de passe","🇮🇳":"अपना पासवर्ड दर्ज करें","🇩🇪":"Geben Sie Ihr Passwort ein","🇧🇷":"Insira sua senha","🇯🇵":"パスワードを入力してください"},
current_password:{"🇺🇸":"Enter your current password","🇪🇸":"Introduce tu contraseña actual","🇫🇷":"Saisissez votre mot de passe actuel","🇮🇳":"अपना वर्तमान पासवर्ड दर्ज करें","🇩🇪":"Geben Sie Ihr aktuelles Passwort ein","🇧🇷":"Insira sua senha atual","🇯🇵":"現在のパスワードを入力してください"},
update_password:{"🇺🇸":"Change password","🇪🇸":"Cambiar contraseña","🇫🇷":"Changer le mot de passe","🇮🇳":"पासवर्ड बदलें","🇩🇪":"Passwort ändern","🇧🇷":"Alterar senha","🇯🇵":"パスワードを変更"},
user_name:{"🇺🇸":"Enter your name","🇪🇸":"Introduce tu nombre","🇫🇷":"Entrez votre nom","🇮🇳":"अपना नाम दर्ज करें","🇩🇪":"Geben Sie Ihren Namen ein","🇧🇷":"Insira seu nome","🇯🇵":"お名前を入力してください"},
account_name:{"🇺🇸":"Name this account","🇪🇸":"Nombre de esta cuenta","🇫🇷":"Nommez ce compte","🇮🇳":"इस खाते का नाम दें","🇩🇪":"Benennen Sie dieses Konto","🇧🇷":"Dê um nome a essa conta","🇯🇵":"アカウントに名前を付ける"},
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dependabot[bot]
Mike Dalessio
Jeremy Daer
Sam RubyandClaude Opus 5.5
Jeremy Daer
Rosa GutierrezandClaude Opus 5.5
GPT on behalf of DHH
Thomas KlemmandAmp
Cursor AgentandThomas Klemm
Marcello CostagliolaandClaude Opus 5.5
Donal McBreenandJeremy Daer
Stanko Krtalić
David Heinemeier Hansson
Edward Tippett
Chris Oliver
Ronald Lokers
Kevin McConnell
Donal McBreen
Eric Hiler
John-Mason Shackelfordandopenhands
Mike Dalessio
Jason Zimdars
Ashwin M
Michael Halliday